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INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 1935, as nearly a year of congressional dispute
over the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Wagner Act)
drew to a close, Senator Robert F. Wagner invoked the most
hallowed of American political ideals in its defense. "[T]he national labor relations bill does not break with our traditions,"
Wagner affirmed of the law that would bear his name. "It is
the next step in the logical unfolding of man's eternal quest for
freedom.... Only 150 years ago did this country cast off the
shackles of political despotism. And today, with economic
problems occupying the center of the stage, we strive to liberate the common man ....,1 For Wagner, the right of workers
to organize and engage in collective bargaining that was guaranteed by the NLRA constituted nothing less than a fulfillment
of the nation's dedication to free institutions.
Yet the Wagner Act, of course, did break radically with
certain of the nation's most entrenched traditions. It controverted the codes of the common law and of classical liberalism,
both of which defined trade unions as the very antithesis of in2
dividual freedom as embodied in the rule of liberty of contract.
To confer legitimacy on the new legislation, therefore, its proponents located it within a different, yet even more deeply ingrained, American tradition: democratic government. "That is
just the very purpose of this legislation, to provide industrial
democracy," Wagner declared.3 The cornerstone of the Wagner
Act, as set forth in its central section, was workers' right to
1. 79 CONG. REc. 7565 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 2321 (1949) [hereinafter NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

2. Wagner himself criticized this legal and economic tradition. See id at
7565-67, reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2321,
2321-25. See generally WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOvEmENT 37-97 (1991) (discussing judicial nullification of
labor and other social legislation under the doctrine of freedom of contract in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS,
THE STATE AND THE UNIONS 36-59 (1985) (discussing judicial hostility to unions
in the nineteenth century).
3. National Labor Relations Board Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm on Education and Labor,74th Cong., 1st Sess. 642 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 Senate Hearings] (statement of Harvey J. Kelly, American Newspaper
Publishers Association), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 1617, 2028.
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"representatives of their own choosing."'4 In the years following the Act's passage, amidst fierce political and legal conflict
over its construction and amendment, the crucial right to
choose representatives came to hinge exclusively on a mechanism at the core of political democracy-the representation
election. "Industrial democracy" became synonymous with the
union election. 5
This Article examines the law governing union elections
from 1935 to the present. Focusing on the connection between
the electoral device and the right to representation, it deciphers
how the ideal of political democracy has shaped the evolution
of the law. It shows that union election rules bear the stamp of
an analogy between political representation and labor representation-an analogy that in turn has fostered the conception of
the union election as a contest between employers and unions.
This conception, the Article argues, has subverted labor's right
to representation, for it rests on a fiction of equality between
unions and employers as candidates vying in the electoral
arena. The model of political democracy provided the framers
of the Wagner Act with compelling language and imagery with
which to assail the problem of "economic despotism." Since
then, however, lawmakers have elaborated the political model
into a web of union election rules that obscures inequality in
the workplace.
Despite the election's centrality to contemporary labor law,
it has hardly been a focal point of legal scholarship. Only three
major studies center on union elections. 6 Notably, all of them
document the confusion and impotence of the rules regulating
elections. According to these studies, union election rules are
not only internally inconsistent 7 and based on assumptions contrary to empirical evidence,s they are also routinely violated
4. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452
(1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988)).
5. See infra Part I. As shorthand, this Article uses the term "union elections" to mean union representation elections. The term refers to elections
through which unions seek to represent employees, not to elections of union
officers. In contrast, the Article uses the term "political elections" to mean
elections of government officials. This distinction is not intended to suggest
that union elections do not involve political questions.
6. See JULIUs G. GETmAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECIONS:
LAW AND REALITY (1976); Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics
in RepresentationElections Under the National Labor RelationsAct, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 38 (1964); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to
Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
7. See Bok, supra note 6, at 42-45.
8. GETMAN FT AL., supra note 6, at 115-16. The Getman study attempted
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with near impunity.9 Yet the labyrinth of rules continues to
expand, growing increasingly complicated.
By exploring the founding purpose of the Wagner Act to
democratize the employment relation, and by following the
doctrinal implications of that conception, this Article offers a
new perspective on the muddle of contemporary labor law. Unlike previous scholarship, it examines how the election
emerged as the linchpin of the right to representation. It also
analyzes the fundamental legal tensions created by transposing
the device of the representation election from the political
realm into the workplace, probing the theoretical roots of the
legal failure disclosed by other studies.10 This Article traces
the contradictions and inefficacy of labor law to its legitimating
metaphor-the analogy between democratic politics and labor
representation. The core defect in union election law, it finds,
is the employer's status as a party to labor representation proceedings, a status contravening workers' express right to "repto test the Board's assumption that prohibited campaign conduct influences
voter behavior and concluded that the assumption is erroneous. Id. Subsequent scholars, particularly William Dickens, have contested Getman's findings. See Weiler, supra note 6, at 1784 & nn.50-54 (citing William T. Dickens,
Union Representation Elections: Campaign and Vote (1980) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)). A summary of
this and other research appears in Richard B. Freeman, Why Are Unions Faring Poorly in NLRB Representation Elections? in CHALLENGES AND CHOICES
FACING AMERICAN LABOR 45, 54-59 (Thomas A. Kochan ed., 1985). This Article does not take sides in this debate, and it presents no new empirical research. Rather, it points to empirical evidence demonstrating that the
particular reforms proposed would have an effect and, in the case of regulation
*ofcampaign conduct, argues that the rules should not be based on judgments
about effects. See infra at notes 104, 350, 362-63 and text accompanying notes
474-75.
9. Weiler, supra note 6, at 1778-81. Weiler's thesis, that unlawful employer opposition to union representation has played a major role in the decline of unionism, recently has been criticized in Robert J. LaLonde &
Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI.L. REV. 953 (1991). Weiler responds
in Paul C. Weller, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58
U. CHI. L. REv. 1015 (1991).
10. Bok cites a lack of empirical research as a possible explanation for the
incoherence of union election law. See Bok, supra note 6, at 40-41. Getman
and his colleagues performed this research, but they did not speculate on why
the Board has adopted rules based on faulty empirical assumptions. See
GETMAN ET AL., supranote 6, at 33-137. Weiler suggests that the primary barrier to meaningful reform is the assumption "that the employer is legitimately
entitled to play the same role in a representation campaign against the union
that the Republican Party plays in a political campaign against the Democrats." Weiler, supra note 6, at 1813. He criticizes this assumption, but does
not trace its origins. See id,at 1813-16.

1993]

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE

resentatives of their own choosing."'"
To focus on political metaphors, on analogies, is not to suggest anything intrinsically limiting about the language of democracy. Historians have shown the malleability of the
rhetoric of industrial democracy-how it was voiced by labor
insurgents a century ago, then adopted by Progressives such as
Louis Brandeis in the early years of this century, and then refashioned to advertise the corporate welfare programs of the
1920s.12 This Article does not argue that the analogy between
political and labor representation dictated the content of union
election rules. It does, however, treat the analogy as more than
a figure of speech. Analyzing how Congress, the courts, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), and partisans
of both labor and management deployed political metaphors in
construing the Wagner Act, this Article reveals the discursive
power of such metaphors to structure conceptions of union
election law. The political analogy facilitated a style of argument that presumed the equality of employers and unions as
players in the union election process. Within the changing configurations of twentieth-century politics, legislators and judges
have not only justified their law-making in democratic terms
but have also molded the rules to fit the potent image of industrial democracy.
By grafting representative democracy onto the employment relationship, the Wagner Act confronted lawmakers with
a new variant of a problem at the heart of liberal political theory-the problem of reconciling the dependence of wage earners with the personal independence deemed essential to
citizenship. The right to labor representation merged the asymmetrical worlds of the workplace and polity, uneasily joining
the hierarchies of the employment relation with formal civic
equality. The juncture was far from stable, as the discussion
below of the contradictory rules regulating employer speech
demonstrates.' 3 The political election failed to supply a coher11. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Thus, unlike Weiler, who attributes the failure of collective bargaining to the inefficacy of the remedies for unlawful employer activities, see Weiler, supra note 6, at 1787, this Article argues that lawful as well
as unlawful employer activity is distorting the process of labor representation.
12. See, e.g., DANIEL T. RoDGERs, THE WoRK ETmIc IN INDusTRIAL

AMERICA, 1850-1920, at 57-62 (1978); Steve Fraser, The 'Labor Question," in
THE RISE AND FALL OF TiE NEw DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 55, 58-59 (Steve

Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989); Nelson Lichtenstein, Introduction to INDUSTRIAL DEiMOCRACY: PAST AND PRESENT (Nelson Lichtenstein ed., forthcoming
1992) (manuscript at 2-23, on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
13.

See infra Part III.
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ent model for securing employees the freedom of the industrial
franchise and for containing undue employer influence. Challenging the logic of rules shaped by a simple political analogy,
this Article illuminates fundamental differences between the
systems of political and labor representation. In light of these
differences, it concludes that employers should be stripped of
any legally cognizable interest in their employees' election of
representatives.
The Article has four parts. Part I reveals how notions of
democratic government infused the debates over the Wagner
Act as well as its construction and amendment. It shows that
although representation was the centerpiece of the legislation,
the Act did not specify how workers would select their representatives. Rather, it was only amidst sustained opposition to
the project of "industrial democracy" that the Board construed
the Wagner Act to transform the government supervised election into the privileged method of forcing employers to recognize their employees' chosen representatives.
Part II focuses on the most perplexing and fundamental issue in union election law: the right of employers to participate
in their employees' election of representatives. It begins by
probing the problem of political enfranchisement and employee
dependence-a problem of longstanding concern to legal and
political theorists. It then analyzes how Supreme Court doctrine and legislative reform, drawing on the example of political elections, transformed employer campaigns from unfair
labor practices into protected speech and thereby assigned the
employer a status tantamount to that of candidate in the union
election.
Part III argues that the employer's anomalous presence in
the union election renders political analogies inapt, a conceptual mismatch that underlies much of the incoherence of the
law. It focuses on the tension between employees' free exercise
of the franchise and employers' rights of free speech. It reveals
how the Board, in regulating employer campaigns, first abandoned the political model for a scientific one, but then oscillated between the two. Likening union elections both to
freewheeling political contests and to experiments run under
stringently regulated conditions, the Board thus formulated a
jurisprudence that swung back and forth from countenancing
employer coercion to prohibiting employer speech, while also
ensnaring unions in its regulatory web.
Finally, Part IV critically scrutinizes the analogy between
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political and labor representation, peering beneath the level of
metaphor. It identifies crucial differences in the procedures,
functions, and results of political elections and union elections,
arguing for a more nuanced analogy between political and industrial democracy and describing the regulatory changes entailed in such a reconception. On account of the asymmetry
between representation elections in the workplace and the polity, Part IV concludes that employers should have no legally
sanctioned role in union elections.
I.

"INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY"

The ideal of industrial democracy figured prominently in
the legislative debates that preceded the passage of the Wagner
Act, and the Act cut deeply into employers' legal authority in
the workplace. But the statute did not spell out precisely how
the new system of labor representation was to operate. Only as
employers persisted in refusing union recognition, and as Congress moved to amend the Act, did the Board designate the key
mechanism of political democracy-the election-as the foundation of labor law. Once the election became integral to labor
representation, political metaphors gained heightened credence
and were voiced on all sides during subsequent debates over the
regulation of union elections.

A. THE WAGNER ACT
The National Labor Relations Act was a radical piece of
legislation, its precursors in the early New Deal notwithstanding.14 Indeed, its enactment is perplexing, for it drew virulent
business opposition and garnered only moderate support from
President Roosevelt.' 5 Historians have demonstrated that a
14. Karl Klare has called the NLRA "perhaps the most radical piece of
legislation ever enacted by the United States Congress." Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Originsof Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265 (1978). The Act's precursors
are discussed in IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
POLICY 18-83 (1950) and JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LA.
BOR RELATIONS BOARD 1-148 (1974).

15. Irving Bernstein stated that the Act "had qualities of a historical accident." IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS 787 (1970). Howell Harris also

asserts that the Act's passage "may have been quite accidental." Howell Harris, The Snares of Liberalism? Politicians,Bureaucrats,and the Shaping of
Federal Labour Relations Policy in the United States, ca. 1915-47, in SHOP
FLOOR BARGAINING AND THE STATE 148, 168 (Steven Tolliday & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 1985); see also BERNsTEIN, supra note 14, at 57-128 (describing business
opposition to and presidential ambivalence concerning the Wagner Act).
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complex of motives brought together the coalition that secured
the Act's passage. 16 At the forefront of the goals professed by
its proponents was democratizing the workplace, a goal that
17
Wagner and other legislators labeled "industrial democracy.'
The nonunion workplace was a despotic blot on the democratic landscape of the nation, contended diverse supporters of
the legislation in congressional hearings during 1934 and 1935.
Employing metaphors drawn from the sphere of politics and
government, they contrasted the status of the employee to that
of the citizen. As Robert L. Hale of the Columbia Law School
testified, without the NLRA an employee in a nonunion company was a "non-voting member of a society."' 8 An engineer in
the automotive industry cited the American Revolution as precedent, explaining that one of its main causes was "that we had
to live under a government without any voice in it ....[]n the
industrial field it is just about this way with us workers in Detroit now."'19 Wage earners had political rights, a local union official testified, but "[i]ndustrially they find themselves
practically disfranchised. '20 "In the midst of a political democ21
racy," he stated bluntly, "you have an industrial autocracy."
According to such arguments, the Wagner Act would enable workers to carry the rights of citizenship into the factory.
The Senate Report on the bill made explicit the analogy between industry and government, equating labor organization
16. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 112-28; GROSS, supra note 14, at
130-48; Kenneth Finegold & Theda Skocpol, State, Party,and Industry: From
Business Recovery to the Wagner Act in America'sNew Deal, in STATEMAKING
AND SociAL MovEMENTs 159 (Charles Bright & Susan Harding eds., 1984);

David Plotke, The Wagner Ac Again: Politics and Labor, 1935-1937, 3 STUn.
IN AM. POL. DEv. 105 (1989); Theda Skocpol, PoliticalResponses to Capitalist
Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal, 10
POL. & Soc'Y 155 (1981).
17. 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 642 (statement of Harvey J.
Kelly, American Newspaper Publishers Association), reprinted in 2 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 2028.
18. To Create a National Labor Board. Hearings on S.2926 Before the
Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Senate Hearings] (statement of Prof. Robert L. Hale, Columbia Law
School), reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 81.
19. Labor Disputes Act- Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm
on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1935) (statement of William E. Dennison,
Society of Designing Engineers), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 2473, 2570.
20. 1934 Senate Hearings,supra note 18, at 302 (statement of Richard W.
Hogue), reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 332.
21. Id. at 300, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 27, 330.
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with the political right to representation: "A worker in the
field of industry, like a citizen in the field of government, ought
to be free to form or join organizations, to designate representatives, and to engage in concerted activities." 22 In the words of
one congressman, "self-government through fairly chosen representatives" was an "inherent" American right. "This bill
does no more than guarantee that right to American labor."'2
Again and again, themes of democracy, self government,
and citizenship, rights of franchise, representation, and association were uttered in justification of the Wagner Act. The paeans to American political ideals and institutions rang forth as if
Independence Day were being celebrated. As Wagner later
averred, the right of labor representation was a fundamental
right of "democratic self-government," marking the "difference
between despotism and democracy." 24
Democratic ideals aside, there still remained the problem
of establishing the legality of the legislation. Here, too, proponents of the Wagner Act cast their arguments in political
terms. For example, the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
defended the bill's constitutionality not on the basis of the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce, the
argument later accepted by the Supreme Court, 25 but rather on
the basis of Article IV, section 4 of the United States Constitution, which guarantees that every state shall have "a republican
form of government. '26 Eschewing an abstract, formal notion
of the Constitution's political guarantee, the counsel for the
AFL told Congress that "the preservation of industrial democracy [was] essential to the preservation of a republican form of
22. S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1099, 1103.
23. 79 CONG. REC. 9691 (1935) (statement of Rep. Withrow), reprintedin 2
NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 3132. Senator Wagner later

echoed this point, saying, "[Tihere can be no more democratic self-government
in industry without workers participating therein, than there could be democratic government in politics without workers having the right to vote." Senator Robert F. Wagner, Address Before the National Democratic Forum (May
8, 1937), quoted in Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER Acr: AFrER TEN YEARs 5, 13 (Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945).
24. Keyserling, supra note 23, at 13. Protection of "the right to bargain
collectively," Wagner elaborated, is "the difference between democracy in industry on the one hand, and tyranny, or at best, benevolent despotism on the
other." 81 CONG. REC. 2940 (1937).
25. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
26. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; 1934 Senate Hearings,supra note 18, at 109
(statement of William Green, President, AFL), reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 139.
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government. '27
The principle of representation was the axis of both the industrial system ordered by the Wagner Act and the political
system ordered by the Constitution. Just as James Madison
had written in The FederalistPapers that representation was
the "pivot" of the American republic,28 so too Wagner deemed
it the "foundation" of collective bargaining.29 Through representation and collective bargaining, Wagner envisioned workers
participating in the creation of the laws of the shop. Accordingly, the Wagner Act gave the National Labor Relations Board
express authority to investigate questions regarding the "representation of employees" and thereafter to "certify" the workers' chosen representative. 30 A representative "designated or
become the
selected" by the majority of employees would then
"exclusive representative of all the employees."'31
Much of the criticism aimed at the Wagner Act concerned
its proscription of company unions32 and its stipulation that the
union selected by the majority constituted the "exclusive representative" of all employees. 3 3 In deflecting such criticism, Wag27. 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 109 (statement of William
Green, President, AFL), reprinted in 1 NRLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 27, 139.
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 386 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
29. 1935 Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 46 (statement of Sen. Wagner),
reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1373, 1422. Even
those who viewed the Wagner Act largely as a macroeconomic measure realized that representation was the key to its economic efficacy. The Director of
the National Emergency Council, Donald Richberg, explained that if "workers
in an enterprise have no voice in the determination of terms and conditions of
employment, there will exist a lack of economic balance, which will continually menace the stability of the economic system." 79 CONG. REc. 267 (1935),
reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1284, 1291.
30. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 449,
453 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1988)). The first precommittee
draft of the bill did not grant the Board authority to resolve questions of representation. This power appeared in the second draft, however, and remained
in the bill throughout the legislative process. Kenneth Casebeer, Drafting
Wagner'sAct Leon Keyserling and the Precommittee Drqfts of the Labor Disputes Act and the NationalLabor Relation Act, 11 INDuS. REL. L.J. 73, 79, 102,
104 (1989).
31. § 9(c), 49 Stat. at 453 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1988)).
32. The years immediately preceding the passage of the Wagner Act witnessed a boom in plans for employee representation created and controlled by
employers. Their detractors denominated such systems of representation
"company unions." BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 38-40.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 159. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 108-09 (summarizing
criticism of prohibition of company unions and establishment of exclusive representation). The only criticism asserted as vigorously as these two was that
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ner and other legislators returned to the model of
representative democracy, in particular to the principles of popular sovereignty and majority rule. Company unions ran cons4
trary to "genuine industrial democracy," argued Wagner.
Likening the guarantee of workers' rights to the creation of
American government, he asked: "When the employer hands
his workers a constitution, can there be real freedom or
choice?" 35 By the same reasoning, the highly controversial
clause regarding "exclusive representation" by an independent,
employee-selected union found its rationale in the basic principle of majority rule. In his congressional testimony, Edwin E.
Witte, an economics professor at the University of Wisconsin,
used an especially evocative partisan political analogy to deride
the idea that employers would voluntarily recognize whichever
unions their employees selected: "Now, that may, at first blush,
seem a fair position, but I submit, gentlemen, that exactly parallels the situation which would prevail, if, instead of you gentlemen here representing your respective States, all of the
people who voted for your opponents were represented by
them." 36 Both government and industry, Witte maintained, required a representative system premised on the will of the majority. The alternative was "pure anarchy. 3 7 The essence of
"industrial government" lay in the "fundamental principle of
democracy, majority rule."38s
Even though the Wagner Act revolved around the right to
representation, the legislation did not specify precisely how the
majority was to choose its representative. Section 9(c) of the
Act empowered the NLRB to resolve questions of representation either through "a secret ballot of the employees" or
through "any other suitable method to ascertin [sic] such reprethe Act prohibited only employer and not union coercion. See infra Part III.D
(discussing the argument for parity between employers and unions). Notably,
both majority rule and elections are distinctive to United States labor law. See
Derek C. Bok, Reftections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor
Law, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1394, 1426-30 (1971).
34. 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 309 (statement of John M.
Carmody, Chief Engineer, Civil Works Administration), reprintedin 1 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 339.
35. 1935 Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 42 (statement of Sen. Wagner),
reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1373, 1418.
36. 1934 Senate Hearings,supra note 18, at 243 (statement of Prof. Edwin
E. Witte, University of Wisconsin), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HSTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 273.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 244, reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 27, 274.
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sentatives."3 9 Apparently, the openness of this provision did
not trouble trade unionists. But such an ambiguous deviation
from the strict procedures used to elect political representatives
was not lost on critics of the legislation. Partisans of management were especially alarmed, alleging a threat to the democratic process, testifying that only a secret ballot was "fair" and
"free from [union] coercion. ' 40 According to the Vice President
of General Motors, "The rule of 'and other suitable method' is
entirely too vague to be workable and is subject to grave
abuse. '41 The chair of one employee representation plan asked,
"What other method is more suitable than by secret ballot
. . . ?"142

In parrying these criticisms, Wagner ultimately sidestepped
the problem of defining "any other suitable method" and sorting out exactly how it would fit into the scheme of choosing labor representation. He staunchly defended the democratic
nature of the procedures laid out in the legislation, but so as
seemingly to read the maligned provision out of the law. His
defense put primacy on the sanctity of elections: "[A]s to ...
representation of the workers you cannot have any more genuine democracy than this. We say under Government supervision let the workers themselves ... go into a booth and secretly
39. § 9(c), 49 Stat. at 453 (footnote omitted) (current version at 29 U.S.C
§ 159(c) (1988)). The NLRB's authority to certify union representatives in the
absence of an election was consistent with the practice of labor boards established under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. In a February 1934
Executive Order, President Roosevelt made explicit the labor boards' authority to determine either "upon investigation, or as the result of an election, that
the majority of the employees of an employer ... have selected their representatives." Exec. Order No. 6580, § 2 (Feb. 1, 1934), reprinted in 1 N.L.B vii
(1934). Although the entire section containing this provision was deleted less
than a month later, Exec. Order No. 6612-A (Feb. 23, 1934), reprinted in 1
N.L.B viii (1934), in March of 1934, the National Recovery Administration issued a release stipulating that in investigating representation, an election "is
not the exclusive method.., and need not be employed except in those cases
where no other adequate method exists." LEWIS L. LORWIN & ARTHUR
WUBNIG, LABOR RELATIONS BOARDS 157 n.31 (1935) (quoting NRA Release No.
4118 (Mar. 29, 1934)).
40. 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 532 (statement of Ralph F.
Foster), reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 566.
41. 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 605 (statement of John T.
Smith, Vice President, General Motors Corporation), reprinted in 2 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 1991.
42. Id. at 659 (statement of Clifford U. Cartwright, Secretary-Chairman,
Employees' Representation Plan, Oklahoma Pipe Line), reprinted in 2 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 2045. He urged that the words
"'any other suitable method' should be stricken." Id. at 658, reprinted in 2
NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 2044.
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vote, as they do for their political representatives in a secret
'43
ballot, to select their choice."
"[This] is what I call the tenets of democracy," Wagner affirmed.44 Yet the Wagner Act did not designate the government-supervised election the sole means by which workers
could choose representatives within the new framework of industrial democracy. Thus the question of whether the method
of exercising the right to labor representation should be made
to square with political practice shifted to the Board and the
courts, becoming a flashpoint of controversy as soon as the Act
became law.

B.

REPRESENTATION AND ELECTIONS

During the first five years after the NLRB began operating
in 1935 it did not hesitate to certify unions as the "exclusive
representative" of employees in the absence of an election. It
issued 272 certifications, nearly a quarter of the total number,
45
relying on evidence other than the tally of a vote.
The procedure in such cases was straightforward. Certification depended upon proof presented at a trial-like hearing
rather than the outcome of an election. An employee or union
filed a petition requesting certification, the Board investigated,
and, if it discovered "a question" concerning representation,
held a hearing.46 At the hearing, if the union offered sufficient
evidence that employees had "already chosen" to be repre47
sented, the Board would certify the union without an election.
43.

Id. at 642 (statement of Harvey J. Kelly, American Newspaper Pub-

lishers Association), reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY,

supra note 1,

at 1617, 2028.
44. Id. at 679 (statement of E.R. Lederer, Chairman, Labor Subcommittee,
Planning and Coordinating Committee for the Petroleum Industry), reprinted
in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 2065. Wagner began
this remark, "[Y]ou have an election under government supervision... where
a man walks into the booth and selects his own representative." Id.
45. The Board certified 897 unions after conducting elections. The Board
conducted a total of 1060 elections. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 40 (1936); 2 NLRB
ANN. REP. 25 (1937); 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 40 (1938); 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 44
(1939); 5 NLRB ANN. REP. 26 (1940). These figures do not include cases settled
by the parties' agreement to hold an election.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1988). A "question" concerning representation existed if a substantial number of employees had expressed a desire to be represented and their employer had refused to recognize their representative. 1
NLRB ANN. REP. 26-27 (1936).
47. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 28 (1936). William M. Leiserson, Chairman of the
National Industrial Recovery Act's Petroleum Labor Policy Board, explained
that board's parallel policy during the hearings on the Wagner Act: "If there
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The Board found admissible diverse forms of evidence of the
majority's will. It relied on signed authorization cards, membership applications, petitions, affidavits of membership, signatures of employees receiving strike benefits from a union,
participation in a strike called by a union, and employee testimony at the hearing. 48
The Board certified unions in the absence of elections despite employer resistance to that procedure and the refusal of
many firms to accept their new legal obligation to bargain with
workers' chosen representatives. Employers contended that
they would abide by the Wagner Act if their employees chose
their representatives in a voting booth. In 1937, one management lawyer argued before the Board that his "[c]ompany
would be more willing to engage in collective bargaining with
the petitioning unions in the event a formal election conducted
by the Board should result in their favor. '49 The Board rejected the argument, however, certifying a union based on evidence of membership alone and thereby imposing a legal duty
on the employer to bargain with the union. 50
By the summer of 1939, however, as the tide of New Deal
reform ebbed, the Board came under intense political pressure,
and its practice of certifying unions without conducting an election drew especially fierce opposition. 5 ' The Board faced attacks from all sides-employers, 52 an antagonistic press, 53 an

is a strike in a plant where a thousand people are working and 900 go out, you
do not have to have an election to determine what the 900 want. They are telling you. It is silly to go through the election business then." 1934 Senate
Hearings, supra note 18, at 236, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 27, 266.
48. See, e.g., Woodville Lime Prod. Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 396, 399 (1938) (affidavits); Combustion Eng'g Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 344, 349 (1938) (participation in strike);
News Syndicate Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 1071, 1075-76 (1938) (applications); Wilmington
Transp. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 750, 753-54 (1937) (employees' testimony); Shell Chem.
Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 259, 264 (1937) (petition); Seas Shipping Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 398, 401
(1937) (signed cards); Richards-Wilcox Mfg. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 97, 100 (1936)
(union membership rolls); see also JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 20 (1981) (citing other NLRB decisions

relying on indicia of majority will other than election results).
49. Campbell Mach. Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 793, 799 (1937).
50. See id. at 798-800.
51. Louis Stark, Labor Board Quits Card Certification,N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 1939, at 5. See generally GROSS, supra note 48, at 1-225 (chronicling the
growth of political opposition to NLRB enforcement of the Wagner Act).
52. Prior to 1937, when the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality
of the Wagner Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937), employers contended that the Act exceeded Congress's power. The day
after the first meeting of the Board, 58 prominent lawyers issued a 132-page
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alliance of Republicans and southern Democrats,M the President,55 and even the AFL.m It was alleged to be biased against
employers, and to favor the Congress of Industrial Organiza-

tions (CIO), 57 and to be infiltrated by Communist sympathiz-

ers.58 Board personnel were summoned before a battery of
congressional investigators-the House and Senate Labor ComInittees and the Special House Committee to Investigate the
NLRB (the Smith Committee). 59 In 1939, at the height of the
statement on behalf of the American Liberty League declaring the Act unconstitutional. GROSS, supra note 14, at 172; Walter Gellhorn & Seymour Linfield,
Politicsand Labor Relations: An Appraisalof Criticisms of NLRB Procedure,
39 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 339-40 (1939). The full text of the statement is in Proposed Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2241-87 (1939) [hereinafter 1939
House Hearings]. Their statement was used as a model in many of the 95 actions employers filed to enjoin Board action between the summer of 1935 and
the spring of 1937 when Jones & Laughlin was decided. Gellhorn & Linfield,
supra, at 340 nA. Employers then turned to an attack on Board procedures.
The charges against the Board are set forth in Gellhorn & Linfield, supra, at
343-88.
53. For example, the American Mercury called the Board a "nightmare"
and Collier's labeled the NLRA the "Strained-Relations Act." Harold L. Varney, The Case Against the Labor Board, 43 AM. MERCURY 129, 129 (1938); Editorial, Collier's, Nov. 5, 1938, at 54. Board Chairman J. Warren Madden later
recalled, "[W]e got very little support from any newspaper or magazine which
would be regarded as influential." GROSS, supra note 48, at 73.
54. The New York Times described a "clamor of legislators against the
board .... ." Luther A. Huston, NLRB Under Fire in Congress, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 1, 1937, at 6E. A Republican senator castigated the Board as an "adjunct"
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), see Nye Criticizes the NLRB
as a "PartisanBody," N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1937, at 1, and a Democratic congressman from Mississippi accused the Board of "conspiring with communistic
influences to destroy Southern industries." Rankin Asks Labor Board Removal for "Red" Plot to Destroy Industry, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1937, at 1.
55. Reports of Roosevelt's dissatisfaction with the Wagner Act and its administration appeared as early as the summer of 1938. GROSS, supra note 48,
at 39.
56. At the 1937 AFL Convention, the Board and its agents "were raked
fore and aft in language seldom heard at American Federation of Labor conventions." Louis Stark, Speakers Score LaborBoard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1937,
at 1. The Convention unanimously adopted a report instructing the Executive
Council to assemble proof of the Board's misfeasance and authorized President
Green and the Council to petition President Roosevelt for "prompt and adequate relief." GROSS, supra note 14, at 251. At its 1938 Convention, the AFL
adopted a resolution calling for amendment of the Wagner Act to curtail the
Board's power. GROSS, supra note 48, at 65-66.
57. See, e.g., Varney, supra note 53, at 134-41, 146-50. Ten unions comprising the Committee for Industrial Organization were expelled from the AFL in
November of 1936 and formed the CIO. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 429.
58. THoMAs I. EMERSON, YOUNG LAWYER FOR THE NEw DEAL 133-34
(1991).
59. See GROSS, supra note 48, at 100-94 (describing the three committees'
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political storm surrounding the Board, with numerous amendments to the Wagner Act pending in Congress, 60 the Board, abruptly and without congressional direction, abandoned its
practice of certifying unions without an election. In the face of
bitter antagonism to its incipient efforts to impose a system of
representation on industry, the Board shifted course and resorted exclusively to the most unimpeachable democratic instrument-the election.
The Board signalled this change in Cudahy Packing Co.,61 a
decision issued in July, 1939. In Cudahy, the United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, Local 21 (Packinghouse Workers) filed a petition seeking to be certified as the representative
of all production and maintenance employees at the employer's
Denver-based meat packing facility.6 2 The Independent Packinghouse Workers Union of Denver (Independent Union), an
independent union that had been party to a collective bargaining agreement with the Company, intervened. 63 At the hearing, the Packinghouse Workers introduced membership cards
signed by 147 of the 157 employees and petitions signed by 141
employees. The Independent Union presented a petition signed
by forty-three employees in the unit.64 After considering this
evidence, the Board broke with precedent and refused to certify
the Packinghouse Workers without an election. The Board
stated that "[a]lthough in the past we have certified representatives without an election upon a showing of the sort here made,
we are persuaded by our experience that the policies of the Act
will best be effectuated if the question of representation which
investigative efforts). Both the House and Senate Labor Committees began
hearings on amendments to the Act during the early summer of 1939. Id- at
101, 103. Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia introduced a resolution to
create a special committee on June 22, 1939. The House adopted the resolution
on July 20. Id- at 104-05, 156.
60. By March, 1939, 11 major bills to amend the Act were pending in Congress. Id, at 79. A Gallup poll reported in the Washington Post that same
month found that 66% of those surveyed thought the Act should be amended
or repealed while only 34% thought it should remain unchanged. I&i at 80.
61. 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939). Cudahy was the first decision in which William Leiserson participated as a Board member. GRoss, supra note 48, at 106.
Roosevelt appointed Leiserson on April 25th in an effort to quiet criticism of
the Board or, in Leiserson's words, to "do a house-cleaning job" at the Board.
Id, at 90.
The very same day that the Board decided Cudahy, it issued a new set of
Rules and Regulations to take effect two days later which, among other things,
allowed employers to petition for elections. Id at 105.
62. Cudahy, 13 N.L.R.B. at 526-27.
63. Id at 527-28.
64. Id at 531.
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has arisen is resolved by secret ballot."'' Aside from the vague
allusion to "experience," the Board offered no explanation for
this decisive shift in the law.
The Cudahy ruling might have been explained by the conflicting evidence of support for the two rival unions admitted in
the case.66 But on the same day it issued the Cudahy opinion,
the Board also decided Armour & Co. 67 In Armour, only one

union claimed to represent the employees. Nevertheless, the
Board reiterated the rule announced in Cudahy and proceeded
expressly to adopt the employer's argument that an election
would induce management to be more amenable to bargaining,68 an argument the Board had rejected just two years earlier. 69 Without comment on its departure from precedent, the

Board spurned evidence of majority support and directed that
an election be held. It reasoned that "any negotiations... will
be more satisfactory if all disagreement between the parties regarding the wishes of the employees has been, as far as possible, eliminated." 70 In reporting the Board's rejection of
nonelectoral evidence of majority support, the New York Times
noted that "employers have refused to abide by [the Board's]
certification of representatives designated by examination of
membership cards."7' Thus, at a time of adverse scrutiny of
Board policy, employer resistance to certification by "any other
suitable method" prompted the Board to rely exclusively on the
device of the election.
Cudahy and Armour & Co. marked the end of the Board's
use of any method other than the election to determine workers' choice of representatives. 72 Between 1939 and 1947, the
Board's statutory power under section 9(c) of the Wagner Act
to recognize other evidence of majority sentiment lay dormant
as a matter of administrative policy. In 1947, with little debate,
73
Congress codified that restriction in the Taft-Hartley Act.
65. I& at 531-32.
66. The Board had earlier denied certification on these grounds. See, e.g.,
Pier Mach. Works, Inc., 7 N.L.R.B. 401, 404 (1938); Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 622, 630 (1937).
67.

13 N.L.R.B. 567 (1939).

68. I& at 569.
69. See Campbell Mach. Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 793, 799 (1937).
70. Armour, 13 N.L.R.B. at 572.
71. Stark, supra note 51, at 5.
72. The Board continued to certify based on nonelectoral evidence only if
the employer did not contest the evidence. 7 NLRB ANN. REP. 58 (1942).
73. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101,
§ 9(c), 61 Stat. 136, 144 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1988)).
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Section 9(c) was amended to read, "if... a question of representation exists, [the Board] shall direct an election by secret
ballot and shall certify the results thereof." 74 In one of the few
comments on the amendment, Senator Carl Hatch approvingly
observed that the secret ballot provision would bring labor law
into conformity with political elections: "This is merely an extension of our general voting practices to the field of labor organizations." 75 Along with a host of other restrictions, TaftHartley formally deprived the Board of the power it had al76
ready yielded to certify a union without an election.
Paradoxically, even after the Board began in 1939 to grant
the election privileged status in certification proceedings, it con77
tinued to rule that an employer could have a duty to bargain
with a union that had not won a Board-supervised election. If a
union could prove that it represented a majority at the time it
requested to bargain and was refused by the employer, the
Board would find that the employer had committed an unfair
labor practice and direct it to bargain. 78 Board practice in duty74. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1988). By contrast, the National Mediation
Board continues to have power under the Railway Labor Act to "take a secret
ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method of
ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representatives
" 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Ninth) (1988).
75. 93 CONG. REC. 5137 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1479-80 (1948)
[hereinafter LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

....

76. For a general discussion of the Taft-Hartley amendments, see HARRY
A. MILLIS & EMILY C. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER AcT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 395-

609 (1950); TOMLINs, supra note 2, at 252-316.
77. The question of whether an employer had a duty to bargain arose in
unfair labor practice cases. The NLRB, then and now, adjudicates two types of
cases: unfair labor practice cases and representation cases. In an unfair labor
practice case, the Board determines whether an employer or union has violated the prohibitions set forth in § 8 of the amended NLRA-including refusing to bargain-and, if it so finds, orders the offender to cease and desist and

to remedy the violation. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160(a)-(c) (1988). In a representation
case, however, the Board investigates whether employees wish to be represented. A representation case does not result in an order, but instead in the
certification of election results. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1988).
78. The contradictory rulings concerning the necessity of an election derived from two key provisions of the Wagner Act. Section 8(5) made it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with "the
representatives of his employees," subject to § 9(a). National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 8(5), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988)). Section 9(a) identified such representatives as those
"designated or selected" by a majority of employees. § 9(a), 49 Stat. at 453
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988)). Thus, § 9(a) of the Act, in speaking merely of "designated or selected" representatives, left unspecified how
representatives had to be chosen. Like § 9(c), which the Taft-Hartley Act later
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to-bargain cases, however, also came under legislative scrutiny.
During the debate over the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress considered but rejected an amendment to the NLRA that would have
required an employer to bargain only with a union certified af79
ter an election or already recognized by the employer.
Nevertheless, in the years after the Taft-Hartley Act was
passed, the Board moved on its own to extinguish employers'
obligation to bargain with unions that had not won Board-supervised elections.8 0 Indeed, in 1966 the Board held that the abamended, see § 9(c), 61 Stat. at 144 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)),
§ 9(a) did not prescribe the election as the sole method. In its first annual report, the Board explained that in unfair labor practice cases concerning an employer's refusal to bargain, an election was unnecessary if employees or the
labor organization could "produce satisfactory evidence of a majority." 1
NLRB ANN. REP. 89 (1936). In other words, a union could win the right to
become the employees' representative even though an election had not been
held.
Between 1935 and 1939, the Board relied on similar forms of evidence of
majority status in unfair labor practice cases under § 8(5) and representation
cases under § 9(c). Comparecases cited supra note 48 (nonelection evidence of
majority in representation cases) with Piqua Munising Wood Prods., 7
N.L.R.B. 782, 787 (1938) (relying on authorization cards to find duty to bargain), enforced, 109 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1940) and Globe Mail Serv., 2 N.L.R.B.
610, 620 (1937) (membership). After Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 562
(1939), however, Board rulings under the two provisions diverged. In Cudahy,
the Board rejected evidence such as membership cards and petitions as proof
of majority support in representation cases. Id. at 531-32. In contrast, after
Cudahy, the Board continued to rely on such evidence in refusal-to-bargain
cases. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 46 N.L.R.B. 180, 197-98 (1942) (applications); Franks Bros. Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 898, 910-11 (1942) (membership

cards).
79. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a)(5) (1947), reprinted in 1
LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 75, at 51, 51-52. The House Conference Report explicitly stated that § 8(a)(5) was intended to follow the provisions of "existing law." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41
(1947), reprintedin 1 LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 75, at 505, 545,
and in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135, 1147. A similar proposal had also been rejected
during the debate over the Wagner Act. See 1934 Senate Hearings,supra note
18, at 652-53 (statement of L.L. Balleisen, Secretary, Industrial Division,
Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 690-91. Again in 1977 and 1978, several proposals of
this nature were unsuccessfully introduced in Congress. See Gerald E. Rosen,
Labor Law Refor. Dead or Alive?, 57 U. DET.J. URB. L. 1, 33-34 (1979).
80. Initially, the Board shifted its focus from the question of whether the
union was the chosen representative when the employer refused to bargain to
the question of the employer's motive in refusing to recognize the union. In
Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced as modified, 185 F.2d 732
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951), the Board signalled the new
direction of the law. The Board posed the question as "whether an employer
is acting in good or bad faith at the time of the refusal," and it held that the
employer could refuse to bargain based on a "good faith doubt of the Union's
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sence of an election itself constituted valid grounds for an
employer to refuse to bargain. An employer, the Board ruled,
"will not be held to have violated his bargaining obligation...
simply because he refuses to rely upon cards, rather than an
's
election, as the method of determining the union's majority."'
Under the new, and still standing, Board policy, an employer may insist for any reason that a union seek an electioneven to gain time to persuade employees to abandon the
union-so long as the employer does not use unlawful means to
influence employees. The employer need not offer an affirmative reason for rejecting a recognition request; rather, "he can
82
demand an election with a simple 'no comment' to the union."
The Board now refuses to find a violation of the employer's
duty to bargain unless the employer has committed infractions
that would "interfere with the election processes and tend to
preclude a fair election." 83 Bringing duty-to-bargain cases in
line with the primacy of the election in representation cases,
the Board no longer aims to discover whether a majority of employees desired union representation when the employer refused recognition, but only whether the union had a fair chance
4
to prove majority support in a Board-supervised election.8
Under current law, neither in representation cases nor in
unfair labor practice cases may workers ordinarily designate
representatives by any method other than an election. 85 In
majority" but not in order to "gain time within which to undermine the
Union's support." Id. at 1264-65.
For the next 20 years, it remained unclear under which circumstances an
employer would be held to have violated § 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain with
a noncertified union. See generally Howard Lesnik, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without An NLRB Election, 65 MICH. L. REv. 851 (1967) (tracing
the development of Board law in this area). The rule was well established
that an employer could lawfully refuse to bargain with a union that actually
possessed majority support so long as the employer had a good faith doubt
about the union's support. See, e.g., Sunset Lumber Prods., 113 N.L.R.B. 1172,
1175 (1955). Less clear, however, was what evidence would suffice to demonstrate that the employer acted in bad faith. Some Board decisions at least suggested that an employer could not simply express doubt about a union's
showing of majority support without valid grounds for that doubt. See, e.g.,
Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 710-11 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1962).
81. Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078 (1966).
82. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 594 (1969).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.; Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310
(1974). The Board generally requires an election unless the unwilling employer mistakenly acknowledges majority support for the union or indepen-
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NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the Supreme Court bluntly stated
the rule: "[S]ecret elections are generally the most satisfactory-indeed the preferred-method of ascertaining whether a
union has majority support. '8 6 The election now provides the
only certain route to the labor representation protected by the
87
Wagner Act.
That elections are indispensable to democratic government
is an article of faith in American political thought.8 8 Nonetheless, the NLRA originally deemed the election only one of several "suitable methods" for selecting labor representatives. The
Board provided virtually no explanation of the theory behind
the crucial change in the law regarding labor representation effected in Cudahy and later decisions. Congressional ratification
of the Board's reversal of policy was equally perfunctory. The
primacy of the union election appears to have stemmed less
from deliberation by lawmakers than from employer resistance
to "industrial democracy" and from the countervailing ideological authority of the election process. 89 In a democratic society
it is all but indisputable that representatives should be chosen
in elections; neither Congress nor the Board, however, ever
dently verifies such support. See, e.g., Jerr-Dan Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 302, 303

(1978), enforced, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979); Sullivan Elec. Co., 199 N.L.R.B.
809, 810 (1972), enforced, 479 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1973).
86. 395 U.S. at 602. The Board's reluctance to certify a union as the workers' representative absent an election victory is illustrated in Texas Super
Foods, Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (May 31, 1991), where the Board for the third
time set aside the results of a representation election because of unlawful interference by the employer. As a part of its remedial order, the Board ordered
a fourth election to be held. Id, slip op. at 29.
87. An employer can voluntarily recognize a union as long as the union
does indeed represent a majority. See International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 740 (1961) (holding that an employer who recognized a union based on a mistaken belief that the union represented a majority
of employees violated the Act).
88. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (the "right to vote freely
for the candidates of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society");
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("Other rights, even the most basic,
are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."); THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (election of representatives one
of the defining features of a republican form of government); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 168 (1969)
(stating that the American Revolution set "the right to vote and the electoral
process in general ... on a path to becoming identified in American thought
with the very essence of American democracy"); Developments in the LawElections, 88 HARV.L. REV. 1111, 1114 (1975) ("No institution is more central
to the United States' system of representative democracy than the election.").
89. Ten years after Cudahy, the Board frankly explained that it abandoned nonelectoral measures to invest its certifications with more "certainty
and prestige." General Box Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 678, 683 (1949).
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fully considered how the procedures of political democracy
would fit into the workplace.
C.

THE POLITICAL ANALOGY

In retrospect, it is ironic that the House Report on the
Wagner Act endorsed the "common belief" that the election
device "in a democratic society has, among other virtues, that of
allaying strife, not provoking it." 90 For since the Act's passage,
the rules governing the labor representation election 91 have re90. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935), reprinted in 2
NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2910, 2930.
91. Under current law, employees, their representative, or an employer
may initiate a representation case by filing a petition with the Board. 29
U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1988). If filed by employees or a union, the petition
must be supported by a showing that at least 30% of the employees desire representation. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1992). If filed by an employer, the petition
must demonstrate that at least one union has demanded recognition. 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(1)(B) (1988). If the Board finds that the petition creates a "question
of representation," it must hold a hearing, to which both the union and the
employer are parties. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1988); NLRB, CASEHANDLING
MLANUAL, pt. 2, § 11008.1 (1989). At the hearing, the Board determines
whether the unit-the group of employees the union seeks to represent-is appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988). The Board also resolves individual eligibility questions. Some employees are ineligible for the Act's protections
because of the position they hold. These employees include supervisors, 29
U.S.C. §§ 152(3) (1988), managers, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267
(1974), and confidential employees, B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724
(1956). The Board is also barred from placing guards in a unit with any other
types of employees. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1988). Professionals cannot be
grouped together with nonprofessionals unless a majority of the professional
employees votes for inclusion. Id § 159(b)(1). If the unit is deemed appropriate, the Board issues a direction of election that describes the unit, resolves
questions of voter eligibility, and sets an election date. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(a)
(1992).
Although the Board supervises elections, unions and employers also influence the procedures. At a preelection conference, the parties consider the location of the polls, the hours the polls will be open, and other election
mechanics. KENNETH C. McGuNEss & JEFFREY A. NoRRis, HOW TO TAKE A
CASE BEFORE THE NLRB 181 (1981). During the balloting, both employers and
unions may station observers at the polls. NLRB, supra, § 11310. Along with
Board agents, the observers can challenge the eligibility of any voter. Id
§ 11338.
The conduct of the employer, the union, and third parties from the time a
petition is filed until the polls close is governed by a set of Board rules developed through common law adjudication. See generally 1-2 JOHN D. FEERICK ET
AL., NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS 465-651 (1991) (3d ed. 1988 & Supp.
1992) (reviewing Board objections law); ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (1985) (same). The losing party may file objections alleging that the other side or a third party violated the rules and
thereby influenced the outcome of the election. If the Board finds that the objections or challenges (if the latter are potentially outcome-determinative)
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peatedly provoked legal and political strife. Three times in the
past half-century Congress has debated substantial revision of
union election law.9 2 Government officials, academics, and corporate and labor spokespersons have attacked this body of law
raise factual issues, it conducts a hearing. NLRB, supra, § 11396.2. If challenges are at issue and the Board sustains the challenges, it certifies the original results. Id, § 11472.3. If it rejects any of the challenges and the resulting

valid ballots alter the outcome, it certifies the new results. Id. If the Board
sustains objections, it overturns the results and directs a new election. Id.
§ 11436. When the election results are final, the Board "certifies" them to the
parties. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1988).
92. In 1938 and 1939 an unusual coalition of employers and the AFL,
which was locked in rivalry with the CIO, brought a number of proposed
amendments to Congress. GROSS, supra note 48, at 75. Prominent among
them were various restrictions on the Board's handling of representation
cases. See id. Though one set of amendments passed the House, none was enacted. Id at 210-11, 224. This owed in large part to Cudahy and other Board
decisions, which altered several controversial rules in representation proceedings, forestalling congressional action. But many of the proposed reforms
reappeared in 1947 when the Republican-dominated Congress adopted the
Taft-Hartley Act. See id. at 252-53.
The Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), constituted a
wholesale revision of the Wagner Act, including its election procedures. See
generally MILLIS & BROwN, supra note 76, at 271-609 (discussing the changes
imposed by the Taft-Hartley Act); ToMLINs, supra note 2, at 252-316 (discussing the social and political context of the Taft-Hartley Act). Enacted over
presidential veto, the Taft-Hartley Act not only codified the Cudahy rule regarding elections, it also gave statutory sanction to the Board's new rule of allowing employers to petition for an election when faced with a request for
union recognition. § 9(c), 61 Stat. at 144 (current verson at 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(1) (1988)). The Act, however, also marked a departure from existing
Board law in representation cases. First, it enabled employees to request an
election to attempt to demonstrate that a union no longer enjoyed majority
support. § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii), 61 Stat. at 144 (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1988)). Second, it limited the Board's discretion to determine whether proposed units were appropriate. § 9(b), 61 Stat. at 143 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988)). Finally, in guaranteeing employers a
broad right to free speech, the Taft-Hartley Act assured their right to campaign against unions in elections. § 8(c), 61 Stat. at 142 (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988)).
In 1977 a set of union election law reforms narrowly missed enactment.
See BARBARA TOWNLEY, LABOR LAW REFORM IN US INDusTRIAL RELATIONS
168-93 (1986); Rosen, supra note 79, at 1-3. See generally Peter G. Nash, The
Labor Law Reform Act of 1977" A DetailedAnalysis, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 59
(1978) (general discussion of proposed reforms). With a Democratic President
and Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, the labor movement
proposed a set of reforms, including a return to the pre-Cudahy rule that allowed the Board to certify a union if a majority of employees signed authorization cards. DANIEL V. YAGER, HAS LABOR LAW FAILED? 42 (1990). The House
backed the Labor Law Reform Act, although it did not contain the card check
provision. Rosen, supra note 79, at 5; see H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977). But the measure died in the Senate after a 19-day filibuster and a record six failed cloture votes. Weiler, supra note 6, at 1770 n.1.
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as unfair and incoherent.9 3 Yet if the rules of union elections
have defied consensus, the controversy has nonetheless been
waged in a common democratic vernacular. Just as political
analogies lent legitimacy to the right to labor representation, so
too they have provided a conceptual framework for continuing
struggles to define the practical meaning of that right. As a
North Carolina statesman summed up the theory of the union
election during the first major reform effort in 1939, "voting to
select a bargaining agent should be something similar to our
system of electing public officers in the Government." 94 At
stake in the ongoing controversy over union election rules are
questions of election timing, constituency, tactics, and review of
results-questions critical to the representation process.
The question of election timing arose in the first blueprints
for the Wagner Act. A January, 1934 outline of "Substantive
Principles" featured the heading "Elections," and the query:
"How frequently, and upon what occasion." 95 The Wagner Act
did not answer the question, or even specify who could request
an election. 96 Just after its passage, however, the Board established a procedure allowing employees or unions to petition for
an election. 97 Pressure then mounted to give employers the
same right.
In subsequent debates over the control of election timing,
political parables were widely advanced. Testifying in congressional hearings in 1939, Board Chairman J. Warren Madden
contended that allowing the employer to determine the timing
of an election conflicted with political practice: "It would be a
good deal as if a candidate for political office, who had timed
his campaign in order to be at his best at election time, suddenly finds that his adversary had gotten the election set some
98
months ahead of time and before he had made his campaign."
93. See infra text accompanying notes 98-120.
94. 1939 House Hearings,supra note 52, at 185-86 (statement of Rep. Barden summarizing an argument against the closed shop).
95. See Casebeer, supra note 30, at 74 (quoting Leon Keyserling, Proposals
for National Labor Board-January 31, 1934-Substantive Principles (Jan. 31,
1934) (unpublished outline)). Keyserling prepared the "Principles" at or
shortly after a meeting attended by AFL President William Green, John L.
Lewis of the Mineworkers, the AFL's Counsel, Department of Labor Solicitor
Charles Wyzanski, Wagner, and Keyserling. Id.
96. See § (9), 49 Stat. at 453.
97. See NLRB, RULEs AND REGS., ser. 1, art. III. § 1 (1935), cited in Gellhorn & Linfield, supra note 52, at 394 n.118.
98. 1939 House Hearings, supra note 52, at 481 (statement of J. Warren
Madden, Chairman, NLRB); see also GRoss, supra note 48, at 73 (discussing
debate over the proposal to allow employers to petition for elections).
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In the words of a union witness, "Well, Congressman, if this is
a fair question, how would you like to have your political adversary... demand that you face the ballot next Tuesday morning
at 10 o'clock." 99
Such arguments persuaded Congress in 1939. Yet, in the
midst of the congressional hearings, on the same day as the
Cudahy decision, the Board adopted a new rule allowing employers to file election petitions, but only when confronted by
demands for recognition from more than one union. 00° This
partial revision did not satisfy the Board's critics, however. In
the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress altered the law to entitle employers to initiate the election process when they were confronted by any demand for union recognition. 1 1 The new rule
does not give employers the same rights as unions to petition
for election. Nevertheless, because the Board cannot run an
election without first holding a hearing unless the parties consent, 0 2 and because the employer is a party to the hearing, 0 3
employers can use their party status to delay elections to the
04
detriment of the union effort.
99.

1939 House Hearings, supra note 52, at 1547 (statement of Byrl A.

Whitney, Director, Education and Research Bureau, Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen).
100. GROSS, supra note 48, at 105 & n.82 (citing NLRB, PRESS RELEASE R1859, NLRB ISSUES NEw RULES AND REGULATIONS (July 12,1939)).
101. § 9(c)(1)(b), 61 Stat. at 144 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B)
(1988)).
102. Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board could postpone the hearing
until after the election, eliminating the parties' ability to use it to delay elections. The Taft-Hartley Act stripped the Board of its discretion to conduct
such "pre-hearing elections." See § 9(c)(1), 61 Stat. at 144 (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1988)). See generally 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 3-4 (1947) (discussing use of pre-hearing elections).
103. See NLRB, supra note 91, pt. 1, § 1100 8.1.
104. Between 1972 and 1978, the average time between the filing of a petition and election in uncontested cases was one and three-quarter months compared to three and one-half months in contested cases. Myron Roomkin &
Richard Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of RepresentationElections, 1981 ILL. L. REV. 75, 85. There is a correlation between such delay and a
$no" vote. See MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN
THE UNITED STATES 201-02 (1987). Employers therefore seek delay. The Senate Committee Report on the 1977 reform bill noted that the party seeking delay exploited its capacity to "force a pre-election hearing whether one is
necessary or not." S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978). Employer
manuals reveal managements' efforts to delay elections. As one author declares, "Mhe adroit employer, together with legal counsel, can usually raise a
sufficient number of issues to provide the basis for a hearing. In exceptional
cases, a hearing can be obtained... even where there are no issues." ALFRED
T. DEMARiA, How MANAGEmENT WINS UNION ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS 50
(1980). Other management consultants have also been forthright about advis-
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In 1977 Congress considered legislation to eliminate election delay through fixed deadlines for Board processing of election petitions.10 5 During this round of debate it was employer
advocates who mustered political analogies against the reform.
For example, a corporate executive asked Congress to imagine
that "a candidate from a rival political party was... campaigning in your home district. Suppose under the election laws,
that individual was able to file a petition and trigger an election
within fifteen days thereafter. Would you think that this was a
fair procedure?"1 0 6 The bill was defeated.10 7 In 1977, as in
1939, lessons from the political arena buttressed the prevailing
argument against union election law reform.
In disputes over the standards for determining employee
constituencies in union elections, the dominant theme has been
"gerrymandering"-a term richly evocative of political corruption and rigged elections.' 0 8 Not only is unit determination the
chief issue in hearings that cause election delays; the character
of the unit often influences the election's outcome, and if the
union wins, the identity and number of represented employees
shape the balance of power between union and management.
ing their clients that "[t]here are... means which may be employed to obtain
a longer period of time" to campaign. William A. Krupman, The Law and
Strategy of Dealing with Union Organizing Campaigns, in BASIC LABOR RELATIONS-1974, at 13, 29-30 (1974). Another consultant declares, "As a practical matter, the union controls the initiation of the organizing drive..., but
the company control the end. This is done by delaying the election." JOHN G.
KnGoUR, PREVENTIVE LABOR RELATuONs 260 (1981).
105. The House bill provided that the Board would conduct an election
within 21 days after the petitioner filed if the petitioned-for unit was defined
as appropriate in a rule or prior decision in the industry. In other cases, the
election would occur within 45 days, unless the case presented issues of exceptional novelty or complexity, in which event the Board was given 75 days to
conduct the election. H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1977).
The Senate bill was identical except that it provided for a period of 21 to 30
days in cases where a rule defined the requested unit as appropriate. S. REP.
No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1978).
106. Labor Reform Act of 1977- Hearings on H.R. 8410 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 219 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 House
Hearings] (statement of James W. Shields, Vice Chairman, Government Affairs Commitee, Parking Industries of America).
107. Weiler, supra note 6, at 1770 n.1.
108. Governor Elbridge Gerry inspired the term in 1812 when, under
Gerry, the Democrat-dominated Massachusetts legislature redrew the districts
for the State Senate in order to increase Democrats' representation, creating
an oddly shaped district in Essex County. An editor of The Continent hung a
map of the districts in his office where a painter observed it, added a head,
wings, and claws to the Essex district, and stated, "That will do for a salamander! Gerrymander!" 6 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 472 (1989).

1993]

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE

Prior to the passage of the Wagner Act, the chairman of the existing labor board warned Congress that to grant either party,
but especially the employer, authority over unit determination
would lead to "unlimited abuse and gerrymandering [and]
would defeat the aims of the statute."'10 9 From 1935 to 1947,
when the Board took the extent of existing union organization
as its standard,110 employers and even some Board members alleged that the Board allowed union "gerrymandering."'
Similar accusations surfaced in internecine labor disputes over unit
determination, which intensified after the AFL expelled the
CIO unions in 1936. Advocates for the AFL in Congress assailed the Board's "gerrymandering," charging the Board with
showing bias in favor of the CIO by creating plant-wide and
even multi-employer units that diluted AFL strength among
particular crafts."12 As one representative explained, "The
Board evidently followed the course that they say Republicans
in the olden days followed in some of the States, of putting
Democrats in a few districts here and there so as to affect the
result of the general election."'1 3 In conceptualizing the problem of constituency, lawmakers along with labor leaders and
employers found their metaphors in politics.
The Board's close regulation of campaign tactics, 1 4 which
often leads the Board to void election results," 5 has prompted
scholarly critics to draw particularly blunt analogies to politics.
In Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality, Julius
109. 1935 Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 82 (statement of Francis Biddle,
Chairman, NLRB), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 1373, 1458.
110. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 133-35 (1944); 12
NLRB ANN. REP. 20-21 (1947). The Taft-Hartley Act ended this practice by
barring the Board from basing its union determination solely on the scope of
existing organization. § 9(c)(5), 61 Stat. at 144 (current version at 29 U.S.C.

§ 159(c)(5) (1988)).
111. Garden State Hosiery Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 318, 326 (1947) (Member Reynolds, dissenting).
112. 1939 House Hearings,supra note 52, at 204 (statement of Rep. Wood).
113. Id.
114. See generally 1-2 FEERICK ET AL., supra note 91, at 449-651 (discussing
regulation of union election campaigns); WILLIfMS, supra note 91 (same).
115. Between 1964, when the Board began to report figures on objections,
and 1989, the percentage of union- or employee-requested elections resulting
in objections ranged from a low of 10% in 1983 to a high of 21% in 1984. See
29-54 NLRB ANN. REP. app. A (1964-1989) (compiling annual data regarding
disposition of representation cases in a table, entitled "Objections Filed in Representation Cases Closed, by Party Filing"). The Board sustained a low of 15%
of total objections filed in 1981, 46 NLRB ANN. REP. app. A, at 201 (1981), and
a high of 29% in 1964, 29 NLRB ANN. REP. app. A, at 185 (1964).
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Getman, Stephen Goldberg, and Jeanne Herman assail rules
against misrepresentation, promise of benefits, eleventh-hour
campaigning, and other campaign speech, arguing that the
Board should leave speech in union elections as free "as in any
political election. 11 6 Goldberg elaborated this proposition in
congressional testimony on the 1977 Labor Law bill, 117 and
other witnesses echoed the theory of making union elections
"more analogous to the political model."' " s According to such
arguments, the Board's regulation of campaign conduct clashes
with principles of free speech and popular sovereignty.
Finally, political practice serves as a point of comparison in
critiques of the protracted legal process for reviewing union
election results. Under current law, the process begins with
the Board's ruling on challenged ballots and objections to campaign conduct. If the ruling is for union certification, the process may wind its way circuitously to the federal appeals courts,
where employers can contest the Board's final order to bargain.119 Union members argue that this process not only
116. GETMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 159-63. Notably, Getman and his colleagues drew heavily on studies of voters in political elections in mounting
their critique. See, e.g., id at 27-32.
117. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 106, pt. 2, at 367-69 (statement of
Prof. Steven Goldberg, Northwestern University Law School). Getman and
his colleagues' proposals were integrated into the Senate bill to the extent of
extending the free speech proviso to representation cases. The Board, however, remained free to regulate speech during the 48 hours preceding an election. S. 2467, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1977).
118. 1977 House Heaings,sup'ra note 106, pt. 1, at 274 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser, President, United Auto Workers).
119. Under current law, the Regional Director rules on objections to an
election that raise questions of fact and challenges to ballots that are potentially outcome determinative following a hearing. An appeal can then be
taken to the Board unless the parties have agreed that the Regional Director's
decision will be final. NLRB, supra note 91, §§ 11368.3, 11400.3, 11434. Unlike
the pre-election proceedings, however, the review procedure may not end with
a decision of the Board-at least not if the union wins the election. A Board
certification of a union is not a final order from which an employer can appeal
to the court of appeals, American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409
(1940). Nonetheless, an employer can effectively appeal the certification by refusing to bargain. At that point the union files an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board. Ordinarily, the Board will cite the employer for refusing to
bargain, finding its pre-election rulings to be res judicata in the unfair labor
practice case. (In some instances, the Board has refused to give its own prior
rulings binding effect and has allowed the employer to relitigate in the unfair
labor practice case issues raised in the earlier representation case. See, e.g.,
Sub-Zero Freezer Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 47, 47-48 (1984).) The employer may challenge this final order, holding that it has unlawfully refused to bargain, in an
appellate court. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988). In the appeal, the employer may
raise any issues that were decided in the earlier representation case. 29 U.S.C.
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postpones collective bargaining, but that it militates against the
finality that marks political elections. As a member of the Textile Workers Union told a congressional subcommittee in 1961,
"It is ironic that the United States can nominate, elect, and inaugurate a President in 6 short months, but the NLRB cannot
give real meaning to a labor election in 4 long years."' 2 0
In constructing the system of labor representation on the
bedrock of the union election, Congress and the Board aimed to
tighten the symmetry between industrial and political democracy. And perhaps for insight, perhaps for more opportunistic
reasons, advocates of both labor and management have looked
to the political realm in contesting union election rules and in
designing opposing schemes of law reform. Legislators, Board
members, trade unionists, employers, academics-all have exploited democratic metaphors, all have argued that union election law goes astray precisely where it departs from political
practice. Lawmakers' declarations notwithstanding, the election did not fit neatly into the workplace. Nowhere was this
more evident than in the legal problem posed by the employer's
role in the representation process, and nowhere did political
analogies figure more prominently.
II.

EMPLOYERS AND UNION ELECTIONS

The preamble to the Wagner Act set forth as the premise
of labor's right to representation the "inequality of bargaining
power" between individual employees and corporate employers.3-2 That inequality, the Act declared, followed from the fact
that employees lacked full freedom to associate and therefore
"actual liberty of contract."'2 2 For decades, the courts had rejected this argument, no matter how vigorously it was prosecuted by labor reformers and influential legal scholars and
§ 159(d) (1988). The appeal effectively stays the Board's order to bargain because the Board cannot enforce its own orders. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988). The
appeal is risk-free to the employer because the Board has held that an employer cannot be found liable to pay damages to its employees or the union for
losses incurred during the appellate process as a result of the employer's unlawful refusal to bargain. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970), enforced, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
120. Administrationof the Labor-ManagementRelationsAct by the NLRB:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Labor Relations Board of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1961) (statement of William Pollock, President, Textile Workers Union).
121. National Labor Relations (Wager) Act, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
122. Id,
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economists.2 3 By 1935, however, a majority in Congress agreed
that the employment relationship was less one of free contract
than of sovereignty and subordination, a situation that labor's
right to representation for the purposes of collective bargaining
was designed to rectify. Such is the standard account of the impulse behind the Wagner Act. What has not been taken into
account, however, is that the procedures for securing such representation did not redress but instead recreated inequality in
the workplace. The primacy of the union election opened the
way for employers to exercise influence over workers' choice of
representatives. Moreover, the conflation of the union election
and the political election cast employer and union as rival candidates vying for workers' votes. This conception both widened
the employer's role in the union election and masked the disparity of power that had motivated the Act's passage.
A.

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE, THE FRANCHISE, AND LIBERAL
POLITICAL THEORY

The problem of reconciling representative democracy with
the hierarchies of the employment relationship was not unique
to the NLRA. Rather, it was a variant of a problem that had
long perplexed legal and political thinkers-namely, the tension between free exercise of the franchise and the economic
dependence of employees. According to the liberal political
theory of the Enlightenment, the rights of citizenship ended
where the employer's sway in the workplace began. At the
founding of the American republic the economic dependence of
wage earners dictated their disenfranchisement, and after they
gained suffrage diverse critics continued to maintain that the
wage system threatened democratic government. The effort to
democratize industry magnified the tension between economic
dependence and political independence by transposing it into
the workplace. Under the Wagner Act, politics and employment were no longer distinct and contrasting orders; rather, the
Act installed democratic norms and procedures directly within
the workplace, setting in sharp relief the problem of defining
the employer's place in the system of representation.
In setting forth a new, liberal theory of governance, seventeenth-century political thinkers such as John Locke and
James Harrington had emphatically argued that wage earners
should be excluded from the suffrage on account of their de123.

See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract,18

YALE

L.J. 454, 470-87 (1909).
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pendence on employers for their livelihoods. 2 4 A century later
William Blackstone reported in his Commentaries that the
"true reason" for property qualifications was that the propertyless had "no will of their own" and, if they had votes, "would
be tempted to dispose of them under some undue influence or
other."'2 5 In 1787 at the Constitutional Convention, American
lawmakers were troubled as well by the political implications
of the employment relationship. Many opposed extending the
franchise to hirelings who lacked personal autonomy and freedom of choice-to "mechanics & manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers."'2 6 Even if they were
granted a formal right to vote, as Gouverneur Morris argued,
propertyless wage earners would not truly be represented because they would "sell" their votes to "the rich who will be able
to buy them."'2 7 In James Madison's words, "they will become
the tools of opulence and ambition."'2S
With the advent of universal manhood suffrage and the
growth of wage labor, the problem of preserving the political
independence of employees took on new urgency. During debates over the use of secret ballots, employer abuses were often
cited.' 29 Introduction of the Australian ballot did not resolve
the difficulties, however. By the early years of the twentieth
century, many states had enacted laws, which remained on the
books for decades, prohibiting employers from coercing or attempting to influence employees' exercise of the franchise. 30
124. C.B.

MACPHERSON, THE POLrICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDU-

ALISM 181, 221-32 (1962).
125. 1 WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARmEs *171 (1765), quoted in Robert
J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 335, 340 (1989).
126. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787, at 402 (Norton 1987) (1840).
127. Id at 402-03.
128. Id. at 404.
129.

In 1880, a congressional committee found that employers frequently

marched or carried workers to the polls where they were furnished with ballots and compelled to hold them up in their hands so they could be watched as
they deposited the ballots in the box. S. REP. No. 497, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10
(1880); see also ELDON EVANS, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES 12-13 (1917) (describing similar election conduct).

130. See, e.g., OKLA. REV. LAwS § 3139 (1910) (repealed) (providing that it
was a misdemeanor for any corporation to influence or attempt to influence
"by bribe, favor, promise, inducement, threat, intimidation, importuning or beseeching" the vote of any employee), reprintedin U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULLETIN No. 148, pt. 2, at 1707 (1914). A compilation of these statutes
appears in Note, Pay While Voting, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 135, 136 n.9 (1947). At
least 37 states still have such statutes on their books. Mark T. Carroll, Protect-
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Labor reformers contended that economic dependence endangered both the individual liberty of citizens and the system of
representative democracy. "Where is an inevitable and irresistible conflict between the wage-system of labor and the republican system of government," a leading spokesman for the
Knights of Labor declared in 1886.131 The solution was not to
disenfranchise labor, 132 but rather to "engraft republican principles on property and industry."'133 A half-century later, New
Deal reformers and trade union leaders echoed the connection
between economic and political dependence. Testifying on behalf of the Wagner Act, the President of the AFL's Metal
Trades Department recalled as "a young man in Worcester,
Mass., going by the polls... and seeing workers herded up to
the polls with their foremen right outside.... So it was not the
wage earners that were expressing their wish at the polls, but it
was the employer."' 1 Wagner made the point more tersely:
"[P]olitical democracy will become a sham and a delusion unless there is economic democracy in industry itself.''13 5
ing PrivateEmployees' Freedom of PoliticalSpeech, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35,
58 (1981).
131. GEORGE

E. MCNEiLL, THE LABOR MovEmENr 459 (1886), quoted in
William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the
Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767, 768-69. On the significance of such arguments in the nineteenth-century labor movement, see LEON FINK, WORKINGMEN'S DEMOCRACY: THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS 4-5
(1983); DAvID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL
REPuBLICANS, 1862-1872, at 238-260 (1967); SEAN WILENTz, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CrrY & THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 17881850, at 61-103 (1984); Forbath, supra, at 813-14.

132. Disenfranchisement remained the cure in the public sector, however,
where from the 1880s onward Congress and state legislatures adopted a set of
sharp restrictions on the political activities of public employees at least in part
to shield them from manipulation by their employers. See, e.g., Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564, 566 (1973);
Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 603-10 (1973); American Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 78-81 (1947).
133. MCNEILL, supra note 131, at 456, quoted in Forbath, supra note 131, at
813.
134. 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 202 (statement of John P.
Frey), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1373, 1582.
135. 81 CONG. REC. 2940 (1937). Wagner later argued, "[The struggle for a
voice in industry through the process of collective bargaining is at the heart of
the struggle for the preservation of political as well as economic democracy in
America." Robert Wagner, The Ideal Industrial State-As Wagner Sees It,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 9, 1937, at 23, quoted in Keyserling, supra note 23, at
14. In fact, Wagner suggested that industry might be the only possible forum
for democracy in modern society. He stated that "politics is becoming impersonalized and when the average worker is remote from the processes of government, it is more imperative than ever before that industry should afford
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As the franchise was introduced into industry under the
Wagner Act, however, it did not remove but instead reinstated
the contradiction between democracy and economic dependence. In the workplace, the problem of undue employer influence remains even more acute. In the political arena,
employers may act as both voters and candidates; 1 36 the fear
has been that through the wage relation they would exercise
influence beyond the mere power of persuasion and disproportionate to their voting strength. In union elections, by contrast,
the law permits employers neither to vote nor to seek to be
representatives of their employees. 3 7 Yet, at the same time,
employers' interest in union elections is even more direct than
in political elections, and their ability to exert influence is far
greater. A union victory alters the legal relationship between
employers and employees, whereas the outcome of political
elections does not necessarily alter employers' legal rights or
immediately affect their interests. Furthermore, in political
elections the electorate includes numerous employers, their
employees, and those outside the labor market. In union elections, however, the voters are always employees of a single employer, which gives the employer incommensurably greater
power to influence a union election than a political election. 38
Thus, the role of employers in union elections is crucial, but
highly ambiguous. Indeed, the problem of employers' undue
political influence that haunted the Founding Fathers constitutes the paramount problem in union election law.
B. AMBIGUITY IN THE WAGNER ACT
The Wagner Act left the role of employers in the labor representation process as ambiguous as the procedures for securing
representation. Precommittee drafts of the Act had specified
that a dispute over "who are the properly chosen representatives" of workers could arise either "between an employer and
his employees" or "between two groups of employees."'139 As
him real opportunities to participate." Robert F. Wagner, Company Unions:

A Vast IndustrialIssue, N.Y. TIME, Mar. 11, 1934, § 9, at 1.
136. This is obviously not true of corporate employers, but it is true of
those who own them.

137. Employers are expressly barred from creating organizations to represent their employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
138. The Board cannot direct an election for union representation in a
multi-employer unit. See ARCHmBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 298 (11th ed. 1991).

139. Casebeer, supra note 30, at 109 (quoting the Labor Disputes Act, Title
III, Draft 2(b), § 307 (Feb. 19, 1934)).
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introduced and adopted, however, the bill gave the Board authority to resolve representation disputes without spelling out
who exactly was party to such disputes. It neither expressly included nor excluded the employer. Section 9 of the Wagner
Act authorized the Board to conduct "an appropriate hearing
upon due notice," but failed to indicate to whom notice was due
or who had a right to participate in the hearing. 140 Similarly,
the Act made it an unfair labor practice for employers to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce" employees in the exercise of
their right to representation, without specifying whether every
41
form of employer influence fell within the prohibition.
Prior to the Act's passage, diverse congressional witnesses
proposed that the law should exclude employers from representation proceedings. In particular, their arguments were directed against the pre-Wagner Act labor boards' policy of
securing employers' consent before holding a union election.
Because those boards lacked enforcement authority, they engaged in mediation more than adjudication and introduced the
representation election as an instrument of conciliation.
Although the 1933 executive order creating the first federal labor board did not authorize elections,' 42 just six days after the
order was issued, the National Labor Board (chaired by Wagner) settled a strike among hosiery workers in eastern Pennsylvania by gaining their employers' agreement to recognize
union representatives who would be chosen in a Board-supervised election. 143 This procedure became known as the "Reading Formula" and was a central element of federal labor policy
prior to the Wagner Act.'4 Notably, it was an employer representative on the labor board, Gerald Swope, the president of
General Electric, who proposed that elections be part of the
140. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 449, 452-53
(1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1988)).
141. § 8(1), 49 Stat. at 452 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988)).
142. See Exec. Order No. 6511, reprinted in 1 N.L.B. vi (1934). The National Labor Board was the first non-wartime board. A National War Labor
Board had existed during World War I. See NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD,

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL
WAR LABOR BOARD TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 5 (1920).

143. See H.W. Anthony Mills, 1 N.L.B. 1 (1933); 1934 Senate Hearings,
supra note 18, at 30 (statement of Milton Handler, General Counsel, NLRB),
reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 60; BERNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 59-60; LORwiN & WUBNIG, supra note 39, at 95-97.
144. LORWIN & WuBNIG, supra note 39, at 96; ToMLNS, supra note 2, at
113-14.
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formula.1 45 For not only did the formula recognize employers'
right to demand proof of majority sentiment, it also allowed
them to specify the procedure for measuring that sentiment: a
Board-supervised election. 1'
The "Reading Formula" carried
the election device into the workplace, but it did so conditional
upon employer consent, in a manner that rendered the employer "party" to the election.
During the congressional debate over the Wagner Act, labor relations experts, federal officials, and union representatives argued against treating the employer as a party to the
representation proceeding. They maintained that the Reading
precedent was inapplicable under the Wagner Act. The most
forceful advocate of this position was William H. Davis of the
Twentieth Century Fund Committee, whose influential study
of labor relations appeared as Congress was considering the
Act.147 Davis advised Congress to deny employers any role in
their employees' choice of representatives. He proposed adding
language to section 9(c) of the Act stating that "the employer
shall not be recognized as a party" to disputes concerning the
148
representation of employees.
Such proposals drew a key distinction between labor mediation and enforcement of the new right to representation.
Under earlier federal policy, when "mediation was in the foreground," as Davis said, "the employer was there as a party."'149
But because employees were to attain a right to designate representatives under the new law, employers should have no role
in that process. For the Wagner Act to perpetuate the idea of
the employer as a party, Davis argued, was a "confusion of the
mediation functions and law-enforcement functions.' 5 0 William Leiserson, Chairman of the Railway Labor Act's National
145. Frances Perkins, Eight Years as Madame Secretary, 24 FORTUNE

77,

79

(1941).
146. Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins later observed, "In a way the consent-election provision was antiunion. Never before had a trade union been
asked to prove that it represented the majority of the workers." Id147.

See 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 704-05 (statement of Wil-

liam H. Davis, Chairman, Special Committee on the Government and Labor,
Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 1617, 2090-91; TOMLuNS, supra note 2, at 131; LABOR AND THE
GOVERmENT. AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR

RELATIONS (Alfred L. Bernheim & Dorothy Van Doren eds., 1935).
148. 1935 Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 718 (statement of William H.
Davis), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617,
2104.
149. Id.

150.

Id.
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Mediation Board and later a member of the NLRB, made similar arguments in a letter to Wagner. According to Leiserson,
there was "a mistake" in the wording of section 9, which
"should be changed to make the representation dispute purely
disputes among employees only, to which the employer is not a
party."'' 1 He urged this change to keep "the employer and his
attorneys... out of the representation disputes" and to make
"the problem of determining the representative . . .a much
more simple one. ' 152 In his congressional testimony, Leiserson

cited his experience on the National Mediation Board, which
handled representation cases with "nobody around except the
employees that are interested.' 153 Because the issue was "not
clearly put" in the proposed legislation, Leiserson explained, he
''
was "afraid the employers may come in. 5
The essential point was that the interest of employers in
workers' choice of representatives in no way entitled them to
participate in that choice-either as parties in litigation or
through an election campaign. As Davis put it, the employer,
"of course," was "interested" in the representation question,
but it was "not his dispute. He is not a party to the controversy.' 15 5 Using the example of international relations, Davis
explicated the difference between having an "interest" and being a "party": "We may be interested in a controversy between
Belgium and England on the value of the belga today, but we
are not parties to that controversy."'156 Similarly, the AFL's
counsel contended that whatever economic stake employers
might have in the outcome of a union election, they had "no
legal interest whatsoever."'15 7 Also enlisting a geopolitical ex151. TOMImNS, supra note 2, at 137 (quoting Letter from William M. Leiserson, Chairman, Railway Labor Act's National Mediation Board, to Sen. Robert
F. Wagner (Mar. 9, 1935)). Leiserson was also Chairman of the NRA Petroleum Labor Board. 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 869 (statement of
William M. Leiserson), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 1617, 2255.
152. ToMINs, supra note 2, at 137 (quoting Letter from William M. Leiserson, Chairman, Railway Labor Act's National Mediation Board, to Sen. Robert
F. Wagner (Mar. 9, 1935)).
153. 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 878 (statement of William M.
Leiserson, Chairman, National Mediation Board), reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 2264.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 718 (statement of William H. Davis, Chairman, Special Committee on the Government and Labor, Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.), reprinted
in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 2104.
156. Id.
157. 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 750 (statement of Charlton
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ample, he asked Congress to "suppose the United States and
Mexico were seeking to adjust a boundary matter by negotiation through commissioners. How would it be regarded if the
United States sought to influence the selection of certain commissioners to represent Mexico? ' 15 8 Other congressional witnesses maintained that it was as illegitimate for employers to
participate in union elections as it was for employees to interfere in the selection of company directors. In Leiserson's
words, "[I]t would be just the same as if the employees, because
they are employees, should walk into a stockholders' meeting
and try to elect the managers."15 9
Ogburn, Counsel, AFL), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 1373, 1530.
158. Id, After the Act's adoption, union lawyer Louis B. Boudin drew an
analogy to international law as he urged the Board to keep employers out of
union elections. An employer has an interest in the outcome of such elections,
Boudin acknowledged, just like one country has an interest in another's representatives. But, he continued,
that does not mean that a country about to negotiate a treaty with another country, the failure of which may result in war, has a legitimate
interest in the internal affairs of the other country, and that it should
be heard either in the election of its government or in any matter
which may affect the election of that government. Such interference
would be acknowledged by all as unwarranted aggression upon a
neighbor's right to self-determination.
Louis B. Boudin, Representatives of Their Own Choosing, 37 ILL. L. REV. 385,
400 (1943). Forty years later, Paul Weiler also adopted this analogy to explain
the position of employers in union elections. See Weiler, supra note 6, at 1814.
The international analogy is not perfect, however, as one country can freely
leave the bargaining table while an employer has a legal duty to bargain with
a certified union.
159. 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 878 (statement of William M.
Leiserson, Chairman, National Mediation Board), reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 2264. The AFL's counsel reasoned similarly: "Employers have no more say-so in the selection of representatives for
collective bargaining by employees than employees have in the selection of the
companies' representatives." Id at 150 (statement of Charlton Ogburn), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 1530; see also
78 CONG. REC. 12,044 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Shipstead) (making same argument), reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1241. This
same refrain appeared in 1939, when the Board reported to Congress that the
"right of employees to choose their representatives when and as they wish is
normally no more the affair of the employer than the right of stockholders to
choose directors is the affair of the employees." 1939 House Hearings,supra
note 52, supp. at 36 (report of the NLRB). Again, in 1943, the Seventh Circuit
used a "reverse statement of the case" to dismiss an employer's objections to a
union election as "ephemeral and unsubstantial." NLRB v. National Mineral
Co., 134 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 320 U.S. 753 (1943). "In what forum in this land of ample legal machinery," the court asked, "could the employees be heard to challenge the election of the stockholders' representative
for collective bargaining?" Id.
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Standing counter to such arguments, however, was the theory that excluding employers from representation proceedings
would encourage them to evade the duty to engage in collective
bargaining. The Legal Division of the existing labor board underscored the pragmatic point that the right to representation
necessarily rested on employer compliance. It argued that
under the Wagner Act the new board would be more likely to
prevail in the courts in forcing employers to recognize unions if
the employers were parties to representation proceedings, and
thus were able to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. 160 The Wagner Act failed to speak either way on the
question, however. It was left to the Board to construe the statute's silence as either excluding employers from or tacitly recognizing them as parties to representation proceedings.
C. EMPLOYERS As PARTIES
When the Board opened its doors in the summer of 1935, it
confronted two questions concerning employers' role in the representation process: Should employers be party to the trial-like
administrative process in representation cases, and should they
be allowed to influence employee sentiment on the subject of
representation? Initially, the Board gave contrasting answers:
It granted employers the status of parties in representation
cases, but it barred them from seeking to influence employees'
representation decision. Yet once the election became the cornerstone of the representation process, the dualism in the rules
became untenable. Employers effectively exploited their party
status to influence the outcome of elections, and the electoral
process inevitably exposed union organizing to employer
influence.
Since its inception, the Board has considered employers to
be parties to representation cases. It has given employers notice of the filing of a representation petition and has also allowed them to participate in any hearings on the petition. 16 1
The current Board CasehandlingManual clearly defines "interested parties" to include employers. 162
The idea that there are parties to representation proceedings and that the employer should be one is consistent with a
conception of such proceedings as a form of fact finding, with
160.
on the
161.
162.

See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 137 (quoting Philip Levy, Memorandum
Davis Amendment (April 6, 1935)).
Gellhorn & Linfield, supra note 52, at 351.
NLRB, supra note 91, pt. 1, § 11008.1.
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the fact at issue being employees' sentiments about a union.
Wagner asserted in 1935 that such a proceeding was "nothing
but an investigation, a factual determination of who are the
representatives of employees.' 63 The Board agreed, explaining
to Congress in 1939 that a representation case "is in the nature
of an investigation of fact by the Board."'1
This aptly characterized the proceedings prior to the 1939 Cudahy decision that
involved review of non-electoral evidence of majority sentiment. Employers' party status in such cases merely gave them
the right to contest the evidence of support already garnered by
unions.
After Cudahy established the primacy of the election, how-

ever, representation cases were no longer simply a process of
adjudication. Rather, they consisted of the election itself (as
the sole admissible proof of majority sentiment), and two
phases of litigation concerning the election-first, resolving
whether an election should be held and who should vote, and
second, determining whether its results actually reflected the
majority's will. 165 Thus, once the election became the exclusive
focus of adjudication in representation disputes, employers' established status as party to representation cases gave them leverage over the electoral procedures through which employees
were required to express their will. Even though the Board
still barred employers from directly interfering with employees' choice of representatives, it opened an avenue for more
subtle, litigious forms of influence.
Employers have exercised their rights in the process of litigation in a manner calculated to affect the outcome of elec166
tions. Here, their ability to delay elections has been central.
163.

1935 Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 50 (statement of Sen. Wagner),

reprintedin 1 NLRA

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 1, at 1373, 1426.

164. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 580 (1939) [hereinafter 1939 Senate Hearings] (report of the
NLRB). The Board continued, "Such a hearing is not in the nature of a trial
but an investigation." I&L
165. See supra note 91 (discussing procedure in representation cases).
166. See supra note 104 (discussing employers' efforts to affect election results through delay).
Despite the fact that both employer and union have always been parties to
representation cases, the Board has always insisted that representation proceedings are nonadversarial. The Board explained to Congress in 1939 that
representation cases "unlike unfair labor practice cases, do not involve a proceeding directed against an employer .... ." 1939 Senate Hearings,supra note
164, at 580 (report of the NLRB). The year after Congress passed the TaftHartley Act, the Board reported that such cases "are not adversary in character." 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 19 (1949). The Board's CasehandlingManual con-
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Yet employers have recently pointed to the high percentage of
elections conducted without litigation as evidence that they are
not obstructing the representation process.' 6 7 Indeed, in more
than eighty percent of the representation cases following union
petitions in each year since 1975, the parties have reached
agreement on all preliminary issues, eliminating the need for a
preelection hearing. 6 8 In seeming contrast to reports of increased employer resistance to unionization in the past twenty
years, 169 the percentage of representation proceedings in which
the parties could not resolve all preliminary issues has steadily
declined during the same period, to just over fifteen percent in
1989, the lowest level since 1948.170 But the apparent consensus
actually reveals that unions have been forced to accept elections on employers' terms because otherwise employers may
delay the conduct of elections and, potentially, the advent of
collective bargaining.171 As a practical matter, because of emtinues to describe a representation case hearing as "investigatory and not
adversary." NLRB, supra note 91, pt. 1, § 11180. Paradoxically, employers
have taken advantage of this characterization of representation proceedings to
delay elections. By refusing to take a position on the appropriateness of a proposed unit or the eligibility of particular employees with which the union
could agree and instead insisting that the Board resolve the questions, an employer insures that the Board will take evidence and prepare a decision in the
"inquisitorial" proceeding. See, e.g., Yale College, No. 39-RC-408, slip op. at 4,
57-67 (NLRB Apr. 22, 1983). This guarantees a delayed election regardless of
how much the union is willing to concede.
167. The Chamber of Commerce cited such percentages during the 1977 reform act debates as evidence that "there is a cooperative air in the investigative process." Labor Reform Act of 1977. Hearings on S. 1883 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 989 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Senate Hearings] (statement of Robert T.
Thompson, Chairman, National Chamber of Commerce). The minority views
in the House Report also cited the high percentage of consent elections as a
reason to leave well-enough alone. H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 105, at 64-65.
168. See generally 40-54 NLRB ANN. REP. app. A (1975-1989) (compiling
annual data regarding disposition of representation cases in a table entitled
"Disposition by Stage of Representation and Union Deauthorization Cases
Closed"). Data is not yet published for 1990 and 1991.
169. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 6, at 1776-86.
170. See generally 13-54 NLRB ANN. REP. app. A (1948-1989) (compiling
annual data regarding disposition of representation cases in a table entitled
"Disposition by Stage of Representation and Union Deauthorization Cases
Closed").
171. See Christine M. Mrak, Expediting Representation Cases and Alternatives to Board Procedure, Address at the AFL-CIO Lawyers Coordinating
Committee Conference 9 (April, 1985) (transcript on file at the MinnesotaLaw
Review). Mrak, a union lawyer, described a "stipulate to almost anything" approach as a means of expediting representation cases. Id As a management
attorney confirms, "The employer, at this stage, has great leverage with both
the union and the Board, and it is usually possible to obtain the time needed to
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ployers' status as parties to representation proceedings, unions
today must seek their consent to elections just as they had to
before the Wagner Act.

D.

EMPLOYERS AS CANDIDATES

Until the mid-1940s, the Board granted employers the status of party to representation litigation but denied them that of
candidate in the representation election. The first entailed the
right to probe and test the union's claim to majority support;
the second would have entailed the right to urge workers to
withhold support from the union-to vote "no." Although
party status enabled employers indirectly to influence election
results, the Board prohibited direct influence. Even before the
Taft-Hartley Act codified employers' right to campaign, however, the Board's use of elections as the exclusive means of testing majority support implicated employers directly in the
electoral process, making it impossible for the Board either
practically to prevent employer influence or legally to justify
prohibiting employer campaigns. Here, again, the early dualism
in Board rules governing the employer's role in the election
gave way, as the employer gained a status tantamount to a candidate in union elections.
Prior to Cudahy, the Board permitted workers to demonstrate support for a union and to gain certification by
nonelectoral means that shielded their self-organization from
their employer. Membership cards could be solicited without
employers knowing that their employees were organizing.
Dues could be collected or a strike planned outside the employers' oversight. Evidence of all these forms of support for a
union could then be presented at a hearing. 17 2 An election was
campaign.... The employer ordinarily can also have its choice as to the exact
day of the week for the election." DEMARIA, supra note 104, at 48. That the
ability to delay allows management to pressure unions to consent to elections
on management's terms is evidenced by the NLRB General Counsel's prediction during the 1977-1978 reform debates that strict time limits for the conduct
of elections would reduce the number of consent elections by 45%. See 124
CONG. REc. 17,050 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Griffin).
172. See, e.g., Combustion Eng'g Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 344, 349 (1938) (holding
participation in strike to be sufficient evidence of majority support for union);
Seas Shipping Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 398, 401 (1937) (signed cards); Richards-Wilcox
Mfg. Co. 2 N.L.R.B. 97, 100 (1936) (union membership rolls).
The old National Labor Board recognized that employees' ability to choose
the method for designating their representatives was a crucial aspect of their
right freely to select representatives. "[Tihe method of designation," the
Board held in 1933, is "within the exclusive control of the workers. The law
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more than an alternative form of proof of employee sentiment,
however. It was an open contest to create or alter that sentiment, requiring notice to the employer, a period of time between the notice and balloting, and the casting of ballots in a
government-supervised process. To be sure, representation litigation was also an adversarial encounter; but it was a contest
over the evidence of majority sentiment, rather than one to
shape the sentiment itself. In narrowing the method of selecting representatives to the government supervised election, the
Board inevitably subjected the process of self-organization to
employer influence.
Initially, the Board attempted to bar employers from
campaigning among their employees. 173 The Board reasoned
does not tolerate any impairment of the freedom of self-organization." Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 1 N.L.B. 58, 60 (1933). A statement of NLB policy confirmed, "The manner of conducting an election is entirely within the
discretion of the employees." 78 CONG. REc. 12,030 (1934) (summarizing NLB
principles), reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1210.
Leiserson explained the NLB's policy in respect to the method of selection:
Section 7 of the Recovery Act gives the employees the right to organize and choose representatives. [In] answer [to] question[s] as to what
steps are necessary, we can only say that that is a matter for the employees to decide for themselves. They may call a meeting and elect
the representatives in any way they desire.
TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 113 (quoting Letter from William M. Leiserson,
Chairman of the National Recovery Act Petroleum Labor Board (In Record
Group 25, Box 81, "NLB General Correspondence File K", National Archives
and Records Service, Washington, D.C.)).
173. See, e.g., American Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 133-34 (1942),
enforcement denied, 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
There is evidence in the legislative history that Congress did not intend to prohibit all employer influence. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Senator David Walsh, stated during hearings on the bill that
there was nothing in the bill "to prevent an employer from discussing with his
employees the merits and demerits of the various kinds of organizations."
1935 Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 557 (statement of John D. House), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 1943. Walsh
explained that the word "influence" was struck from what became § 8(1) of
the Act "because we felt that an employer should not be prevented from exercising his influence for or against any particular organization." Id. at 557-58,
reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, 1617, 1943-44. Notably, the word was contained in the Railway Labor Act that in other respects
served as a model for the Wagner Act. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Ninth) (1988).
Indeed, during the 1939 hearings, the Board denied that it barred employer campaigning in the absence of "a background of open manifestations of
hostility to self-organization." 1939 Senate Hearings,supra note 164, at 497 (report of the NLRB). It is difficult to find cases that do not involve independent
unfair labor practices. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 346, 378-79 (1939)
(examining company publications in light of prior discriminatory discharges),
enforced in part,114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940), cert denied, 312 U.S. 689 (1941).
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that employers could not vote and did not appear on the ballot
as candidates in representation elections and therefore had no
legitimate interest in the outcome. Moreover, because of employers' economic authority over the employee electorate, the
Board held that employer participation would prevent voters
from casting their ballots freely.
The Board stated this conclusion most forcefully in the
1942 case of American Tube Bending Co.' 7 4 In that case, Local
420 of the International Association of Machinists filed a petition seeking certification as the representative of the almost 500
employees of the New Haven-based metal tube manufacturer.175 An independent union intervened. 7 6 Four days
before the election, American Tube's President, Henry W.
Jones, Jr., sent a letter on company stationery to all the employees regarding the issues at stake in the election. 77 A day
before the election, the foremen directed all employees to assemble in groups, and Jones addressed each group, touting the
company's achievements and informing the employees that
they would be voting on who to "have for your leader. ' Th The
choices on the ballot, Jones advised, were the two competing
unions or "the present management of your company."1 79
Jones urged all of the employees to vote, intoning the theme of
political democracy: "Americans, ever since the Declaration of
Independence, and even before that, have settled questions like
this by going to the polls, and voting secretly exactly as they
80
wished."
The Board, however, did not view the employer's campaign
rhetoric as the exercise of a political birthright. Instead the
Board undertook to enfranchise American Tube's employees,
holding that the Wagner Act entitled employees to choose
"their bargaining representative free from employer interference."1" 1 Furthermore, such freedom imposed a "correlative"
duty on the employer to "maintain complete neutrality with reBut the Board's language in American Tube and other cases was considerably
broader. See infra text accompanying notes 174-92.
174. 44 N.L.R.B. 121 (1942), enforcement denied, 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
175. Id at 121.
176. Id. at 122.
177. Id,at 124-26.
178. Id. at 126-28.
179. Id. at 128.
180. Id. at 129.
181. Id.
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spect to an election." 18 2

In American Tube, the Board categorically rejected the notion that the employer was a candidate in the election. It reiterated the rule set forth in an earlier case: "An election is not
a contest between a labor organization and the employer of the
employees being polled, and participation by an employer in a
preelection campaign as if he were a contestant is an interference with the employees' rights to bargain collectively through
representatives 'of their own choosing.' "183 The Board dismissed the employer's construction of the choices appearing on
the ballot as a "false interpretation of the issues." 1 4 By equating the choice of "[n]either"union with "the present management of [the] company," the Board declared, the employer
"became a candidate in the election and forced himself upon
the ballot."'18 5 The letter and speeches to the employees conveyed the idea that "their employer considered himself to be a
party to the election.., and that a vote for the unions was a
vote against the company. 18s6 That was a "deception," the
8
Board held.

7

Nevertheless, American Tube's campaign speech was not
unlawful simply because it propagated a "false interpretation." 18 According to the Board, the speech was unlawful because its message was inextricably tied to the employer's
economic power over its employees. Emphasizing that the foremen assembled the employees on company time and that the
letter was on company stationery, the Board stated that such
tactics "brought heavily into play the economic dependence" of
the employees upon American Tube. 8 9 Given these conditions
of inequality, the Board concluded, "[ilt was impossible for the
employees to distinguish between the [employer] qua candidate
182. Id.
183. Id. at 132 (quoting Sunbeam Elec. & Mfg. Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 469, 487-88
(1942), enforced as modified, 133 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1943)).
184. 1d. at 131.
185. Id. at 131 & n.8.
186. Id. at 130-31.
187. Id. at 132. In a number of other cases, the Board was careful to characterize employer communication as "not isolated or unconnected occurrences," but rather as an "intelligent campaign against the union." Sunbeam
Eec., 41 N.L.R.B. at 485 n.18; see also Nebel Knitting Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 284, 293
(1938) (describing the employer's pattern of anti-union conduct as a "campaign
to combat and defeat" the union's attempt to organize workers), enforced as
modified, 103 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1939).
188. American Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 131 (1942), enforcement
denied, 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
189. Id. at 133.
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and the [employer] qua employer[ ]."190 Based on the "relationship existing between the author of the utterances and the employes [sic] as well as the circumstances under which the
communications were delivered," the Board ruled that the employer's campaign communications "attained a force stronger
than their intrinsic connotation, and beyond that of persuasion"
amounting to illegal coercion. 19 '
For nearly a decade after its founding, the Board took the
position that employer persuasion could not be separated from
coercion. In its First Annual Report, the Board deemed employer campaign statements an effort to "poison the minds of
workers."'192 In 1939 the Board reported to Congress its opposition to proposed amendments to the Wagner Act that would
have guaranteed employers' right to express their views on the
union question. 193 The Board objected that such a reform
would trench on the right to representation and "abandon the
fundamental principle of the Act that the employer shall keep
his hands off the self-organization of employees."' 194 Here, too,
the Board stressed the realities of economic inequality and employer authority in the workplace. An employer could not "express his opinion in a vacuum," the Board reasoned. 95 "Behind
what he says lies the full weight of his economic position, based
upon his control over the livelihood of his employees."'196 The
Supreme Court ratified this reasoning when it upheld the
Board's requirement that employers remain neutral toward
competing unions.197 "Slight suggestions" of employer preference have a "telling effect among men who know the consequences of incurring that employer's strong displeasure," the
Court declared. 9 8
I&
191. Id
190.
192.

1 NLRB ANN. REP. 73 (1936). The Board's policy led two experts to

advise employers in 1940 that they should "refrain from advising Employees in
any matters concerning labor organizations.... Do not express opinions of
any labor organization .... ." They encouraged employers to "stay completely
neutral regarding elections." W.A. RINCKHOFF & HARVEY B. RECTOR, PROCEDURE AND PRACTICES UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 8, 14

(1940).
193. See GROSS, supra note 48, at 198.
194. AE (quoting NLRB, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD TO THE SENATE COMAIITEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR UNDER H.R.
9195 19-20 (1940)).
195. Id
196.

Id

197.
198.

International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
Id,at 72.
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Yet there was a tension in the Board law governing employer influence. The Board's proscription, under American
Tube, of employers' direct influence through a campaign conflicted with employers' right to influence indirectly the outcome of an election by delaying it, reshaping the unit, or
challenging voter eligibility. Moreover, employers' rights as
parties to the adjudicative phases of representation proceedings
were difficult to separate from participation in the election
itself.
The question of employer observers at the polling place exposed the tension in Board law with particular clarity. In 1938
the Board ruled that employers could not be present at elections, finding that their party status did not entitle them to observe the balloting.1 99 According to the Board, the mere
"presence of an employer's representative" might inhibit employee free choice "although no interference or coercion is intended by the employer. ' '2 0° The Board reaffirmed the
exclusion in 1940, holding that employers "may not, as a matter
of right, exercise any prerogative in the Board's administration
of Section 9 of the Act. '20 1 In its 1942 decision in Southern
Steamship Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusionary rule, finding it "wholly reasonable to remove any possielection in the absence
bility of intimidation by conducting20 the
2
of the employer's representatives.1
Yet prior to the Court's decision, the Board announced that
since the election in dispute in Southern Steamship Co. it had
reversed the rule, permitting employers to place observers 2at
03
the polls to challenge ineligible voters and to verify the tally.
The Board immediately imposed limits on employer observers,
barring supervisors and others too "closely identified with an
employer. '20 4 Nevertheless, the right to station observers at
the polls clashed with the rule excluding employers from the
campaign. The inconsistency was plain in the Board's language.
In 1942, in its Seventh Annual Report, the Board explained that
"each party to the election has an equal number of observers to
represent it at the scene of the balloting.... Company observ199. American France Line, 4 N.L.R.B. 1140, 1141 (1938).
200. Id.
201. Southern S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 31 (1940), enforced, 120 F.2d 505 (3d
Cir. 1941), enforcement denied on other grounds, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
202. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 37 (1942).
203. Southern S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 31 n.3a.
204. Watkins Brick Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 500, 500 (1953).
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ers are usually nonsupervisory personnel. ' 205 Yet that same
year, in American Tube, the Board characterized the employer's insistence that it was "a party to the election" as a
2
"deception." 06
The demise of the rule set forth in American Tube followed not simply from the tension between its exclusion of employers from campaigns and their status as parties to the
adjudicatory phases of representation proceedings. In addition,
the creation of an electoral contest in which one party could
campaign while the other had to remain silent contradicted
traditional notions of political freedom. 20 7 Even in the debates
over the Wagner Act, employers argued that an election with
only one candidate was incongruous. It was a simple proposition, asserted the counsel for one employers' association:
"[G]uidance from two different sources, each of which tends to
disclose and correct the frailties of the other, stimulates wholesome discussion and thinking. '208 A representative of the National Publishers Association used more colorful language to
make the same point: If an employer were "hog tied," employees would be subject to "bulldozing," and an election would
"not register the real choice of a body of employees. '20 9
205. 7 NLRB ANN. REP. 35 (1943) (emphasis added).
206. American Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 130, 132 (1942) (emphasis added), enforcement denied, 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 768
(1943).
207. The discussion that follows, in addition to the foregoing, is premised
on the fact that most union elections involve only one union. GOLDFIELD,
supra note 104, at 207 (noting that between 1972 and 1984, 94% of union elections involved only one union). The perception that employers are candidates
may be diluted when more than one union is competing, at least in the eyes of
voters. Empirical research suggests that employees are more likely to vote for
representation in elections involving competing unions. See id. at 204, 207
(finding a 76.4% union victory rate in multi-union elections, compared to a
49.1% union victory rate in all elections between 1972 and 1984); Gary N.
Chaison, The Outcomes of Multi-Union RepresentationElections Involving Incumbents, 13 PUB. PERSONNEL MGT. 435, 436-37 (1973) (reporting similar finding); Ronald L. Seeber, Union Organizing in Manufacturing: 1973-1976, in 1
ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 1, 23, 26 (David B. Lipsky &
Joel M. Douglas eds., 1983) (same).
208. 1934 Senate Hearings,supra note 18, at 1019 (brief of Walter G. Merritt), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 1057.
Merritt was counsel to the American Anti-Boycott Association, which sponsored several important pieces of pre-Wagner Act litigation, for example,
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (the Danbury Hatters Case). See Daniel
R. Ernst, The Lawyers and the Labor Trust: A History of the American AntiBoycott Association, 1902-1919, at 143 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Princeton University).
209. 1935 Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 280 (statement of Guy L. Har-
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In a dissent from a 1946 Board opinion barring employers
from forcing employees to listen to anti-union campaign
speeches, Member Gerald D. Reilly contended that the Board
should recognize employers as candidates. Later that year
Reilly helped to draft the Taft-Hartley Act, and in his dissent
he aired the theory he would soon incorporate into the new legislation.210 Acknowledging that the parallel between employers
and aspirants to political office was not precise, he suggested
that "the candidates are the choices on the ballot"--self-representation and union representation 2 1 1-and he therefore maintained that the notion of the employer as a candidate was "no
more far-fetched than viewing the employees themselves as
candidates. '212 The problem was that the forces supporting one
choice-self-representation--could not match the resources
"available to national industrial unions. ' 213 The employer,
Reilly concluded, should be considered a proxy for the choice of
214
self-representation, a necessary rival to the union.
According to this theory, employer campaigning was not
only necessary to insure true freedom of choice in representation elections; it was also protected speech, just like that of a
candidate for political office. At a time when the ordinary haggling between buyer and seller was unprotected, 2 15 employers
rington, National Publishers Association), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 1666.
210. Mniis & BROWN, supra note 76, at 377.

211.

Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 813 (1946) (Member Reilly, dissent-

ing), enforced as modified, 167 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 812-13. The Chamber of Commerce echoed this logic during
the debates over the 1977 reform bill. It was "essential," the Chamber reasoned, that "voters in union elections, as well as political elections, have the
opportunity to become fully informed," and "this require[d] that both the
union and employer have an adequate opportunity to communicate ... with
employees regarding the issue of union membership." 1977 House Hearings,
supra note 106, pt. 2, at 542 (statement of Robert T. Thompson, Chairman, Labor Relations Committee, National Chamber of Commerce).
215. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642, 645 (1951); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). Even Roger Baldwin, the founder of the
American Civil Liberties Union, rejected the contention that "the act unreasonably restricts employers' rights of free speech." Roger Baldwin, Organized
Labor and Democracy, in CIVIL LIBERTIES AND INDuSTRiAL CONFLICT 3, 27
(1938). "An employer may advertise his anti-union sentiments in the press or
in public speeches," Baldwin reasoned, but he "may not address them directly
to his employees in an effort to prevent their joining a union." Id. The ACLU
itself, however, criticized the Board's decision in Ford Motor Co., 4 N.L.R.B.
621 (1937), in which the Board found that Ford had conducted a violent antiunion campaign and ordered the company, among other things, to cease dis-
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sought in both the courts and Congress to elevate to the status
of free speech their campaigns to persuade employees to continue to bargain as individuals. 2 16 The Board's placement of the
contest over union representation in an exclusively electoral
framework lent new power to employers' arguments that their
campaign rhetoric belonged at the core of the liberties pro2 17
tected by the Constitution.
In 1945, reversing a decade of Board precedent,2 1 8 the
Supreme Court declared that the First Amendment protected
tributing anti-union literature. The ACLU found this aspect of the order to be
an overbroad restriction of the employer's speech. American Civil Liberties
Union, Memorandum on the Ford Case (March 1938), Robert F. Wagner Papers, box 5, file 58 (Georgetown University).
216. Employers' right to free speech was a central issue during the 1939
hearings. GRoss, supra note 48, at 180-81, 198, 207-08, 253. In fact, the House
version of the Wagner Act contained a provision that "nothing in this act shall
abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press, as guaranteed in the first
amendment to the Constitution," but it was deleted in conference. 79 CONG.
REc. 10,259 (1935), reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATIE HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 3260.
217. Cf. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) ("[1It can
hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.").
The same argument surfaced in 1977 and 1978 against reforms that would have
limited employers' opportunity to campaign. Senator Robert T. Stafford asserted, "It is only elemental democracy that the employee have equal access to
the arguments of each side before he casts his secret ballot. Surely, a citizen
should have the same right in his employment decisions that he does in choosing among candidates to represent him in Government." 124 CONG. REc.
14,324 (1978).
218. In the 1941 case of NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S.
469 (1941), the Court suggested, but stopped short of holding, that employers
had a First Amendment right to resist unions. The case involved not an election but the creation of a company union. In finding that the employer dominated the union, the Board relied on a bulletin posted throughout the
operations and a series of speeches by high company officials urging employees
to form and join an independent organization. Id. at 479. The Court did not
reject the Board's conclusion, but it expressed concern that the agency had
found that the speech alone constituted an unfair labor practice without reference to "surrounding circumstances." Id The Court therefore remanded the
case to the Board for redetermination of the issues. Id. at 480. On remand, the
Board again held that the employer had violated the Act. 44 N.L.R.B. 404, 440,
enforced, 132 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 533 (1943). Although Virginia Electric is often cited as marking the end of the Board's requirement of
employer neutrality, see, e.g., GROSS, supra note 48, at 248-49, it is important to
note that American Tube was decided the year after Virginia Electric. Yet it
is also important to note that Virginia Electric did convince one eminent jurist, Learned Hand, to depart from his earlier ruling that the Board could bar
employer campaigns, see NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941),
in reversing the NLRB's decision in American Tube, 134 F.2d 993, 995 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
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employers' campaign speech just as it did that of candidates in
political elections. The case, Thomas v. Collins, concerned state
suppression of union speech during a labor election campaign.219 The Court affirmed the union's First Amendment
rights, and then went beyond the facts of the case to establish
that unions and employers must have parallel rights to speak
freely in electoral contests. Presupposing that unions and employers are rival candidates in representation elections, the
Court bestowed on employers a right to campaign against
220
unions.
Thomas involved a Texas statute that required labor
organizers to register and obtain organizers' cards before soliciting members. 221 R. J. Thomas, the President of the United
Automobile Workers, traveled to Pelly, Texas to address a rally
sponsored by the Oil Workers Industrial Union (CIO) which
had petitioned for an election among a group of petroleum
workers. Prior to Thomas' speech, the State Attorney General
obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order under the
registration law. Thomas gave the speech, and he was arrested
222
and charged with violation of the law and criminal contempt.
The Supreme
Court overturned Thomas's contempt
2 23
conviction.
The Thomas Court put particular emphasis on the electoral
setting of the speech in question. The State of Texas argued
that the law was "directed at business practices" and could be
sustained if it had a "rational basis. ' 224 The Court ruled, however, that the electoral context elevated the speech above ordinary commercial interchange. 225 It noted that the speech and
rally were "incidents of an impending election for collective
bargaining agent" and, finding that the labor election was an
"occasion . . .clearly protected" by the First Amendment, it
226
ruled that the speech was protected as well.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson affirmed that free
expression was no less important for industrial democracy than
for political democracy. He highlighted the parallels between
the union election and the political election, reiterating the ar219.

323 U.S. 516 (1945).

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id at 537-38.
Id,at 519-20 n.1.
Id at 520-23.
Id at 543.
Id. at 526, 527.
Id. at 528-29.
Id at 533, 534.
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guments that had secured statutory protection of workers'
rights in order to elevate those rights to constitutional stature.
Justice Jackson began with the proposition that speech is protected because the founders "knew of no other way by which
free men could conduct representative democracy." 2 27 He then
unfolded the connections among speech, labor representation,
and political democracy:
The necessity for choosing collective bargaining representatives brings
the same nature of problem to groups of organizing workmen that our
representative democratic processes bring to the nation. Their
smaller society, too, must choose between rival leaders and competing
policies. This should not be an underground process. . . . If free
speech anywhere serves a useful social purpose, to be2 28jealously
guarded, I should think it would be in such a relationship.

For Jackson as well as for other members of the Court, it
was imperative to establish that employers had equal rights to
speak freely in union campaigns. The majority stated emphatically that "employers' attempts to persuade to action with respect to joining or not joining unions are within the First
Amendment's guaranty. '229 Jackson spun out the point in
greater detail: "Labor is free to turn its publicity on any labor
oppression . . . . The employer, too, should be free to answer." 23 0 Jackson expressly criticized earlier rulings by both
the Board and the Supreme Court that denied employers the
right "in all its breadth and vigor" to speak freely in union election campaigns. 23 ' "Free speech on both sides ... of the labor
relation is to me a constitutional and useful right," he concluded.232
Justice Douglas also concurred separately, simply
to rebut the "intimation that the principle announced in this
2 33
case serves labor alone and not an employer.
Congress codified employers' right to free speech in the
1947 Taft-Hartley Act. The Act's proponents cited the Supreme
227. Id. at 545-46 (Jackson, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 546. Derek Bok later echoed this argument: "The Supreme
Court has already made clear that speeches in representation campaigns are
generally subject to the first amendment.... And this seems only logical, for
representation elections are closely akin to political contests." Bok, supra note
6, at 68.
229. 323 U.S. at 537.
230. Id. at 547 (Jackson, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 548.
232. Id. at 547.
233. Id. at 543 (Douglas, J., concurring). After Thomas, the Board began
consistently to allow employer anti-union speech. See, e.g., Fisher Governor

Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1291, 1295-96 (1946), enforced, 163 F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1947);
Oval Wood Dish Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 1129, 1139 (1945).
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Court's opinion in Thomas to convince lawmakers that to include such a guarantee would simply confirm a constitutional
liberty.23 4 With little debate, Congress adopted a free speech
proviso. Stated in neutral terms, but intended specifically to
overrule decisions such as American Tube,2 35 the proviso made
clear that employers' expression of "views, argument, or opinion" was not an unfair labor practice unless it contained a
236
"threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
By the late 1970s employer advocates argued that management not only was free to express anti-union views, but that it
had an affirmative "right" to campaign against unions. In opposition to proposed reforms of federal labor law that would have
restricted employers' opportunity to campaign by shortening
the time between filing of petitions and elections, the National
Association of Manufacturers asserted that "an employer
should not be denied of the right to persuade his employees...
that they do not need a union." 237 According to the Chamber
of Commerce, a "careful balancing" of unions' and employers'
"campaign rights" was essential in representation elections. 238
Such notions of the equities of the labor election were central
to the defeat of the 1977 labor reform bill and found authority
in the Supreme Court's ruling in Thomas and the Taft-Hartley
239
free speech proviso.
By entitling employers to campaign like candidates, the
Board, Congress, and the Supreme Court brought to the fore
234. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947), reprintedin 1 LMRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 75, at 407, 429.
235. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1947), reprintedin 1
LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 75, at 292, 375; S. REP. No. 105, supra
note 234, at 23, reprintedin 1 LMRA LEGISLATivE HisTORY, supra note 75, at
407, 429.
236. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988).
237. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 106, pt. 1, at 145 (statement of National Association of Manufacturers).
238. See id., pt. 2, at 540-42 (statement of United States Chamber of

Commerce).
239. Previous scholars have accepted this conception of employer and
union as contending candidates. Julius Getman and his colleagues argued that
the very fact that elections give employers an opportunity to campaign is a
"powerful nonempirical argument supporting the preference for elections."
GurMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 136. This is because the "concept that each

party should have a roughly equal opportunity to persuade the voters is fundamental to the democratic process." Id. Derek Bok, too, while acknowledging
that "this principle is not expressly set forth in the statute," nevertheless
found a requirement of fairness to both union and employer "central to the
very idea of an election." Bok, supra note 6, at 53. But see Weiler, supra note
6, at 1813-16 (arguing that employers should have no right to campaign).
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the tension between political freedom and economic inequality.
The campaign rule also distilled the significance of speech to
the balance of power in the workplace. Not only did the law
governing the employer's role depart from early constructions
of the Wagner Act, it also derived from a different reading of
the power at stake in the employment relationship. The Wagner Act explicitly recognized the economic inequality of employers and the employed-as the Board held in American
Tube, the law zealously guarded employees' rights on account
of their "economic dependence." 2 40 In the aftermath of the
Thomas decision and the Taft-Hartley Act, however, solicitude
for employers' equal right to speak freely displaced the notion
that employer speech amounts to an exercise of economic authority. As the representation election assumed a cardinal position in labor law, political liberties overrode legal efforts to
redress economic disenfranchisement. Industrial democracy
had provided the legitimating metaphor for labor's new rights
to representation, but that metaphor came full circle to justify
employers' right to induce workers to refuse representation.
III. FREE SPEECH AND EMPLOYER AUTHORITY
Just ten months after the Taft-Hartley Act took effect, the
Board confronted the task of guaranteeing employees' freedom
to choose representatives while respecting employers' freedom
of speech. In the 1948 case of General Shoe Corp.,24 ' the Board
invalidated a labor election on the grounds that the employer's
campaign precluded employee free choice. A pivotal case, General Shoe generated a complex jurisprudence of objectionable
campaign conduct, and its standards for measuring electoral
misconduct still guide Board law today. In General Shoe the
Board held that speech could be grounds for invalidating elections in representation cases even though, under the Taft-Hartley Act's free speech proviso, it could no longer be wholly
2 42
barred as an unfair labor practice.
General Shoe also stands as a landmark case in setting
forth a new model of the labor election. In balancing employee
rights to vote freely with employer rights to speak freely, the
Board found the political model inapposite. The ruling relied
240.

American Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 133 (1942), enforcement

denied, 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
241. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), enforced, 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
242. Id. at 126.
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not on political metaphors but instead on scientific metaphors.
It termed the labor election an "experiment" that should be
conducted under "laboratory conditions" so as to gauge accurately employee desire.243 Imposing a standard of pristine fairness, the laboratory model dictated stringent regulation of
campaigns, which was a procedure at odds with the rhetorical
license permissible in political elections. 2 4 In later decisions,
however, the Board did not apply this model uniformly. Veering back and forth between metaphors of science and politics,
the Board restricted employer speech in some cases while
countenancing employer coercion in others. Nor was this the
only inconsistency rooted in the Board's mixing of metaphors.
In General Shoe the Board responded to the Taft-Hartley guarantee of free speech by erecting an alternative barrier against
employer coercion. Yet the potent political image of employer
and union as rival candidates thereafter led the Board to hold
both parties to the strict scientific standard of the "laboratory."
A. A LABORATORY FOR DEMOCRACY
The election at issue in General Shoe occurred before the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.24 5 The employer conducted a
campaign through letters, pamphlets, and speeches that, in the
Board's opinion, "undeniably were calculated to influence the
rank-and-file employees in their choice of a bargaining representative. '246 Supervisors visited workers at their homes "for
the purpose of dissuading them from selecting the Union. '247
On the eve of the election, the company's president had the employees brought to his office in small groups and read them an
"intemperate anti-union address."2 4 8 In the spring of 1947 the
trial examiner held that this "intensive anti-union campaign"
was an unfair labor practice. 249 After the Taft-Hartley Act
243. Id. at 127.
244.

While campaign finance is regulated in political elections, the content

and location of campaign speech remains unregulated. See, e.g., Stephen D.
Sencer, Read My Lips: Examining the Legal Implications of Knowingly False
Campaign Promises,90 MICH. L. REV. 428, 440-42 (1991) (discussing judicial reluctance to punish false campaign promises). For a discussion of regulation of
campaign finance, see generally David Cole, FirstAmendment Antitrust: The
End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 236
(1991).
245. 77 N.L.R.B. at 124.
246. Id. at 125.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 126-27.
249. Id. at 125.
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took effect, however, the Board found itself "constrained" to
disagree with the examiner.250
The Board held that Taft-Hartley's free speech proviso protected General Shoe's campaign but also found that the campaign provided grounds for setting aside the election. In so
doing, the Board uncoupled the question of whether conduct
was an unfair labor practice from the question of whether such
conduct required the Board to overturn election results. The
Taft-Hartley Act stipulated that speech was not, and could not
be used as evidence of, an unfair labor practice.2 5 1 In General
Shoe, however, the Board held that the employer's conduct
warranted overturning the election.25 2 The Board noted that
this remedy was extraordinary, and it acknowledged that it
could not "police the details surrounding every election" and
had, in the past, only "sparingly" exercised its power to order a
new election. 25 3 Yet the Board ruled that in the case of "excessive acts"-when the "record reveals conduct so glaring"-the
election should be invalidated.25 4 Such glaring conduct, according to the Board, must imperil "employees' freedom of
choice," 25 5 and in General Shoe it found this point had been
reached. Although lawful under the Taft-Hartley free speech
proviso, the employer's campaign "created an atmosphere calculated to prevent a free and untrammeled choice by the
25 6
employees."
In General Shoe the Board not only created a new category
of offense in order to escape the literal reach of Taft-Hartley's
free speech proviso, it also broached a new theory of the union
election. In American Tube and many other early Board cases,
the Board had simply barred employer campaigns as unfair labor practices-illegal intrusions into elections in which employers had no protected interest. This approach was no longer
available after the Taft-Hartley Act, which codified the political
model of employer and union as rival candidates. The Board
therefore formulated an alternative model, founded on the
premise that "[ain election can serve its true purpose only if the
surrounding conditions enable employees to register a free and
250. Id.
251.

Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101,

§ 8(c), 61 Stat. 136, 142 (1947) (current version at 29

252.
253.
254.
255.

77 N.L.R.B. at 126.
Id
Ird.
Id.

256. Id.

U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988)).
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untrammeled choice for or against a bargaining representative."25 7 From this premise, which focused on the conditions
requisite to employee freedom, the Board went on to deduce a
scientific theory of the election:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a labora-

tory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as
nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the
employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our
duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled. When, in the
rare extreme case, the standard drops too low, because of our fault or
that of others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not present and
the experiment must be conducted over again. 2 5 8

The laboratory metaphor drew on the notion of the union
election as a form of fact-finding that had figured as a minor
theme in congressional debates in 1935 and 1 9 3 9.29 The theory
of the election as an experiment conformed with its function as
evidence within a trial-type proceeding. An appeal can be
taken from a trial judgment and, if the judgment resulted from
inadmissible evidence or was otherwise tainted, the case can be
remanded for retrial. Likewise, a contaminated experiment
can be rerun.
The sterile, scientific model of the union election put forward in General Shoe, however, was strikingly inconsistent
with the vital, contentious world of democratic politics. In fact,
in a later ruling the Board explicitly acknowledged that in order to insure employees' free exercise of the franchise, it had
adopted "safeguards more rigorous than those applied in the
arena of democratic procedures which lie at the very heart of
our form of government. '260 The model of a laboratory where
the "atmosphere" can be regulated, "surrounding conditions"
controlled, questions of "degree" examined, variables isolated,
257. 1d.
258. Id. at 127 (footnote omitted). The Board asserted that the uncoupling
of the standard of objectionable conduct from the definition of unfair labor
practices was not an innovation, citing cases in which it had held union conduct objectionable despite the absence of union unfair labor practices in the
law prior to the Taft-Hartley Act. Id, at 127 n.1O. The standard applied in
these earlier cases, however, was markedly different from laboratory conditions. Just three years before General Shoe, the Board had declared, "[a]bsent
violence, we have never undertaken to police union organizations or union
campaigns." Maywood Hosiery Mills, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 146, 150 (1945); cf National Tea Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 774, 779 (1942) (overturning election because of
violence).
259. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
260. Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 530 (1973), enforced, 500 F.2d 914
(8th Cir. 1974).
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and improper influences removed 26 ' hardly describes the format of a political campaign. Nor are the "uninhibited desires"
of voters a fixed substance that can be distilled through repeated trials. The laboratory metaphor and its remedial correlate, the rerun election, challenge the ideal of popular
sovereignty intrinsic to representative democracy.
In General Shoe, moreover, the Board did not specify exactly what influences would contaminate union elections. It
neither held that all employer campaign speech warranted upsetting election results nor stated that only employers could
pollute the election experiment. Rather, in finding evidence of
inordinate employer influence, the Board spoke of "the rare extreme case." 262 It dismissed American Tube as a precedent, distinguishing the speech at issue in the two cases. The Board
stated that the conduct in General Shoe was more offensive, involving "no mere campaign speech" of the type at stake in
American Tube.2 63 According to the Board, the speech went
"so far beyond the presently accepted custom of campaigns directed at employees' reasoning facilities... that the election results could not be taken to represent the employees' own true
2
wishes." 6
What distinguished the speech in GeneralShoe was neither
its content nor that it was uttered by the company president.
Rather, the Board differentiated between lawful employer
campaigning and unlawful interference with employee freedom
of choice by focusing on the site of the employer's expressive
activity. The question "of degree" concerning the "requisite
laboratory conditions" ultimately reduced to a question of
place. 265 The Board drew a line around those places where employer speech constituted an inherent exercise of authority
over employees, ruling that speech in those sites invalidated
elections. In General Shoe the Board identified as the "extreme" conduct requiring a new election both the dispatch of
foremen to "propagandize employees in their homes" and the
giving of speeches to small groups of employees in the office of
the company president. 266 The Board justified the line around
the president's office by reasoning that it was "the very room
which each employee must have regarded as the locus of final
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. at 126-27.
Id at 127.
Id. at 126.
Id at 127.
See id. at 126-27.
Id
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authority in the plant. '267 Thus, in striking a balance between
employers' liberty to speak and employees' free exercise of the
franchise, the Board adopted a spatial rule. Yet the Board did
not explain why the line should encompass employee homes.
B. THE Locus OF AUTHORITY
The Board's decision in General Shoe generated a complex
and contradictory body of doctrine. The decision itself drew
immediate criticism from the Special Joint Congressional Committee on Labor-Management Relations, which proposed an
amendment that would have overturned General Shoe by stipulating that the Taft-Hartley free speech proviso extended not
only to unfair labor practice cases but also to representation
cases. 26 8 The amendment was not adopted. Nonetheless, in
General Shoe and subsequent rulings in representation cases,
the Board gave scrupulous consideration to employers' freedom
of speech. 269 In fact, apart from prohibiting threats and
promises, which were specifically exempt from the free speech
proviso, the Board turned away from the task of regulating the
content of employers' campaign speech and increasingly focused on its location.2 0 As one member observed, the Board
had shifted by the late 1940s from "an exclusive concern with
what was said by employers to employees, to the issues involved in how and where such speeches were given." 2 71 After
267. Id
268. Joint Comm on Labor-ManagementRelations, S. REP. No. 986, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 6-7, 54-55 (1948). The Joint Committee was established

by the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, sec. 401, 61 Stat. 136, 160 (1947). The Senate's
1978 reform bill contained a similar provision. See S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 6 (1978).
269. For example, in Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962), the
Board reaffirmed its holding that the free speech proviso did not apply in representation cases, but noted, "[t]he strictures of the first amendment, to be
sure, must be considered in all cases." Id at 1787 n.ll.
270. The Board continued to prohibit threats and promises as allowed by
the free speech proviso. See, e.g., Playskool Mfg. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1417, 1419
(1963) (threats); Wagner Elec. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 532, 533 (1967) (promises);
see also WILIAMS, supra note 91, at 151-90 (discussing cases involving employer threats), 130-46 (discussing cases involving employer promises). It also
began to restrict both employer and union misrepresentation, see, e.g.,
Hollywood Ceramics Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 226 (1962), and racially inflammatory speech, see, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 72 (1962); see
also WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 25-66 (discussing cases involving misrepresentation), 97-108 (discussing cases involving appeals to racial prejudice).
271. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 412 (1953) (Member Murdock, dissenting in part). Murdock actually stated that this shift began the
year before Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act in Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B.
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the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, the Board sought to delimit
the places and circumstances conducive to equality between
employer and employee, and to distinguish them from those in
which the employer's authority precluded free discussion of the
representation question. But that scheme of categorization has
produced blatantly contradictory and incoherent rulings. Unable to define clearly the locus of authority, the Board sharply
and arbitrarily restricted employer campaigning while simultaneously allowing coercive forms of employer speech outside of
the proscribed sites.
The tensions in the Board's approach were conspicuous
even in General Shoe. In finding that the office of the company
president constituted the "locus of final authority" and that
speech uttered there constituted objectional conduct, 272 the
Board did not state whether employer authority could pervade
other company sites. Nor did it state how the rule applied if
the layout of a workplace did not so neatly match its chain of
command. Moreover, while presupposing that speech in the
"locus of final authority" starkly emphasized employer economic authority, the Board also found objectionable the dispatch of foremen to "propagandize" against the union at
employee homes. 27 3 In a single case, then, the Board held that

employer speech is coercive both in the site most closely identified with and tightly controlled by the employer-the locus of
final authority-and in the site seemingly most remote from
the locus of final authority and most closely identified with and
tightly controlled by employees-their homes.
After General Shoe, the Board could not stably fix the "locus of final authority." Seeking to equate employer authority
with a particular location, the Board wandered throughout the
workplace. In the 1957 case of People's Drug Stores, Inc., the
Board found objectionable the employer's interviews of employees in the backrooms and basements of its stores.2 74 The Board
acknowledged that there was nothing physically distinctive or
socially symbolic about these places. Still, it reasoned, "[t]he
very fact that employees were summoned by management representatives to a place, removed from their work stations,
which has been selected for that purpose by management rep802 (1946) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 211-14). 107 N.L.R.B.

at 412.
272. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948), enforced, 192 F.2d 504
(6th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
273. Id. at 127.
274. 119 N.L.R.B. 634, 636 (1957).
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resentatives imparts to the place selected its character as 'the
locus of final authority in the plant."'2 5 Dissenting, one Board
Member accused his colleagues of detaching the restriction
from its original physical moorings, creating "'a roving situs'
for 'the locus of final authority.' "276 That was exactly what the
Board had done.
In People's Drug the Board tacitly recognized that employer authority is not confined to any particular space in many
plants and offices. Thus, the Board tried to define the locus of
final authority in more abstract terms by deciphering the social
meaning of various sites in the workplace. Territory familiar to
employees or where they were gathered as a group, the Board
reasoned, should not be cordoned off against employer
speech. 277 If the employer addresses employees "in open areas
of the plant, where they are not unaccustomed to find themselves," the Board held in a case decided the year after People's
Drug, the speech is likely to result in "free and open discussion
with both management and employees enjoying the confidences
and assurances which are normal aspects of collective and
group activities. '278 The Board explained that "a critical element underlying" the locus doctrine was the "isolation" of
small groups of employees from their workmates.27 9 In part,
this rationale served to reconcile the seemingly conflicting
prohibitions of employer speech both in the locus of final authority and in employee homes. According to the Board, employer speech is coercive if addressed to isolated employees,
even in their own homes, while speech to large groups, even in
sites closely identified with management, is not.280 Yet the ele-

ment of unfamiliarity in the locus doctrine remained discordant
with the ban on home visits.
The Board's emphasis on employee unfamiliarity with the
275. Id.; see also National Caterers of Virginia, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 110, 112
(1959) ("The unusual act of setting up two chairs in a corner of the storeroom
which also contained the manager's desks.., reasonably led employees to believe that the location was a locus of managerial authority.").
276. 119 N.L.R.B. at 642 (Member Jenkins, dissenting). For a case involving a truly "roving" locus, see Phelps Dodge Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 531, 533 (1969)
(finding supervisor's truck to be locus of final authority).
277. 119 N.L.R.B. at 636.
278. Mead-Atlanta Paper Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 832, 834 (1958), enforced, 268
F.2d 938 (10th Cir. 1959).
279. Id.
280. Tuttle & Kift, Div. of Ferro Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 848, 849 (1959). The
Board has cited isolation as a rationale for the ban on home visits. See Peoria
Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 547 (1957).
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site finally severed the locus doctrine from the original concern
with employer authority. In the 1974 case of NVF Co., 2 8 1 the
Board elaborated that strand of the doctrine that had first been
articulated in People's Drug. In NVF, the employer's general
manager called nearly every eligible voter into his office in
groups of five to six to solicit their "no union" vote. 2

2

The

Board's Regional Director overturned the election on this
ground, but the Board reversed. 283 Although the speech took
place in the general manager's office, the Board reasoned that
"the employees were familiar with this office since they had
occasion to visit it to obtain loans from, or discuss grievance
matters with, the general manager. '' 284 The site "thus had no
special impact of awe upon the employees," the Board flatly
concluded.28 5 In other words, precisely because the employer
exercised its economic prerogatives in the office, ruling on
workplace disputes and dispensing financial favors there, employees were accustomed to the site, and it therefore was not
the locus of final authority. By the Board's reasoning, familiarity might not breed outright contempt, but at least it counteracted employee "awe" of authority.
NVF not only extended the rule of unfamiliarity so as to
undermine the original rationale for the locus doctrine; it also
drastically narrowed the concept of isolation. NVF thereby
contradicted the Board's holding in General Shoe that speeches
delivered to groups of twenty to twenty-five employees were
objectionable. 286 In NVF the Board held that employees "were
not singled out" because they were addressed in "groups of five
or six." 28 7 In view of the "size of the groups," the Board con-

cluded, "there is no reason to believe that the individual employee considered that he was singled out by the Employer for
special attention and thus for special pressure. '2 8 Apparently,
the Board barred only utter isolation of individual employees in
281. 210 N.L.R.B. 663 (1974).
282. Id. at 663.
283. Id
284. Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
285. Id, see also Crane Carrier Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 206, 207 (1958) (holding
that a conference room was not a locus of authority because employees met
there with the company president to discuss "production and personnel

problems").
286. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126-27 (1948), enforced, 192 F.2d
504 (6th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
287. 210 N.L.R.B. at 664.
288. Id.
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the locus of final authority.289
Two decades before NVF, however, the Board had developed a separate line of precedent founded on exactly the converse of the proposition that employer authority is most
palpable when employees are isolated from one another, and
that it is diluted among large groups of employees. In the 1953
case of Peerless Plywood Co., the employer assembled all of its
employees the afternoon before an election to hear an antiunion speech by the secretary-treasurer of the company. 290 The
Board invalidated the election. Based on "experience with conducting representation elections," the Board held that such
"last-minute speeches" delivered to "massed assemblies of employees" had an "unwholesome and unsettling effect and tend
to interfere with that sober and thoughtful choice which a free
'291
election is designed to reflect.
In Peerless Plywood the Board announced a prohibition of
"election speeches on company time to massed assemblies of
employees" within the twenty-four hours preceding an election.292 The rule still stands today. Under this rule, employers
do not engage in objectionable conduct simply by campaigning
within the last twenty-four hours before an election. Company
officials may even systematically address every employee individually within the twenty-four hour period.2 93 Rather, to run
afoul of the rule, employers must address a "massed assembl[y]. '294 In Peerless Plywood, the Board found the employer's speech coercive because of the "mass psychology" of
the group, in contrast to the danger of isolation underlying the
locus of final authority and home visit decisions.295 In General
Shoe and its progeny, the Board has created a jumble of inconsistent and nonsensical rules, relying on rationales running
289. Even utter isolation was not enough in Flex Prods., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B.
1117 (1986). In that case, the company president individually called 120 of the
164 employees into the plant manager's office. The Board nonetheless found
that there was no evidence "that the employees were being singled out for special pressure" because they knew that the president was meeting "with virtually every employee." 1d. at 1118.
290. 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 428 (1953).

291. Id. at 429.
292. Id. (emphasis added). It is notable that in the political context, the
Supreme Court has struck down restrictions on campaigning on election day.
See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966) (striking down ban on electionday editorial endorsements).
293. Associated Milk Prods., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 879, 879 (1978).

294. PeerlessPlywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. at 429.
295.

Id
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from the symbolic meaning of place, through group dynamics,
to mass psychology.
The unintelligibility of Board jurisprudence on employer
influence is most striking in its rulings on the question of "captive audience" speeches. Since General Shoe, the Board has
continued to overturn elections based solely on employer
speech if the speech is uttered under conditions that highlight
the employer's economic authority. 296 Meanwhile, however,
the Board has also held that the free speech proviso protects
employers' flagrant use of economic power to insure an audience for their speech and to prevent the audience from responding. 297 Although the Board in Peerless Plywood forbade
employers from delivering speeches to massed assemblies of
employees on company time during the twenty-four hours preceding an election, it left employers free to make such "captive
audience" speeches before the twenty-four hour period and
even during the insulated period so long as the speeches are not
given to large groups of employees.
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board ruled that captive
audience speeches were unlawful. In the 1946 case of Clark
Bros. Co., the Board found that an hour before the polls opened,
the employer shut down the power and engines in its plant, all
operations were suspended, and the foremen directed the employees to listen to "anti-CIO campaign speeches.., broadcast
throughout the entire plant."298 In effect, the Board held, employees were compelled to listen to the speeches because their
employer "controlled the manner in which the employees occupy their time. ' 299 Only by leaving the plant could employees
have escaped the speeches, which they were "not at liberty to
do during working hours. ''3 °0 Therefore, employees were not
"free to determine whether or not to receive" the employer's
"aid, advice, and information." 30 1 By wielding its "economic
power" to hold an employee audience captive, the Board ruled,
the employer committed an unfair labor practice. 30 2
In Clark Bros., the Board was careful to spell out that it
was not restricting the "expressions of opinions," but only the
296.
297.
298.
1947).
299.

See supra notes 274-92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 308-25 and accompanying text.
70 N.L.R.B. 802, 804 (1946), enforced as modified, 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.
Id.

300. Ia
301. Id at 805.
302. Id
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compulsion to listen involved in captive audience speeches. 30 3
The compulsion was not "an inseparable part of the speech,"
the Board held. 30 4 For an employer to hold captive an audience
of employees was as much an illegal use of force as "the act of aspeaker in holding physically the person whom he addresses in
order to assure his attention." 30 5 The Board concluded that the
"law may and does prevent such a use of force without denying
the right to speak. '306 Distinguishing between exercise of "superior economic power" and liberty of speech, the Board found
3 0° 7
that the employer was "coercing its employees to listen.
Since the Taft-Hartley Act, however, the Board has refused
to separate the compulsion to listen from the freedom to
speak.3 08 Only two years after Clark Bros., the Board approved
employers' use of captive audience speeches.30 9 Construing the
free speech proviso, the Board stated explicitly that its "language... and its legislative history, make it clear that the doctrine of the Clark Bros. case no longer exists. ' 310 In General
Shoe the Board recognized that the free speech proviso was on
its face limited to unfair labor practice cases. Nevertheless,
since the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, the Board has not
granted the alternative remedy of overturning elections solely
on the basis of employer captive audience speeches. 311 By 1975,
303. Id. at 806.
304. Id. at 805.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. The Senate Report on the Taft-Hartley Act specifically disapproved of
Clark Bros., but it stated that the case stood for the proposition that employer
speech was unlawful merely because it took place "in the plant on working
time." S. REP. No. 105, supra note 234, at 23, reprintedin 1 LIRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 75, at 407, 429. At least one witness called for
"[e]xpress repudiation" of the captive audience doctrine. Labor Relations Program: Hearings on S. 55 Before the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 2139 (1947) [hereinafter 1947 Senate Hearings] (statement of Earl Carroll, Earl Carroll Theater-Restaurant).
309. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948).
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., S & S Corrugated Papers Mach. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1364
(1950). In S & S Corrugated, the Board concluded that, under Babcock, employer captive audience speeches alone could not form the basis for a finding
that the employer had interfered with its employees' free choice of representation. Id. The Board later limited the holding of S & S Corrugated when it
overturned an election prior to which a retail employer had promulgated a
broad, privileged no-solicitation rule and then delivered a captive audience
speech within a few days of the election. See Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B.
608, 611-13, 614 n.12 (1951) ("To the extent that our decision herein may be
deemed inconsistent with the Board's decision in S & S Corrugated..... that
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even a liberal Board member declared that he had "no quarrel
with the view that the Act does not preclude an employer from
calling his employees together as a 'captive audience' to hear
12
his anti-union views."'
Although the Board ratified captive audience speeches on
account of the free speech proviso, such conduct involves an element of coercion easily distinguishable from expression. The
captive audience speech is diametrically opposed to the "free
and open discussion"3 13 the Board professes to promote. For
unlike voters at a political rally, employees can neither freely
decide whether to attend such meetings nor exit if they dislike
what is being said. As a union witness explained to Congress in
1947, "addressing captive workers over plant loud-speaker systems during compensable working hours is a form of free
speech, not enjoyed by a Senator seeking to influence a majority of his constituents in a pending election. A Senator can only
hope that his auditors will not turn the dial."3 '- 4 The Board

even upheld the discharge of an employee who discretely left a
captive audience meeting, affirming a trial examiner's holding
that workers have "no statutorily protected right to leave a
meeting which the employees were requiredby management to
attend on company time and property to listen to management's noncoercive antiunion speech designed to influence the
outcome of a union election."3 15 By focusing exclusively on the
speech, the Board blinked at the fact that the discharge was an
exercise of economic power punishing the employee who dared
not to listen to anti-union speech.
Furthermore, while the Board has barred employers from
campaigning in the "locus of final authority," holding that the
very site inhibits free discussion, it has nonetheless affirmed
employers' power to stifle such discussion in captive audience
decision is overruled, but Babcock & Wilcox is adhered to."). The decision in
Bonwit was consistent with S & S Corrugatedto the extent that each case recognized the employer's right to give captive audience speeches. As the Board
stressed in Bonwit, it did not proscribe such speeches, but rather the employer's discriminatory application of a no-solicitation rule against the union.
Id.at 614-15.
312. J.P. Stevens & Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 850, 854 (1975) (Member Fanning,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), enforced, 547 F.2d 792 (4th Cir.
1976).
313. Mead-Atlanta Paper Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 832, 834 (1958) (explaining the
locus of authority doctrine).
314. 1947 Senate Hearings, supra note 308, pt. 3, at 1270 (statement of
George Q. Lynch, Pattern Makers League of North America).
315. Litton Sys., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (emphasis added).
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meetings. According to the Board, it is lawful for employers
deliberately to exclude union supporters from captive audience
meetings. In the 1970 case of Luxuray of New York, a women's
apparel manufacturer directed its supervisors to send all employees to a series of campaign meetings, but to keep at work
the union's organizing committee and a few other employees
suspected of being prounion. 31 6 The trial examiner conceded
that through this tactic the employer "did its best to inhibit the
free play of discussion. 3 1 7 Yet the examiner found the exclu31 8
sion lawful, and the Board upheld his finding.
If employers allow union supporters to attend compulsory
campaign meetings, they can still silence them by prohibiting
all employee discussion. The Board has ruled that an employer
may "attempt to further its antiunion campaign by conducting
a captive audience meeting and by declaring that no questions
would be answered in the course thereof. 3 1 9 Similarly, once a
meeting is in progress, an employer may remove an employee
who persists in trying to ask a question despite instructions that
no questions would be fielded. In a 1967 captive audience case,
the Board unequivocally declared that an employer has "no
statutory obligation to accord the employees the opportunity to
speak." 32 0 In fact, although employers cannot lawfully fire employees who speak out spontaneously during a captive audience
meeting,3 2 ' they may lawfully fire employees who evince a concerted plan to voice union support.32 2 As the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals declared in reversing the Board's decision to
reinstate an employee who had the "temerity to ask questions" 323 at a captive audience meeting, it is not a forum in
which "'employees must be placed in the status of equals in
dealing with management.' "324 The Board has spun an intricate web of rules in its attempt to delineate the places and cir316. 185 N.L.R.B. 100, 101 (1970), enforced in part, 447 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1971).

317. I& at 103.
318. Id at 100 n.1.
319. F.W. Woolworth Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1980), enforced, 655 F.2d
151 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
320. Hicks-Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 806, 814 (1967).
321. Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 51, 51 (1973), enforced in part,
500 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1974).
322. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 850, 850 (1975).
323. Id at 851 (Member Fanning, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
324. NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 11 (8th Cir. 1974) (quoting NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 1972)).
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cumstances in the workplace that inhibit "free and open
discussion" of the union question. Since the Taft-Hartley Act,
however, the Board has disregarded employers' use of their material power to force employees to listen to anti-union speech, a
3
discussion scarcely free or open. 2

C. THE WORKPLACE AS POLITICAL SPACE
Not only in captive audience meetings, but throughout the
workplace, the Board has affirmed the power of employers to
suppress speech and discussion. The realities of employer authority and employee dependence, so obvious in the captive audience meeting, exist during the entire work day and in every
site at the workplace. As the Board observed about the employment relation, employers have the "ability to control [employee] actions during working hours."326 Any time, then, that
employers campaign during work time, they necessarily use
their "control" to influence the outcome of union elections. Dependent on their jobs, employees are no more free to leave the
work site to avoid employer speech than they are to depart
from a captive audience meeting. In either case they are subject to discharge or at least a loss of pay. As Chief Justice Earl
Warren declared, "Employees during working hours are the
classic captive audience." 32 7 Although the Board has recognized the workplace as a "privileged and effective forum," 328 it
has failed to define the entire workplace a locus of authority.
Nor has the Board given employers and unions equal rights to
campaign in the workplace: It allows employers not just to
campaign but to prevent unions from doing so.
In Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 329 the Supreme Court affirmed the significance of the workplace as political space. The
Court upheld Board rulings that barred most employers from
prohibiting both employee discussion of union representation
during breaks and distribution of union literature during nonwork time in nonwork areas of plants and offices. 330 The Board
325. One study of over 200 elections found that employers used captive audience speeches in 67% of the elections. JOHN J. LAWLER, UNIONIZATION AND
DEUNIONIZATION: STRATEGY, TAcTIcs, AND OUTCoMEs 145 (1990).

326. Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 805 (1946), enforced as modified, 163
F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
327. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting in part and concurrizg in part).
328. Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1634, 1635 (1953).
329. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
330. 1d. at 805.
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has held, however, that employers may lawfully prohibit employees both from campaigning for unions during work time
and from distributing union literature in work sites.3 31 It is
even lawful for some employers, such as retail stores and hospitals, to prevent employees from campaigning during their own
time if they are in areas open to the public.3 32 Conversely, employers are free to interrupt production and address employees
333
on the union question anywhere in the workplace.
The disparity between rights to speak for and against union
representation extends still further. The Supreme Court has
allowed almost all employers to bar union organizers from the
workplace,3 - 4 a rule Justice Clarence Thomas recently reaffirmed in his first opinion for the Court.3 3 5 In all but the most
remote sites, such as logging camps, mines, and mountain resort
hotels, Justice Thomas held, "'an employer may validly post
his property against nonemployee distribution of union literature.' "336 According to the Board, in controlling workplace access, employers may not discriminate against unions among
other outside solicitors. If they permit charitable solicitation,
337
for example, they also must also permit union solicitation.
Similarly, they may not permit employees to distribute antiunion literature but not pro-union literature. 338 Employers,
however, are fully at liberty to conduct their own campaign in
331. E.g., Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 (1962) (upholding
ban on employee distribution of literature in work areas); Peyton Packing Co.,
49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943) (upholding ban on employee campaigning during
work time), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
This line of cases is discussed in William B. Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1964).
332. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 495 (1978) (agreeing
with Board that solicitation may be banned in "immediate patient care areas,"
but disagreeing on the definition of such areas); Goldblatt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B.
1262, 1263 (1948) (holding that solicitations may be banned on a retail store's
sales floor).

333. See supra notes 308-15 and accompanying text (discussing NLRB approval of employer captive audience meetings).
334. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (holding

that an employer may prohibit nonemployees from distributing literature on
company property when there exist reasonably available alternate channels of

communication).
335. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
336. Id. at 848.
337. See, e.g., Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 1206, 1207 (1981), enforcement denied, 677 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1982).
338. See, e.g., Columbus Mills, Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 31, slip op. at 1 (May
31, 1991).
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the workplace, while
excepted.

excluding

all others-unions

not

If employers use the workplace to campaign, however, they

falsify any claim that a neutral purpose underlies the exclusion
of union campaigns. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia recognized this in a ruling that the Supreme Court
would later strike down. The court of appeals reasoned that
the employer, having distributed "certain amounts of literature
at certain places at certain times," could not simultaneously
claim that union distribution "of the same quantity of literature
at the same places and at the same times would be disruptive of
order or cleanliness... [or otherwise] a detriment to his operation." 339 For a fleeting moment in 1953, the Board did outlaw
this discriminatory conduct. In MetropolitanAuto Parts,Inc.,
the Board recognized the employer's right to seal the workplace against all campaigning, but it held that if an employer
"chooses to enter the representation campaign and utilizes company time and property to present his views, he uses a 'privileged and effective forum' which he may not in fairness refuse
to the opposition. '340 Only nine months later, however, in Livingston Shirt Corp., the Board reversed course.3 1
In Livingston the Board conceived of the employer's use of
the workplace to campaign, together with its exclusion of unions, as an exercise of the right to free speech.3
Thus, the
Board held that a rule requiring union access to company property attached a penalty on the exercise of a right. The requirement of access was tantamount to a fine, an "obligation"
imposed on the employer to "donate his premises and working
time to the union for the purpose of propagandizing the em339. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1956), qff'd
in par, rev'd in part,357 U.S. 357 (1958).
340. 102 N.L.R.B. 1634, 1635 (1953). This rule was suggested by the Second
Circuit's opinion in NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947). The
Board earlier had required union access only when an employer promulgated
a broad, privileged no-solicitation rule (for example, in a department store)
and delivered captive audience speeches. See, e.g., Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96
N.L.R.B. 608, 611-13 (1951).
341. See 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
342. Id at 404-06. In this context, as in the regulation of captive audience
meetings under Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953), the Board has
undermined its own absolutist free speech position by continuing to require
union access when an employer both promulgates a broad, privileged no-solicitation rule-of the type allowed in retail stores and hospitals-and uses company time to campaign against the union. See May Dep't Stores Co., 136
N.L.R.B. 797, 800-02 (1962), enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
The Board first approved of this exception in Livingston, 107 N.L.R.B. at 409.
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ployees.' '343 The Board found no evidence of unlawful discrimination in the fact that the employer exercised its right to speak
while barring the union from speaking. Instead, the Board concluded just the opposite. It found that the workplace was the
employer's "natural forum," just as the union hall was the "inviolable forum for the union to assemble and address employees,"3 44 and it denied any "distinction in principle" between
granting union access to the workplace and "admitting an employer to the union hall for the purpose of making an antiunion
speech."3 45 Two years later, the Board reasoned that "management prerogative certainly extends far enough so as to permit
an employer to make rules that do not bind himself."34 6 Under
Board doctrine, then, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate between a party and a nonparty to a union election. Yet
the employer may lawfully discriminate in a much more invidious manner-between parties-by freely using the workplace
to campaign while barring the union.
In NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, the Supreme
Court affirmed this doctrine.3 4 7 In that case, company supervisors distributed literature that was "anti-union in tenor" while
"all employees-whether they [were] for or against the union"
were forbidden from distributing literature.3 48 The Court rejected the notion that in entering a campaign the employer incurs an obligation not to exploit its authority over the
workplace. Rather, the Court held that the Board could mandate equal access to the workplace only upon evidence that exclusion "truly diminished" the union's ability to get its
"messages to the employees."34 9 Since this decision, the Board
has not accepted the invitation to prove in particular unfair labor practice cases that without equal access to the workplace
343.

Livingston, 107 N.L.R.B. at 406.

344. Id.
345. Id. at 407. During the 1977 House debates over the labor law reform
bill that included a guarantee of equal access to the workplace, an amendment
was introduced to "balance" the guarantee by also granting employers access

to union property. See Nash, supra note 92, at 74, 80 n.27. The Senate reform
bill actually contained such a "balanced" access provision. S. REP. No. 628,
supra note 105, at 23, 47.
346. Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1154 (1955), enforced as modifzed sub
nom. United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
aff'd in par4 rev'd in part,357 U.S. 357 (1958).

347. 357 U.S. 357, 363 (1958).
348. Id. at 359.
349. Id. at 363. The Court also rejected the claim for equal access because
the pro-union employees had not requested an exception to the solicitation
rule. Id
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unions cannot compete equally with employers in election campaigns.3 50 In deciding representation cases in which the free
speech proviso by its express terms does not apply, the Board
has not departed from the rule established by Livingston and
Steelworkers. To the contrary, the Board continues to allow
employers to exempt themselves from restrictions on
campaigning in the workplace.
On the Board itself, however, dissenting opinions have
been voiced. As one Board member pointed out in Livingston,
the central issue that employer workplace campaigning raises is
not one of speech or discrimination, but rather one of authority.3 51 In other words, the wrong at issue is interference with
employees' right not to listen to employer campaign rhetoric.
Finding that the employer's campaign in the factory deployed
the "economic power inherent in his control of his employees
at the situs of their employment," the Livingston dissent construed the requirement of equal access to be "in the nature of
requital." 352 The dissent viewed the entire workplace as a locus
of authority and would have subjected employer speech at the
"situs of employment" to the same restrictions that employers
apply to union speech. 353 Such a rule would have neutralized
one facet of employer influence owing to their superior economic power.
The weight of employer authority in the workplace is augmented by the Board's practice of holding union elections
350. In General Electric Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1251 (1966), the Board indicated that it would "defer any reconsideration" of the question until it had
evaluated the effects of its new rule, set forth in Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,
156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239 (1966), that required employers to provide unions with
a list of employees' home addresses within seven days after the Board directed
an election. The Board, however, has never reconsidered the issue. This is
true even though empirical evidence suggests that denying access truly diminishes unions' ability to communicate with workers. In their study of 31 elections, Getman and his colleagues found that 83% of the employees attended at
least one company meeting while only 36% attended at least one union meeting. GETmAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 92. More importantly, very few employees who did not already intend to vote for a union attended its meetings while
nearly the same percentage of union supporters and opponents appeared at
company meetings. Id Finally, undecided voters who eventually voted for the
union, and those initially opposed to it who switched their sentiments, were
more likely to have attended union meetings and to be more familiar with the
union's campaign than undecided voters and company supporters who eventually voted against the union. Id at 103-04.
351. See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 421 (1953) (Member Murdoch, dissenting).

352. Id.
353.

Id at 420-21.
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there. Currently, the Board instructs its agents that the "best
place to hold an election" is the worksite and, further, that absent "good cause to the contrary" the election must be held
there.s3

4

The Board's Chairman reported to Congress in 1977

'35 5
that elections conducted elsewhere are "a rarity.
Substantial advantages accrue to the employer when the
workplace is the election site. Unions and employers do not
have equal access to the area proximate to the polling place.
Even though the workplace is generally the only place where
all employees gather and even though working conditions are
ultimately at stake in the election, if the polling takes place at
work, the employer may lawfully keep the union at a distance
from the balloting. In fact, refusal by union organizers to leave
the workplace during an election is grounds for overturning the
results.3 56 The practical effect is that employers can campaign
among employees on election day, and even during the polling,
but unions cannot.
The advantage to employers surpasses having the last
word. Because voting usually occurs on company time and
company property, employees cast their votes when they are
being paid by and are under the control of the employer, who
may lawfully monitor their movements as they enter and exit

the polls. 3 5 7 Just recently, the Board upheld an election where

one company supervisor checked off the names of employees on
a list as they entered the employer's van to ride to the polls,
354. NLRB, supra note 91, § 11302.2.
355. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 106, pt. 1, at 411 (responses of John
H. Fanning, Chairman, NLRB, to inquiries). The Treasurer of the Chamber of
Commerce testified during the 1977 hearings that he was aware of only one
election which had been held away from employers' property. 1977 Senate
Hearings, supra note 167, pt. 1, at 990 (statement of Robert T. Thompson,
Chairman, National Chamber of Commerce).
356. Phillips Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. No. 7, slip op. at 3
(Aug. 12, 1991). The Board reasoned that such a challenge to "the Employer's
assertion of its property rights" would not be lost on employees as they vote.
I at 3.
357. Even if employees are on leave or on their day off on the day of the
election, employers are permitted to pay them for the time they spend coming
to work to cast their ballot. See, e.g., Rod Lion, 301 N.L.R.B. No. 7, slip op. at 2
(Jan. 9, 1991); see also Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 286 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1052
(1987) (holding that employer could provide expenses incurred in voting).
Such payments were cited as evidence of employer domination in testimony
concerning company unions given during the hearings on the Wagner Act.
1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 253 (statement of William J. Long,
President, Weir Cove Lodge No. 30, Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel,
and Tin Workers), reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 27, 283.
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and another checked off their names as the employees entered
the employer's facility housing the polls.-58 Board procedures
attempt to limit employer control of the actual release of employees to vote by providing that one observer for each party,
after informing "the applicable supervisor," should notify employees that they are free to vote. The procedures specify that
3' 5 9
"the actual releasing should not be done by a supervisor.
Yet the Board's own language of "releasing" suggests that employer authority prevails except for the moment when the employee steps inside the private sanctuary of the voting booth.
Employer advocates frankly acknowledge that holding
elections at the workplace may tilt the vote in the employer's
direction. The manual, Preventive Labor Relations, explains:
"Union supporters are, almost by definition, more determined
or dedicated than company supporters and those who remain
uncommitted. An election conducted on 'neutral' ground would
'360
probably reduce the size of the vote in the wrong quarters.
Among employers, it is an article of faith that their "best interest lies in maximum turnout for the election.

' 36 1

Empirical re-

search corroborates that high turnout favors no representation,
presumably because the "uncommitted" will, if brought to the
polls, vote to preserve the status quo,3 62 and turnout for union

elections is extraordinarily high. In political elections, turnout
is just over fifty percent in presidential election years and less
than forty percent in off-year elections, 363 and it is even lower
among the working class. 36 In contrast, turnout in union elections has not dropped below eighty-three percent since figures
became available in 1948.365 The difference derives partly from
358. American Nuclear Resources, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. at 2-3
(Oct. 29, 1990).
359. NLRB, supra note 91, § 11330.4.
360. KILGOUm, supra note 104, at 291.
361.

CORNELIUS QUINN ET AL., MAINTAINING NONUNION STATUS 205 (1982).

362. John T. Delaney, Union Success in HospitalRepresentationElections,
20 INDUS. REL. 149, 155 (1981); Herbert G. Heneman III & Marcus H. Sandver,
Predicting the Outcome of Union Certification Elections: A Review of the
Literature,36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 537, 544 (1983); Seeber, supra note 207,

at 20.
363. MIcHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN
POLrTICS 1992, at xxxvii (1991).
364. See Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further 'Reflections on the
DistinctiveCharacterof American LaborLaws," 1990 WIS. L. REv. 1, 53 (finding 47% turnout among working class voters, compared to 77% among higher
income voters).
365. Turnout has remained virtually constant varying from a low of 86% in
1982 to a high of 91% in 1964. See 13-54 NLRB ANN. REP. app. A (1949-1990)
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the convenience of voting at work and partly from the salience
of the economic issues involved in union representation, 366 but
it also reflects employers' ability to use their authority on the
non-neutral ground of the workplace to muster a high
367
turnout.
That employers stand to gain when the workplace is the locus of the election is perhaps best evidenced by their willingness to open their property to the balloting. The Board has no
authority to order employers to put the voting booths on their
premises, but employers almost always assent. As the Board
Chairman testified before Congress in 1977, most employers
"prefer" to situate union elections on their property. 368 It is a
(compiling annual data regarding voter turnout in a table entitled "Types of
Elections Conducted").
366. See, e.g., GETMAN Er AL., supra note 6, at 28.
367. The cases are replete with descriptions of employer efforts to insure
that all employees vote. See, e.g., Harvard College, No. 1-RC-19054, slip op. at
24-25 (NLRB Oct. 21, 1988). During the debates over the Wagner Act supporters of company unions also heralded high voter turnout in elections of company union representatives. See, e.g., 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at
367, 370, 383, 388, 415, 421, 493, reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 1617, 1753, 1756, 1769, 1774, 1801, 1807, 1879. But detractors
cited evidence of workers "actually [being] driven to the polls on the end of a
riot stick," 1934 Senate Hearings,supra note 18, at 252, reprinted in 1 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 282, as well as more subtle pressures to vote, see id. at 233, 255, 487, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 263, 285, 521.
Myron Roomkin and Richard Block present an alternative explanation in
A PreliminaryAnalysis of the Participation Rate and the Margin of Victory
in NLRB Elections, in 34TH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE INDuSTRiAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 220 (1981). They find that participation is inversely related to the closeness of elections, but that this relationship is
stronger in union victories. 1d. at 224. They speculate that the difference is
caused by employees balancing the probability that their vote will affect the
outcome against their fear of retaliation from the loser, a fear that is stronger
if they expect the employer to be the loser. Id.
368. 1977 House Hearings,supra note 106, pt. 1, at 412 (response of John H.
Fanning, Chairman, NLRB, to inquiries). During these same debates, several
employer representatives threatened that if the reforms were adopted, employers would begin refusing to so accommodate the Board. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 167, pt. 1, at 990 (statement of Robert T. Thompson,
Chairman, National Chamber of Commerce); H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note
105, at 77-78.
Unions ordinarily do not object to elections taking place on employers'
property. This is primarily because, under the Board's regulations, employer
ownership of the property clearly is not grounds for objection-otherwise
"good cause" would exist in every case and the employer's premises could not
be characterized as the "best place" to hold an election. NLRB, supra note 91,
§ 11302.2. Moreover, unions may fear that employers will use the union's objection as a campaign issue, informing employees that it was the union that
wanted to make voting more inconvenient.
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preference that follows directly from employers' right to campaign and is the logical conclusion of what the Board early on
termed the employer's "superior economic power" in the
369
workplace.
In General Shoe the Board embarked on the project of regulating campaign conduct in order to guarantee employees' liberty of the franchise in the aftermath of the Taft-Hartley Act's
guarantee of free speech to employers. The body of contradictory doctrine the Board formulated expressed both its refusal
to exclude employers from the union election and its inconsistent construction of their place in that contest. The Board
partly abandoned the political model, while failing to devise a
coherent "scientific" alternative. On the one hand, the Board
perceived that the economic authority intrinsic to the employment relationship distinguished employers from candidates in
political elections. On the other hand, in deferring to employers' statutory right to campaign, the Board upheld their coercive use of authority in the workplace. In General Shoe the
Board read the Taft-Hartley Act's terms strictly, holding that
37 0
the free speech proviso did not apply in representation cases.
Subsequently, while respecting this precedent, the Board nonetheless paid deference to employers' freedom of speech in ruling on objections to employer campaign conduct. Thus,
employers were endowed with political liberties in the very locus of their economic dominion. Accordingly, the Board could
not separate employers' freedom to speak from their ability to
command, nor could it confine employers' authority to particular sites, leaving the rest of the workplace safe for democracy.
D.

THE "MUTuAmTY ARGUMENT"

Unlike the employer, a union stands in relation to unrepresented employees no differently than do candidates to voters in
a political election. The union holds no lawful power, economic
or otherwise, over the constituency it seeks to represent-it
371
does not hire, fire, or control the working day of employees.
369. Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 805 (1946), enforced as modified, 167
F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
370. 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948), enforced, 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951), cert
denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
371. Some craft unions and unions that are active in the maritime trades
do exercise power over unrepresented workers through the operation of hiring
halls. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 672-74 (1961).
These unions are, however, unlikely to seek representative status through an

election.
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Even the most coercive campaign tactics, such as uttering
threats, therefore carry different meaning when unions execute
them than when employers do. When employees cast their ballots, they know that, if the union loses, it will have no economic
authority over them and probably will leave the workplace.
Conversely, win or lose, the employer retains control over their
livelihoods. Despite the secret ballot, the employer can make
highly effective threats-for example, by raising the specter of
plant relocation. A losing union has no equivalent authority
over its prospective constituency. The different status of the
two parties in the workplace suggests that different sets of
rules are needed to assure that neither employee nor union interferes with employee free choice. General Shoe pointed in
that direction. Yet the laboratory model provided no basis for
distinguishing between employer and union, and the political
model continued to present a powerful case for treating the two
parties equally. Since General Shoe the Board has imposed virtually parallel restrictions on unions and employers despite the
utter lack of union authority in the unorganized workplace.
The question of whether federal law should restrain unions
as well as employers was perhaps the chief point of contention
in the debates over the Wagner Act. Opponents of the Act insisted on parity between the contending parties. As one industry economist put it, "In all fairness, the same elements of
coercion, intimidation, interference, and restraint should be de372
clared unlawful if indulged in by either labor or employer.
Yet proponents of the Act rebutted the "erroneously conceived
mutuality argument. 3 73 They pointed out that state law already barred union coercion and that enacting federal prohibitions would raise "the ghosts of many much-criticized
injunctions" issued by federal courts in an earlier era.37 4 Ac372. 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 682-83 (statement of Leslie
Vickers, Economist, American Transit Association), reprinted in 1 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 720-21. The National Association of

Manufacturers proposed an amendment to the Wagner Act prohibiting both
employers and unions from coercing employees, largely in an effort to prevent
the bill's passage. GRoss, supra note 14, at 140-42.
373. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2300, 2316. Wagner's chief aid, Leon

Keyserling, formulated the Senator's counterarguments in Leon Keyserling,
Memorandum on Coercion From Any Source: The Bill Preserves Mutuality,
Robert F. Wagner Papers, box 2, file 2 (Georgetown University).
374. S. REP. No. 573, supra note 373, at 16, reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2300, 2316. For a discussion of the injunction
era see FORBATH, supra note 2, at 59-97.
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cording to the Senate Committee Report, the argument that
"labor organizations should be no more active than employers
in the organization of workers... would defeat the very objects
of the bill."375 The Wagner Act did not proscribe any union
practices as unfair.37 6 Nevertheless, the Board went on to hold
that egregious union campaign conduct could warrant invalidating an election, 377 and the Taft-Hartley Act codified the "mutuality argument."
Taft-Hartley's proponents vociferously
contended that "management should be afforded equal rights
with unions under the Wagner Act. 3 78 The 1947 Act not only
protected employer campaigns, it also established a set of union
379
unfair labor practices.
Paradoxically, the Board cited pre-Taft-Hartley cases that
overturned elections due to union campaign conduct as precedent in General Shoe.38 0 In that case, the Board voided the
election based on employer speech that did not amount to an
unfair labor practice. It erected a new, heightened standard for
judging campaign conduct, adopting the metaphor of "laboratory conditions," but it did not specify that the standard applied
only to employers. 38 ' Since General Shoe, adhering to the conception of union and employer as vying candidates, the Board
has judged both by the strict standard of the laboratory.38 2
375. S. REP. No. 573, supra note 373,1at 16, reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2300, 2316.

376. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 449,
452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988)).
377. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 169, 171-72 (1944) (finding
that a union's posting of a wage increase notice the day before a runoff election was ground for overturning the union's victory over a competitor union).
378. 1947 Senate Hearings,supranote 308, pt. 2, at 911 (statement of Hugh
H.C. Weed, Vice President, Carter Carburetor Co.).
379. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101,
§ 8(b), 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1988)).
380. 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 n.10 (1948), enforced, 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
381. See id. at 127.
382. See infra notes 391-96, 401, 403-05 and accompanying text. Between
1964 and 1989, employers made at least a quarter of the objections filed each
year. Employer objections account for a high of 50% of total objections in 1982
to a low of 26% in 1964. 28-54 NLRB ANN. REP. app. A (1964-1990) (compiling
annual data regarding objections in a table entitled "Objections Filed in Representation Cases Closed, by Party Filing.")
Derek Bok suggests that in the absence of an empirical basis for conclusions about the effects of campaign tactics, the argument "that comparable restrictions have been placed on the other side" became an "attractive basis for
justifying intervention." Bok, supra note 6, at 74 n.92. There is also a procedural explanation for the application of strict standards to unions. Because
the only way that rulings in representation cases can reach the courts is
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To be sure, neither the Board nor the courts have entirely
dismissed differences in the positions of employers and unions
in the workplace. Some restrictions apply only to employers.
Rejecting the claim that the Board used a "double standard" to
overturn elections based on employer promises of increased
benefits while allowing union pledges to secure higher wages,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals graphically stated the distinction: "An employer in an unorganized plant, with his almost absolute control over employment, wages, and working
conditions, occupies a totally different position in a representation contest than a union, which is merely an outsider seeking
entrance to the plant. '38 3 On occasion, the Board too has
spurned the notion of parity. In rejecting an employer's objections to a union's lowering of a membership assessment in the
midst of a campaign, the Board denied that the union's tactic
was "analogous in principle to that of an employer who, with a
purpose to defeat a union, grants to employees a benefit he
would not normally have granted." 384 The union's action, unlike the employer's, could "scarcely be viewed by the employees
as a warning that, if the union is not obliged, the employees
may be made to suffer later," the Board declared. 3 85 "[I]f the
union is not obliged-that is, if it loses the election-it can have
'3 6
no effect on the employees in the future whatsoever.
The Board also has recognized "a substantial difference"
between employers and unions in assessing the impact of visits
to employee homes. 38 7 "Unlike employers, unions often do not
have the opportunity to address employees in assembled or informal groups, and never have the position of control over tenure of employment and working conditions which imparts the
coercive effect to systematic individual interviews conducted by
employers," the Board has stated.388 Unions not only have
"more need" for home visits, "but, more important, lack the relationship with the employees to interfere with their choice of
through employers' refusals to bargain, the courts cannot review Board rulings
on union objections or Board rulings sustaining employer objections. The only

Board rulings which reach the courts are those rejecting employer objections
to unions' conduct. See supra note 119 (explaining the process by which rul-

ings in representation cases reach the courts). A one-way, upward ratchet
thus operates on the standards governing union conduct.
383. NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26, 30 (5th Cir. 1969).
384. Primco Casting Corp., 174 N.L.R.B. 244, 245 (1969).
385. Id,
386. Id.
387. Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131, 133 (1957).
388. Id
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representatives thereby."38 9 In cases concerning interrogation,
surveillance, and speech in the locus of final authority, the
Board has also distinguished between the contending parties. 390
In evaluating campaign conduct, however, the Board has
never systematically examined the different standing of unions
and employers in the unorganized workplace. Not only has the
Board applied the same "laboratory" standard to the conduct of
each party, it has uniformly imposed rules that are senseless
when applied to unions.391 In Peerless Plywood Co., for example, the Board set forth the twenty-four hour rule in neutral
terms: "[E]mployers and unions alike will be prohibited from
making election speeches on company time to massed assemblies of employees within 24 hours before the scheduled time
for conducting an election. '3 92 Yet how can a union, often forbidden access to the workplace, make a speech on company
time to a massed assembly of employees?
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, in IndustrialAcoustics Co. v. NLRB, that a union had violated the
twenty-four hour rule. 393 In that case, a union, turning acoustics to its own industrial ends, parked a car with a loudspeaker
outside a plant gate and broadcast music and campaign rheto389. Id. at 134.
390. Unions are free to ask employees about their sentiments while employers are not. See, e.g., Springfield Hosp., 281 N.L.R.B. 643, 643 (1986), enforced, 899 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1990); Kusan Mfg. Co., 267 N.L.R.B. 740, 746
(1983), enforced, 749 F.2d 362 (6th Cir. 1984). Union interrogation is found to
be objectionable only when it concerns support for a rival union or decertification effort and is coupled with threats. See, e.g., Graham Eng'g Co., 164
N.L.R.B. 679, 695 (1967); Retail Clerks Int'l Assoc., Locals 698 & 298, 160
N.L.R.B. 709, 710, 720-21 (1966). Employer polling is restricted, although the
Board has recently loosened the restriction. See Rossmore House, 269
N.L.R.B. 1176, 1177 (1984), enforced, 760 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting a
per se rule against employer interrogation in favor of test based on the circumstances of each case). Notably, the Board has flatly barred all employer polling once a petition is filed, holding that such polling "does not ... serve any
legitimate interest of the employer" even though political candidates routinely
poll before elections. Struksnes Constr. Co., Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063
(1967). Employers are barred from engaging in surveillance of union activities,
but the restriction does not apply to unions. ATR Wire & Cable Co., 267
N.L.R.B. 204, 210 (1983), enforced, 752 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985). Finally, by its
terms, the locus of final authority doctrine cannot be applied to unions. See
supra notes 268-89 and accompanying text.
391. In fact, the Board has insisted on its even-handed treatment of employers and unions. See, eg., Oak Mfg. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1324 n.4 (1963)
(explaining that union and employer preelection conduct is subject to similar

standards).
392.
393.

107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953).
912 F.2d 717, 721 (4th Cir. 1990).
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ric. 394 The court noted that "some employees wear ear plugs

during work" and that "the speeches were inaudible... while
the machinery was in use" and could mainly be heard during
the lunch break. 395 Still, the court had "no difficulty" finding
that the employees were a captive audience that could not avoid
hearing the broadcasts, and therefore ruled that the union's
396
speech violated the per se rule and "tainted" the election.
Because in Peerless Plywood the Board had phrased the twentyfour hour rule in neutral terms, union organizers who are
locked outside the plant gate speaking through megaphones are
now equated at law with company presidents who hold the keys
to the gates and speak to the employees assembled silently inside at their direction.
The neutral application of campaign rules has led the
Board to prohibit innocuous union conduct of the sort in which
candidates for political office routinely engage. For example,
the Board stated in neutral terms a seemingly arbitrary rule
against keeping lists of voters, barring "anyone from keeping
any list of persons who have voted, aside from the official eligibility list. '3 97 Like political candidates, however, unions often
keep lists of those who have cast their ballots in order to "get
out the vote." 398
The prohibition of list-keeping makes sense only as applied
to employers. Because elections almost always take place on
employers' property, employees may perceive them as employer-staged.3 99 During the debate over the Wagner Act, its
proponents observed that the franchise in company-union elections was not free precisely because employers ran them in
their plants and kept lists of voters. "[I]f you refused to vote,
they took down your check number and name and marked you
394. Id. at 718.
395. Id at 719 n.2, 721.
396. Id at 720-22. In Industrial Acoustics, the Court followed United
States Gypsum Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 734, 734-35 (1956) (holding that union soundcar broadcasts were objectionable "in substance, albeit not in form" even
though employees "were not summoned to hear the speeches[,] . . .were not
under the control of the maker[,] . . .were not compelled to listen[,] . .. and

the attention given to the speaker by the employees was incidental while performing their duties").

397. International Stamping Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 921, 922 (1951).
398. See, e.g., Harvard College, No. 1-RC-19054, slip op. at 4-6 (NLRB Oct.
21, 1988).
399. In InternationalStamping, the son of the company president roamed
through the plant during the election with a list of employees, checking off
their names as they left to vote. 97 N.L.R.B. at 922.
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as declining to vote," testified one steel worker. 4°° Like candidates in political elections, however, unions have no legal authority over either voters or the election site. Nevertheless, a
union that stations organizers outside a set of grocery stores to
keep a list of off-duty employees going in to vote is sanctioned
equally with the employer inside who gathers the employees
together and checks off their names as they are sent to the
polls.

40 1

The legal construction of employers and unions as posing
commensurate threats to electoral freedom extends even to
finding an analogy in union conduct to the quintessential act of
management authority-the grant of economic benefits. The
danger to hirelings' political liberty that the framers of the
Constitution had seen in employer vote-buying is now seen to
emanate from unions as well. The Board bars employers from
granting wage increases and other benefits shortly before an
election. Affirming the restriction in the 1964 case of NLRB v.
Exchange Parts Co., the Supreme Court vividly described the
"danger" in a grant of benefits as "the suggestion of a fist inside
the velvet glove," that the source of benefits "may dry up if it is
not obliged. '40 2 A decade later in NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co., the Court applied the Exchange Parts theory to unions,
overturning an election on account of a union's promise to
waive a ten dollar initiation fee for signers of authorization
cards if it won the election. 40 3 The Court was even-handed in
drawing prejudicial presumptions about the threat of reprisal
signalled by the economic inducements that both unions and
employers might offer. "[W]e cannot assume that unions exercising powers are wholly benign towards their antagonists," the
Court declared. 40 4 Like the employer grant of benefits, the
promised union waiver of the fee, according to the Court, "may
well seem ominous to nonunionists who fear that if they do not
'405
sign they will face a wrathful union regime.
400. 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 487, reprinted in 1 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27, 521 (statement of George H.

Powers).
401. See Piggly-Wiggly No. 011, 168 N.L.R.B. 792, 792-93 (1967) (setting
aside election in which union kept a list of employees entering stores to vote).

402. 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
403. 414 U.S. 270, 280-81 (1973). Getman notes the connection between this
case and the "over-regulation of employer speech" in Julius G. Getman, Ruminations on Union Organizingin the Private Sector, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 69

(1986).
404. 414 U.S. at 280.
405. rd at 281. Neither the Board nor the courts, however, have extended
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The problem with this theory, however, is that the union
possesses no authority over employees if it loses a representation election. It is not that unions are any more benign toward
their opponents than are employers, but rather, as Justice
White pointed out in his dissent in Savair, that "important differences" exist between the threats employers and unions
pose.4°6 Justice White attacked the "supposed analogy" between the union's "contingent" waiver in Savair and the em40 7
ployer's "actual" increase in benefits in Exchange Parts.
Because the union "was not the representative of the employees, and would not be if it were unsuccessful in the election, [it]
could not make the same threat by offering a benefit which it
would take away if it lost the election." 40 8 Playing on the language of the earlier holding, White declared, "the union glove is
not very velvet," and "in the union context, the fist is
'409
missing.
What Justice White put so curtly has largely eluded the
Board and the courts since the enactment of the Taft-Hartley
Act: the disparity of power between unions and employers in a
workplace where employees are unrepresented. The framers of
the Wagner Act had been emphatic about that disparity of
power, repudiating the idea of "mutuality" in creating a code of
protections and prohibitions to govern unions and employers.
Yet in regulating the system of labor representation, the Board
has constructed a set of rules that in critical respects treats the
two parties equally. The Taft-Hartley Act did not dictate this
result, for even after its enactment the Board sought to circumscribe employer power with rules such as the prohibition of
speech in the "locus of final authority" in order to preserve
"laboratory conditions." Rather, the image of contending parties, equally bound by a common set of rules, derived from the
ideal of political democracy itself.
Since its creation the Board has adopted two approaches to
the problem of employee dependence so powerfully illuminated
by employer campaign speech. Before the Taft-Hartley Act,
the Board aimed to bar employer speech, thereafter literally to
this theory to reach all union promises of benefits. See, e.g., NLRB v. Golden
Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26, 30 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that a union's prom-

ise to gain benefits if it were selected did not materially affect employees' free
choice).

406. 414 U.S. at 285 (White,
407. I& at 284-85.
408.

Id at 285.

409. Id.

J., dissenting).
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confine it so as to preserve laboratory conditions. Both approaches were confounded by the sway of the political analogy:
The notion of employer and union as rival candidates undergirded not only the free speech proviso, but conversely, too, the
strict regulation of both union and employer campaign conduct.
The insertion of the democratic device of the election into a
workplace permeated by employer authority lies at the root of
a jurisprudence that countenances employer coercion and bars
harmless union conduct.
IV.

RETHINKING INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND
UNION ELECTION LAW

Since the New Deal, the guiding assumption of Congress,
the Board, and the courts has been that the system of labor representation is the analog of political democracy. However rhetorically compelling, this analogy is nonetheless too simple.
Rethinking the law requires probing beneath the layer of metaphor to take account of complexities in the analogy between labor representation and political representation--complexities
that reveal ways in which the political election is inappropriate
as a model for the union election. Not only does the election fit
differently into the schemes of representation in the workplace
and in the polity, the nature of representation itself is different
in the two realms.
Such differences highlight the anomalous presence of employers in union elections and their peculiar capacity to thwart
industrial democracy. The tension between democracy and dependence recognized by the framers of the American political
system lies buried under a thicket of union election rules. In
current labor law, the idea of industrial democracy is a fiction,
masking inequalities that subvert labor's right to representation. Law reform should point in the direction of recognizing
and redressing those inequalities, starting with the insight that
employers should neither be parties to nor accorded the rights
of candidates in union elections.
A.

COMPLICATING THE POLITICAL ANALOGY

The Wagner Act inscribed the distinctions between the
political election and the union election. In creating a system
of political representation, the United States Constitution defines the units of representation and mandates election of rep-
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resentatives at predetermined intervals. 410 The Wagner Act
was not a constitution, however. It did not mandate representation. Rather, it simply protected workers' right to organize
themselves and to designate their own representatives. The
first right named in the Act's pivotal section seven is the right
of "self-organization." 4 11 The Wagner Act and its amendments
neither define constituencies for purposes of representation nor
specify when they should elect representatives. Instead, the
law entitles workers themselves to choose how, when, and, indeed, whether they wish to be represented.
The differences between the union election and the political election have engendered many of the most disputed questions in union election law. The question of election timing, for
example, would not even arise if union elections were exactly
akin to political elections, for political elections occur periodically on fixed dates.4 ' 2 Union elections, on the other hand, follow no schedule, occurring only sporadically when employees
or unions request an election or demand employer recognition.4 13 Similarly, continual litigation would not arise over unit
determination if union elections were like political elections.
4 14
Political elections take place within predetermined districts,
but in union elections, as the Supreme Court has affirmed, the
rule has always been that the unit's composition must be newly
415
determined "in each case."
An even more crucial difference between the union election and the political election is that workers can
choose not to be represented. 416 Citizens do not have that
410. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
411. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 44952 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988)).
412. This is not true in parliamentary systems. See MARY A. GLENDON ET
AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 297-99 (1985).

413. As a 1977 House committee report pointed out, "[tihe Act does not
provide for a continuing referendum or regularly scheduled periodic polls on
unionization." H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 105, at 33.
414. Some political units, such as congressional districts, are not fixed permanently, but rather are subject to periodic redefinition. But even these units
are not redefined before every election. See ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DIsTmIcTNG 40-46 (1963).

415. American Hosp. v. NLRB, 111 S.Ct. 1539, 1543 (1991). This language
derives from the text of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988). Although the
Court in American Hospitalupheld the Board's power to make rules defining
appropriate units, it emphasized that the rules must still be applied in each
case. 111 S.Ct. at 1543.
416. The original bill Wagner introduced in the Senate in February of 1934
vested the Board with authority to investigate a "dispute as to who are the
representatives of employees." S.2926, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 207(a) (1934), re-
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choice. 417 As AFL General Counsel Joseph Padway testified
before a House Committee in 1939, offering a rare observation
on the sui generis right to labor representation: "The peculiar
part about this law as distinguished from ordinary legislative
procedure in Government, which requires the President of the
United States to be elected ... [and] the Congressmen from a
district to be elected, is that it does not require employees in a
plant to select a bargaining agent, if they do not want to. ' 418 In
other words, employees may either simply refrain from petitioning for an election or, if an election occurs, vote against representation. As Padway explained further,
In your district, that you represent ... they have an election for a
Congress, but they have got to vote for a Congressman. They cannot
vote 'No.'. . . They have got to elect you or someone else. Under the
National Labor Relations Act they can vote 'No.' They can vote 'We
do not want a Congressman, we do not want a Representative.' 41 9

The Board's Chairman stated in a 1940 opinion that "the Board
provides a place upon the ballot... where the employees may
vote 'against' the labor organization involved," or if there are
competing unions "for 'neither' or 'none.' ,,0 Unlike citizens,
printed in 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HiTORY, supra note 1, at 1, 11. This language suggested that all employees had representatives and the disputes which
needed to be resolved concerned merely their identity. The language was subsequently altered to give the Board authority over "a question ... concerning
the representation of employees." S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(c) (1935),
reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 3270, 3274.
417. At least that choice does not appear on political ballots. The question
of what the outcome would be if no one cast a ballot in a political election has
never arisen.
418. 1939 House Hearings, supra note 52, at 838 (statement of Joseph A.
Padway, General Counsel, AFL).
419. Id. at 836-37. Louis B. Boudin argued in 1943 that providing a choice
of no representation was inconsistent with the Wagner Act and political practice. "Historically, voters have always voted, at least in elections in which
there were candidates, for a certain candidate." Boudin, supra note 158, at
400.
Under the Railway Labor Act, voters are not given an express no-representation choice, but if less than 50% of eligible employees vote, certification
will not issue. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988); see Herbert R. Northrup, The Railway
Labor Act-Timefor Repeal?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 441, 496 (1990).
420. R.K. LeBlond Mach. Tool Co., 22 N.L.R.B. 465, 470 (1940) (Chairman
Madden, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Otherwise, the Chairman
continued, "a collective representative might be forced upon the employees despite the wishes of a majority." Id. In the years prior to the Taft-Hartley Act,
Member Edwin Smith insisted that if a majority of employees voted to be represented by a union, even if their votes were split between multiple unions,
the runoff ballot should not contain the choice of no union. Id. at 468-69
(Member Smith, concurring); Interlake Iron Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 55, 62-64 (1937)
(Member Smith, dissenting). Member Smith's position has always been the
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employees can entirely forego representation.
Indisputably, the union election and the political election
are alike in that both employees and citizens are entitled to
vote for representatives of their own choosing. Despite this
basic likeness, the election's function within the system of representation is dissimilar in the worlds of politics and of labor.
The union election inaugurates-it is constitutive of-the system of labor representation. In contrast, the political election is
embedded within an already institutionalized system of representative government. Prior to an election, labor lacks all formal representation in the workplace, and a union must win
representative status in the absence of any preexisting standing
in the workplace. The union, then, is unlike a minority party
seeking to regain or acquire an established place within the
political system. Before an election, the employer can deny a
union any authority; in fact, most employers shun even casual
contact with union leaders to prevent employees from mistakenly believing that the union shares authority in the shop. 421
In displacing unilateral employer authority, a union election
victory thus reorders, rather than simply renewing, the system
of workplace governance. Unlike the political election, the
union election enacts a peaceful transition from autarchy to
rule under the Railway Labor Act. See Northrup, supra note 419, at 496-97.
The other members, see, e.g., Interlake Iron Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. at 60-61, and
eventually the Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act, see Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 9(c)(3), 61 Stat. 136, 144 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988)), disagreed. Witnesses before
Congress drew an analogy between the choice of no union and that of a thirdparty candidate. One management attorney compared union elections to an
election among a Republican, a Democrat, and an Independent and asserted
that if the two major party candidates together received a majority, and "If we
followed the method the Board now has adopted we would say that the Republican and the Democrat together having received the majority of the votes,
the voters had showed they wished a party man, not an Independent, and
therefore we would leave the Independent off the ballot." 1947 Senate Hearings, supra note 308, pt. 1, at 154 (submission of Theodore R. Iserman). The
law now provides that if the choice of no union places first or second, it should
appear on the runoff ballot even if a majority of votes were cast for representation in the first election. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988).
421. Clyde Summers recently argued that employers have a duty to recognize nonmajority unions as representatives of their members only, but he acknowledges dicta to the contrary. Clyde Summers, Unions Without
Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 531, 538 n.34 (1990). Contemporary trade unionists, such as the President of the AFL Office Employees International Union, believed that the Wagner Act barred their prior practice of
bargaining solely for their members and that this prohibition made organizing
more difficult. See Paul R. Hutchings, Effect on the Trade Union, in THE
WAGNER Acr: AF=ER TEN YEARS, supra note 23, at 72, 74.

1993]

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE

democracy. 422
Not only do union elections and political elections bear different relationships to representation, the nature of representation also is different in the two realms. The union election
vests labor's representative with no sovereignty in the workplace. It is on this point-the legal authority of the union to
govern-that the analogy between industrial and political democracy is most tenuous. Although the authority of elected officials within the American political system is constrained by a
structure of checks and balances, citizens' representatives have
plenary authority within their prescribed domains. By contrast,
in the workplace the system of governance is mixed: the regime of employer authority persists alongside the new regime
of labor representation. In fact, the labor election confers no
unilateral authority on unions; they must seek employers' consent in collective bargaining to any alteration of the law of the
shop. Even before its passage, proponents of the Wagner Act
dispelled the notion that it would "turn over industry to the
employees. 42 3 As one lawmaker emphasized, labor would not
"control anything except the selection of its representatives. '424
Nonetheless, critics of the Wagner Act have often asserted
the contrary. In urging amendment of the Act in 1947, Representative Fred A. Hartley claimed that it "surrendered to the
labor barons sovereign powers over the working man and woman of the United States."
Similarly, the House Report that
recommended adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act declared that
American workers "have been subject to a tyranny more des422. Paul Weiler vividly illuminates this aspect of union elections when he
"borrow[s] an analogy from the political arena" other than the selection of
representatives in an already democratic polity to describe such elections.
Weiler, supra note 9, at 1025. Weiler asks his readers to
[i]magine a group of countries in Central America with traditional authoritarian regimes. Under pressures from a variety of sources, these
countries periodically conduct referenda about whether their citizens
will be given a guaranteed voice in national affairs and, if so, who is to
be their representative in dealing with the authorities. Naturally unhappy about this threat to their own prerogatives, the rulers are wont
to campaign vigorously against such a major step by the polity.

Id.
423. 79 CONG. REC. 9682 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Griswold), reprintedin 2
NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 3109.

424. Id.
425. 93 CONG. REC. 3535 (1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 75, at 615. Congressman Richard M. Nixon used almost exactly the same words to assail the Wagner Act. See id. at 3603, reprinted in 1
LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 75, at 727.
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potic than one could think possible in a free country.'1 6 Yet
none of the coercive practices routinely ascribed to unions-enforcing a closed shop, extracting compulsory dues, forcing employees to strike-have ever been lawful absent employer
consent and most are now unlawful even with employer consent.4 7 Only by gaining a share of employers' economic au-

thority can unions gain any coercive power in the workplace. A
majority vote for representation affords the union no authority
to set the terms of employment, yielding it only a right to negotiate about wages, hours, and working conditions, and placing
the employer under no obligation to reach agreement with the
union. 28 Unlike the political election, the union election establishes a system of representation but not of representative
government.
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the analogy between the union election and the
political election.4 9 "[W]hat is basically at stake" in labor's
right to representation, the Court declared, is "not the election
of legislators or the enactment of legislation. '430 To the contrary, the union election creates merely "a nonpermanent, limited relationship between the employer, his economically
dependent employee and his union agent."' 431 Rather than fundamentally transforming the employment relationship, the
426.

H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 235, at 3, reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGIS-

supra note 75, at 292, 295.
427. The Taft-Hartley Act prohibited the closed shop. See Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 136, 140
(1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988)). A union and employer
can agree that employees must pay a fee to the union as a condition of employment, but the union can only charge a fee equivalent to the cost of representing the employees. Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988).
Unions have no authority to force employees to strike unless they have voluntarily become members, and the Supreme Court has held that members are
free to resign at any time, even during a strike, and even if they have agreed
not to resign during a strike. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95,
100 (1985).
428. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). The only other right that hinges on certification is the right to be present at investigatory interviews of employees. See
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260-64 (1975). But the union has no
right to bargain over the discipline or turn the interview into an adversary
proceeding;, it merely has the right to be present and be heard. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 612, 613 (1980), enforcement denied, 667 F.2d 470
(5th Cir. 1982). The employer can insist that it is only interested in "hearing
the employee's own account." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260.
429. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
430. Id- at 617-18.
431. Id- at 617.
LATIVE HISTORY,
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Court reasoned, the election simply interposes the union as the
agent of the employees for the limited purpose of bargaining
4 32
with the employer.
What prompted this rare judicial statement of the disjunction between union and political elections 433 was the Court's
holding that in exceptional circumstances labor could obtain
representation without an election.4 3 The Court acknowledged
the "superiority of the election process. '435 Still, it challenged
the absolute sanctity of the election, upholding the validity of
other indicia of employee sentiment in cases where employer
coercion was so extreme as to preclude a free election. 436 In interrogation of employees, surveillance, promise of benefits, and
threats of reprisal, including plant closing, the Court found evidence of employer authority so coercive that the only remedy
was to jettison the election as a way to resolve the representation question. 437 By so ruling, the Court recognized that what
lends such force to employers' anti-union campaigns is the persistence of their plenary power even after representation elections. Accordingly, the Court distinguished between the
"economically dependent employee" and the "independent
438
voter"-between the union election and the political election.
In justifying its approval of nonelectoral means of obtaining
representation, the Court laid bare the limited authority of
union representatives.
Arguably, the direction of labor law reform should lie in
439
transforming the Gissel exception into the general rule.
Rather than making labor representation more like political
representation, the means of choosing the two types of repre432. Id
433. Gissel's is not the only such statement. In Bausch & Lomb Inc. v.
NLRB, 451 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971), the court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the Board's holding that misrepresentations could be grounds for
overturning an election. Id at 879. The court stated that "[t]he analogy of
public elections to labor representation elections falls short of compelling similarity." I&
434. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596-97.
435. Id. at 602.
436. Id. at 614-15.
437. Id. at 580-90.
438. Id at 617-18.
439. Gissel expressly held open this possibility. Id. at 595. The Board rejected it in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 723
(1971), and the Supreme Court affirmed at 419 U.S. 301 (1974). The Court simply decided in Linden, however, that the Board did not abuse its discretion
when it held that a union must petition for an election unless the employer
has violated the law and disrupted the electoral process. Id. at 309-10.
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sentatives could be differentiated. The nub of the Gissel ruling
was that precisely because labor representatives do not govern,
it is proper, at least in exceptional circumstances, for them to
be chosen by nonelectoral means. Such a return to the Board's
pre-Cudahy doctrine was a key union goal during the unsuccessful 1977 reform effort. 440
Alternatively, it could be argued that industrial democracy
should be made more like political democracy by altering the
nature of the choice presented to workers in union elections.
Such a reform would mandate employee representation, and
the question posed on the ballot would simply be which
representative. 44 1
The reforms of mandating labor representation and of
abandoning the union election both address the distinction between political and labor representation. Each would circumscribe employer influence: one by withdrawing the choice of
whether to be represented from employees and thereby also
from employers, the other by insulating the choice from employer influence. Yet each would require fundamental statutory revision unlikely in the foreseeable future. Employees
have always had the choice of no representation, and the TaftHartley Act enshrined the right "to refrain" from representation alongside workers' right to "representatives of their own
choosing."
The Act also codified the Cudahy doctrine. Indeed, the election has been central to the defense of labor representation since the debates over the Wagner Act. A proposal
to return to the pre-Cudahy rule did not even make it out of
4 43
committee during the 1977 law reform effort.
Moreover, abandoning the union election is not merely politically infeasible. It would also cut against the principle of
majority rule that is central to the union's effective representa440. See YAGER, supra note 92, at 42. More recently, Paul Weiler endorsed
such a rule, citing Canadian practice as precedent. Weiler, supra note 6, at
1806-08.
441. Paul Weiler has recently backed such reform, reaching the "pessimistic" judgment that in order to insure workers representation, it is "necessary
to take away from these employees (and also the employer) the choice about
whether such a participatory mechanism will be present." PAUL C. WEILER,
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 282 (1990). Modeled on the West German Works
Councils, Weiler's proposal is that the law create a representative body in each
workplace. Id. at 284. Elections would then be an appropriate means of filling
the seats in the body.
442. Ch. 120, sec. 101, § 7,61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1988)).
443. TOWNLEY, supra note 92, at 129; YAGER, supra note 92, at 42.
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tion of employees. The relationship between workers and unions is not a simple principal and agent relationship. Because
the majority rules, even though as a legal matter its rule
merely precludes direct dealing between individual workers
and the employer, the majority will should be expressed
through the conventional institution of the election.
The alternative proposed here is to eliminate the formal
role of employers in union elections. What complicates the
analogy between industrial and political democracy-what disrupts the symmetry between the union election and the political election-is the economic authority of employers. Because
the union election is constitutive of labor representation, employers have plenary authority beforehand; and because the
union election does not fully transform the system of governance, employer authority persists even after the choice of representatives. The material authority of employers is presumed
by the existing structure of labor law, and it would not be displaced by the reform proposed here. Rather, the proposal is to
rewrite the law to deny employers any unique avenue for using
their authority to influence union elections.
The Board should return to the principle that a union election is not a contest between the employer and the union. This
idea was set forth in American Tube,"4 and it can be implemented without abridging employers' freedom of speech. Such
a reform would accomplish directly what the other proposals
would accomplish indirectly-it would limit employers' influence on their employees' choice of whether to be represented.
Unlike the other proposals, however, it could be achieved with
445
almost no alteration of the statutory framework.
B.

REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS

The union election should not be thought of as a contest
between employer and union. This theory, as the foregoing

suggests, has obscured and ratified the disparity of power between the employer and union in the election process. Instead,

the union election should be conceptualized in terms of the category of "self-organization," the central right the Wagner Act
444. 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 132 (1942), enforcement denied, 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).

445. Congress "entrusted the Board with a wide degree of discretion in establishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free
choice of bargaining representatives by employees." NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co.,

329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946).
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guaranteed to labor. Elections are simply the final step in the
process of self-organization, expressing the extent of employee
organization and, if majority support exists, vesting the organization-the union-with the authority to represent the individual employees. Such a reconception entails the corollary that
employers should neither have legal standing as parties to the
representation proceeding nor have rights tantamount to those
of candidates in union elections.
The law leaves the Board discretion to determine the ap446
It
propriate parties to hearings in representation cases.
should exercise this discretion by specifying that the only parties to both pre- and post-election hearings are employees and
the unions seeking to represent them. If employers are denied
party status, it also follows that the Board should revert to its
earlier rule, already approved by the Supreme Court, of barring
employers from placing observers at the polls to challenge ballots, as such challenges are resolved at post-election hearings. 447
Furthermore, employers should not be allowed to refuse to
bargain after a union election victory as a tactic to provoke an
unfair labor practice charge and thus the relitigation of issues
resolved in the earlier representation proceedings. 44 8 Such a
"technical refusal to bargain" should be permitted in only one
instance: where the law excludes certain employees from a
bargaining unit in order to protect employer interests. For example, the Taft-Hartley Act excluded supervisors from the coverage of the law in order to insure that they remained loyal to
employers. 449 It would be lawful, then, for employers to refuse
to bargain concerning supervisors, managers, or confidential
employees, but not on the grounds that the unit was otherwise
inappropriate, that ineligible employees voted, or that the
446.

29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1988).

447. See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 37 (1942).
448.

See supra note 119 (discussing employers' refusal to bargain as a litiga-

tion tactic). This reform would require Congress to revise 29 U.S.C. § 159(d)
(1988). That section provides that when an order in an unfair labor practice
case is "based in whole or in part upon facts certified following" a representation proceeding, the record from the earlier proceeding shall be included in
the record on appeal from the unfair labor practice case. Id. The legislative
history of this section suggests it was intended to allow employers to obtain
judicial review of the "entire election procedure." S. REP. No. 573, supra note
373, at 14, reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2300,

2314.
449.

§ 2(3), 61 Stat. at 137-38 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988));

see Virginia A. Seitz, Legal, Legislative and ManagerialResponses to the Or-

ganization of Supervisory Employees in the 1940's, 28 AM. J. LEG. HisT. 199,
242 (1984) (discussing exclusion of supervisors).
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union engaged in objectionable campaign conduct. 450
On these latter issues employers should have no right to be
heard in either a representation case or an unfair labor practices case, even though Board rulings might indirectly affect
their duty to bargain. According to longstanding Board doctrine, the question of whether a proposed unit is appropriate
turns solely on whether employees in it share a sufficient
"community of interest" to be represented by a single union.4 51
The law's "primary concern" is that employees grouped together for collective bargaining share "substantial mutual inter'4 52
ests in wages, hours and other conditions of employment.
The requirement of appropriateness correlates with the principle of majority rule because without a "community of interest"
a single union cannot fairly represent employees. Employers
have no standing to assert their employees' right to fair representation. 453 As Wagner tersely put it, "This is not an em' '4
ployer's matter at all.
Similarly, employers should have no right to raise questions concerning voter eligibility or campaign conduct. Because
employers have no right to vote, they cast no ballots the significance of which can be diluted by the inclusion of ineligible employees. Nor, obviously, can employers be coerced in the
exercise of a franchise they do not have. Because employers
lack the formal status either of candidates vying to represent
employees or of voters, they should not be entitled to charge
that unions disobeyed the rules governing voter eligibility or
campaign conduct. On the questions of unit determination,
450. See supra note 91 (discussing these exclusions). Employers could also
refuse to bargain on the grounds that a unit contained both guards and nonguards. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1988). But an employer could not refuse to

bargain on the grounds that a unit contained both professionals (a majority of
whom had not voted for inclusion) and nonprofessionals, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b)(1) (1988), because this unit rule is designed to protect professional employees rather than employers.
451. 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 174 (1938).
452. 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 39 (1950).
453. See infra notes 487-93 and accompanying text.
454. 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 293 (statement of William
Baum and Isadore Feibleman, Employees' Mutual Benefit Association), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIV HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 1679. The
makeup of a unit may make collective bargaining less convenient for an employer, but the employer is not obligated to reach agreement with the union
representing the employees in the unit. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). If employees define a unit that does not match an employer's existing personnel structure, the Board could consider that fact in determining whether the employer
negotiated in a good faith attempt to reach agreement with the union.
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voter eligibility, and campaign conduct, only the employee constituency 45 5 and their potential union representatives should be
45 6
heard.

This redefinition of the parties to labor representation proceedings would eliminate or, at least, greatly simplify longstanding controversies concerning election timing, constituency,
and review of results. The question of timing would be answered decisively: Employees and unions alone could influence
the Board's election scheduling, a result the law has intended
all along. The Taft-Hartley Act allowed the employer to petition for an election but only after a union demands recognition.45 7 As the House Report stated, the Act preserved the
right of unions to "time the holding of an election to suit themselves." 458 By exploiting their party status in representation
hearings, however, employers have effectively influenced election timing. The proposed reform would prevent employers
from achieving indirectly what they are not entitled to pursue
directly.
Prohibiting employers from interceding in representation
proceedings would also simplify the question of constituency. It
would preclude employers from objecting to the composition of
units and the eligibility of individual employees merely as a
way to delay elections. Moreover, it would confirm that, under
455. Employees do not currently have party status in representation cases.
NLRB, supra note 91, §§ 11008.1, 11194.3. This Article suggests that the Board
should change this rule.
456. Critics of this proposal may argue that employers must be party to
proceedings that they initiate by filing petitions. It is evident, though, that unions rather than employers are the moving force in these proceedings because
an employer may only file a petition upon a union demand for recognition, 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1988), and because a union can disclaim interest in the
bargaining unit and thereby cause the Board to dismiss the petition, Ny-Lint
Tool & Mfg. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 642, 643 (1948).
Critics may also argue that employers must be party to these proceedings
because they provide essential evidence. The Board's subpoena power under
29 U.S.C. § 161 (1988), however, provides an answer to this argument, for if the
Board requires the employer's presence for evidentiary purposes, it may simply subpoena the employer.
Finally, an objection that employers should be parties to proceedings in
which their own conduct may be at issue applies equally to current procedures
in which objections may be based on the conduct of third parties. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 217-35 (discussing third-party misconduct as
grounds to set aside an election).
457. § 9(c)(1)(B), 61 Stat. at 144 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B)
(1988)).
458. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 235, at 35, reprintedin 1 LMRA LEGISLATivE HISTORY, supra note 75, at 292, 326.
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the Wagner Act and its amendments, employees and unions
have the initial authority to define the unit in their petitions,
and that the Board is generally bound to honor their definitions.45 9 In the early 1930s, the Board's precursors found that
the question of whether representation should be "by plant or
department" concerned employees alone. "It is not for the employer or for this Board to dictate the type of organization
which should be established," the National Labor Board held in
1933.460 Under current law, the question before the Board is
simply whether the requested unit is appropriate, not whether
it is the most appropriate one. 461 The exclusion of employers
from representation cases would insure, in Wagner's words,
that "employees' desire[s] will be followed in nearly every
462
instance."
Finally, denying employers standing to contest each ruling
issued in representation cases would both streamline and bring
equity to the review of election results. Congress made the results of representation proceedings nonreviewable precisely to
prevent employers from using the appellate process to delay
elections. The debate over the Wagner Act reveals that Congress aimed to bar employers from blocking elections through
appeal, as was common under the National Industrial Recovery
Act.463 In closing one door to employer delay, however, Con-

459. Even if an employer petitions, where the unit defined in the petition
differs significantly from the unit in which a union has demanded recognition,
the Board will dismiss the petition. See, e.g., Linden Lumber Div., Summer &
Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309 (1974).
460. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 1 N.L.B. 58, 61 (1933).
461. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418 (1950), enforced in
part,190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953). This principle is based on the language of § 9(a), which requires that the unit be "a unit
appropriate for such purposes." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
462. 1935 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 293 (statements of William
Baum and Isadore Feibleman, Employers' Mutual Benefit Association), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1617, 1679.
463. Employers' ability to appeal the old NLRB's election orders led to "an
almost complete strangulation of the labor boards in their efforts to obtain
elections." GROSS, supra note 14, at 93 & n.87. Chairman of the Board Francis
Biddle reported to Congress in 1935 that "in every case where the employer
has not consented to the holding of the election and the National Board has
been compelled to use its power to order an election the employer has succeeded in tying up the enforcement of the order almost indefinitely in the
courts." 1935 Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 97 (statement of Francis Biddle), reprintedin 1 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1373, 1473.
Congress drafted the Wagner Act, according to the House and Senate Reports,
to insure that this experience was not repeated. H.R. REP. No. 969, supra note
90, at 20, reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2910,
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gress opened another. The result, that employers could obtain
review of certifications only by refusing to bargain, added an
additional step to the review process. 464
If employers were neither parties to the original proceedings nor allowed to reopen the issues by refusing to bargain
(except where Congress intended to protect employer interests), the existing imbalance whereby employers have two opportunities to raise objections to an election while unions have
only one would cease to exist.4 65 Moreover, as the grounds for
refusing to bargain after an election would be significantly narrowed, few election questions would reach the courts. Most
cases would end at the Board, thereby expediting the advent of
collective bargaining.
The closing of this second door to delay would require minor revision of the statute. The Wagner Act provided that the
record from representation proceedings would become part of
the record in unfair labor practice cases when the order in the
latter was based "in whole or in part upon facts certified" in
the earlier proceeding. It also provided that appellate courts
should base review of the order issued in the unfair labor practices proceeding on this combined record. 466 This provision
clearly suggests that the court, on appeal from an unfair labor
practice case, can entertain questions that arose in the representation case, a proposition that the legislative history supports.46 7 Congress should therefore amend the statute to
2930-31; S. REP. No. 573, supra note 373, at 6, reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2300, 2305.
464. Unions appeared before Congress in 1939 and 1947 to demand equity
in the review of representation decisions. LaborRelations Program: Hearings
on S. 55 and S.J. 22 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 1054 (1947) (statement of William Green, President,
AFL). No legislation emerged from Congress in 1939, and although the House
approved an amendment that would have allowed either party to obtain review in 1947, the amendment was removed in Conference Committee. 93
CONG. REc. 6602 (1947), reprinted in 2 LIRA LEGISLATvE HISTORY, supra
note 75, at 1542. In addition, the 1977 reform bill would have limited employers' ability to obtain judicial review of certification decisions by narrowing the
standard of review. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1977), reprinted in
1977 House Hearings,supra note 106, pt. 1, at 3, 10.
465. Opponents might argue that this proposal would create a new inequity
because the union would have one opportunity to be heard and the employer
none. But, in fact, union and employer alike would have an opportunity to be
heard concerning the construction of their own rights.
466. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 9(d), 49 Stat. 449,
453 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1988)).
467. See S. REP. No. 573, supra note 373, at 14, reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2300, 2314. The legislative history states that
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narrow the scope of review obtainable through a technical refusal to bargain. It should not accord employers party status in
representation proceedings, nor should it allow them to reopen
questions resolved in the proceedings in a subsequent unfair labor practice case.
Although employers have been recognized as parties to
representation cases since the passage of the Wagner Act, they
have been denied the formal status of candidates in representation elections. They are not named on ballots; they cannot foster company unions to vie for employee votes.461 Nevertheless,
through court and Board rulings and statutory amendment, employers have incrementally acquired the rights of candidatesmost centrally the right to campaign. To remedy this, the law
should not return to the rule of American Tube, which barred
employers from campaigning against unions.469 Rather, employers should cease to gain through legal procedures and economic authority any opportunity to influence employees that is
not open to other interested third parties. They should be accorded no special privileges of speech.
Congress should refashion election procedures to eliminate
the affirmative accommodation of employer campaigning. Employers should no longer have legal capacity to delay elections
in order to gain time to campaign. Further, elections should be
removed from the workplace, where employers have the last
word. 470 Wagner himself cited voting "at the plant" as evidence
that voting in company-sponsored employee representation
plans was "not a free expression of choice." 471 The Board has
although "there shall be no right of court review anterior to... an election,"
once the Board has issued an order subsequent to the election, "the entire
election procedure becomes part of the record and is fully reviewable by any
aggrieved party" under § 10. I&
468. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
469. 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 131 (1942), enforcement denied, 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
470. Removing elections from the workplace would be consistent with the
practice of earlier labor boards. The old NLRB mandated, "Elections should
never be held in the plant where the workers are employed." LORWIN &
WUBNIG, supra note 39, at 307 (quoting Memorandum from Francis Biddle,
Chairman, NLRB, to the Regional Labor Boards (March 6, 1935)). Both the
NLB and the old NLRB found municipal buildings, churches, lodge halls, or
vacant shops in which to set up the polls. Id. at 159, 307; see also Emily C.
Brown, Selection of Employees' Representatives, 40 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1, 13
(1935) (if employees had no objection, the NLB conducted the election in the
plant, but in "many cases neutral territory was provided"). The War Labor
Board held elections both in and outside plants. NATIONAL WAR LABOR
BOARD,U.S. DEPARTmENT OF LABOR, supra note 142, at 60.
471. 1935 Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 656 (statement of Clifford U.
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plenary discretion over the election site and has rejected objections based on the holding of an election off the employer's
premises.472 All elections should take place on neutral
ground.

473

Not only must Congress refashion election rules to recast
employers as interested third parties, it must redraw the rules
to prevent employers from exploiting their singular economic
power to persuade employees to remain unrepresented. This
should be the principal objective of Board regulation of campaign conduct. As currently framed, the ostensible focus of
Board campaign law is employee free choice, but the Board
lacks a coherent theory for judging the impact of a myriad of
campaign tactics. The reform proposed here would not require
the Board to assess the impact of employer campaigning on employee voting patterns, nor would it require the Board to balance unions' and employers' rights to campaign. Rather, the
Board would consider solely whether an employer in any way
exploited its authority as employer to augment the impact of its
speech. The proposal is not that the Board deregulate union
election campaigns, although the reforms would greatly simplify the rules, but rather that the Board systematically elaborate its insight in General Shoe-that regulation is necessary to
reconcile employers' freedom of speech with employees' free
exercise of the franchise.
This new legal framework would entail a body of new campaign rules. For example, employers could not lawfully exploit
employee dependence to insure audiences for their anti-union
speech. Thus, captive audience meetings at any time, not simply during the final twenty-four hours before an election,
should be grounds for overturning an election. 4 74 Similarly, the
Cartwright, Secretary-Chairman, Employees' Representation Plan, Oklahoma
Pipe Line Co.), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at

1617, 2042.
472. See, e.g., Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1441, 1443 (1944).
473. The National Organizing NLRB Subcommittee of the AFL-CIO recently urged greater use of mail ballot elections for similar reasons. "The use
of mail ballots, " it noted, "prevents an employer from presenting the appearance that it controls the election and the election process. Locating the polling
booths on the employer's property has a negative psychological impact on the
employees and it allows the employer to engage in a wide range of last-minute
illegal tactics." Harold McIver & Jeffrey S. Wheeler, Suggested Administrative Changes in the NLRB Proposed by the National Organizing NLRB Subcommittee 5-6 (Feb. 24, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Minnesota Law Review).
474. This would be consistent with the free speech proviso, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(c) (1988), because it would not render such meeting an unfair labor prac-
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Board should not hunt through the workplace searching for the
"locus of final authority," but instead should acknowledge that
employer authority pervades the workplace and that compulsion is implicit when employers campaign during the work day.
This would not mean that employers should be unconditionally
prohibited from campaigning in the workplace. Rather, employers should be bound by their own restrictions on solicitation and distribution. 475 Such a rule would make plain to
employees that when employers campaign at work they occupy
no different position than unions. Forced to obey their own
time, place, and manner rules, employers would have to either
persuade their employees through the same means used by unions and candidates for political office-calling meetings after
work, leafletting at the plant gate-or allow balanced access to
the workplace. Requiring employers to create an open forum
to exactly the same extent that they use the workplace as a
platform would dispel any suggestion that listening to antiunion rhetoric is part of the job.
This new framework would eliminate many of the most artice, but merely grounds for overturning an election. Moreover, captive audience meetings do involve a threat-that employees will be disciplined if they

do not attend. The references to speech on company property in the legislative history do not suggest that Congress intended to insulate this form of
threat. See S. REP. No. 105, supra note 234, at 23-24, reprinted in 1 LMRA
LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 75, at 407, 429-30.
475. If an employer forbids employees from discussing the union during
work time, the employer should not be allowed to disseminate its views during
work time. If an employer posts its property against all outsiders, including
union organizers, it should not be able to bring in a lawyer or labor relations
consultant to convince workers to vote against the union.
The Supreme Court rejected an equal access argument in NLRB v. United
Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357 (1957). The argument in Steelworkers,
however, was made in the context of an unfair labor practice charge, rather
than in support of an objection, and it was issued prior to the development of
persuasive empirical evidence that a lack of equal access does "truly diminish[ ]", 357 U.S. at 363, the ability of unions to communicate with employees.
See GETMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 92, 103-04. Moreover, the Steelworkers
holding rested, in part, on pro-union employees' failure to request equal access. See 357 U.S. at 363.
The 1977 reform bills contained a requirement that the Board adopt rules
insuring equal access. S. REP. No. 628, supra note 105, at 47 (1978); H.R. REP.
No. 637, supra note 105, at 53. The arguments advanced in favor of such a requirement, however, rested on the notion of "equality of opportunities" rather
than on the argument made here. S. REP. No. 628, supra note 105, at 23. Opponents successfully argued that unions actually enjoyed campaign opportunities not available to employers (such as home visits to employees) and that
equal access would further disbalance campaign rights in favor of unions. See,
e.g., 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 167, at 952-53 (statement of United
States Chamber of Commerce).
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cane rules currently governing campaign conduct, such as the
locus rule, the ban on list-keeping and employer home visits,
and the twenty-four hour rule. In their place would be a simpler and internally consistent set of rules unified around the
principle of allowing employer speech no power beyond that of
persuasion. These rules would impose "laboratory conditions"
only so far as to enable employees freely to exercise the political right to representation within a relationship of economic
dependence.
C.

COUNTERARGUMENTS

The proposals, of course, will generate objections. What
follows is a response to the principal objections that may be leveled against each component of the proposed reforms. Opponents of the reforms might advance two sorts of objectionsone constitutional and one equitable-to the idea of excluding
employers from representation proceedings. It could be argued
that this proposed reform, along with the narrowing of defenses
to a charge of refusal to bargain, deprives employers of property or liberty without due process. It remains an open question, however, whether Board certification of a union affects an
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Moreover, even
if it does, the proposal accords employers due process.
Certification places only temporary or minor restrictions
on employers' ability to manage their businesses. Prior to certification, an employer can either deal directly with individual
employees or act unilaterally; thereafter, the employer must
bargain with the union before altering the terms of employment.476 Employers are under absolutely no legal compulsion
to reach agreement with unions, however, and if bargaining
477
reaches an impasse, employers can do as they will.
The Supreme Court emphasized the limited nature of employers' interest in the representation process when it upheld
procedures under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) that are analogous to the rules proposed here. Under the RLA, the National
Mediation Board (the equivalent of the NLRB) has the discretion to decline to hold a hearing concerning unit determina476. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
477. Employers are under a continuing injunction against dealing directly
with individual workers, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988), but after bargaining to an
impasse they can unilaterally impose the terms they would have proposed to
the individuals. E.g., NLRB v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 906 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th

Cir. 1990).
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tion. 478 When United Airlines brought suit to compel the
Board to hold a hearing on the question, "in which it would
participate as a 'party in interest,'" the Court expressly rejected its due process argument.479 The airline argued that because the RLA "compels it to treat with the representative
chosen by the majority of its employees" in an election, it had a
"direct and substantial interest in the scope of the unit" and
"due process require[d]" that it be allowed to participate in proceedings at which the issue was resolved. 480 The Court ruled to
the contrary, however, declaring that "United is under no compulsion to reach agreement with the certified representative. '481 The Court concluded that although the resolution of
the unit question "might impose some additional burden upon
the carrier, we cannot say that the.., interest rises to a status
which requires the full panoply of procedural protections."48 2
Thus, the Court dismissed precisely the objection that might be
made here, holding that employers do not have a constitutional
48 3
right to participate as parties in representation proceedings.
Although the Supreme Court has refined its due process
analysis since the decision involving United Airlines, 48 4 the proposed reform is constitutional even under current standards. In
the United Airlines case, the Court did not fully analyze
whether the certification of a union deprives an employer of
either liberty or property, but even assuming that certification
works such a deprivation, 48 5 the proposal is consistent with the
478. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (Ninth) (1988).
479. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employees v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380

U.S. 650, 666 (1965).
480. Id at 660.
481. Id. at 667.
482. Id. The Court specifically noted that "[t]o require full-dress hearings
on craft or class in each representation dispute would .... place[ ] beyond
reach the speed which the Act's framers thought an objective of the first order." Id at 667-68.
483. Arguably, the Court based its holding on the fact that the National
Mediation Board had "requested, received and considered" United's views on
the craft or class issue. Id at 666. Such submission of written argument would
be consistent with the proposal at issue here.
484. Key cases redefining liberty and property rights under the Due Process Clause are Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
485. Employers may argue that certification deprives them of their rights
under state law to alter conditions of employment unilaterally and at any time
(in the absence of express contractual limitations) and to enter into employment contracts with individual workers. Cf. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
481 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1987) (accepting the government's concession that "the
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Due Process Clause. The Clause guarantees the right to contest
the legality of governmental action.4 86 Here, the action is certification of a union. Significantly, the Taft-Hartley Act changed
the factual predicate for union certification from majority support for a union to majority selection of a union in an election.
Under the Wagner Act, employers may have had a constitutional right to contest the existence of majority support in a
hearing. In the Taft-Hartley Act, however, Congress substituted the election as a measure of employee sentiment for the
process of hearing and adjudication. By doing so, Congress statutorily altered all employers' protected interest in continuing
to deal directly with individual employees. Thus, employers
have no constitutional right in each case to argue that the results of an election do not actually reflect majority sentiment,
for such an argument would challenge the legislative judgment
that an election is an accurate gauge. The Due Process Clause
7
accords no such right.4
The Due Process Clause would not have been violated if
the Board had never created challenge and objection procedures. As Judge Gibbons of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit stated in NLRB v. ARA Services, Inc.,
"Board supervision and Board investigation with no provision
for a hearing on employer complaints would be perfectly consistent with due process for employers. '488 That the Board has
created these procedures, which, under the proposal, employees
and unions will continue to use, does not give employers a concontractual right to discharge an employee for cause constitutes a property interest").
Henry F. Farber argues that employers have no constitutionally protected
interest in certification proceedings, but the argument is flawed. He draws an
analogy between the employer's position and that of the patients in O'Bannon
v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980). Henry F. Farber, Comment, Proceduresfor Resolving Objections to NLRB Elections, 6 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 252, 260-61 (1987). In O'Bannon, the Court held that patients displaced
from a nursing home as a result of its decertification were due no process. 447
U.S. at 790. But the patients were displaced only as a practical consequence of
the government's action, while certification directly alters employers' legal
rights.
486. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 n.8 (1985).
There is, however, no right to argue for leniency or a departure from legal requirements. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977).
487. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1985); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co.
v. Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). This construction of the Due
Process Clause is consistent with that of Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act, which excepts from the Act's hearing requirement "proceedings
in which decisions rest solely on... elections." 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(3) (1988).
488. 717 F.2d 57, 67 (3d Cir. 1983).
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stitutional right to invoke or participate in the procedures.48 9
Moreover, the question here is not really whether the employer has a right to be heard, but about what it has a right to
be heard. Employers would continue to have a right to be
heard in unfair labor practice proceedings before being ordered
to bargain. The factual predicate of employers' obligation to
bargain is Board certification of a union after an election. Employers should therefore be allowed to assert that certification
has not issued, but they should not be allowed to reopen representation cases, in effect, by asserting the rights of employees
who either have chosen not to assert their rights or have been
unsuccessful in doing so. In the unfair labor practice proceeding, the employer will be able to contest the inclusion of managers, supervisors, confidential employees, or guards in the
unit. It will also be able to argue that the contours of the unit
limit its ability to reach agreement with the union. But the employer will not otherwise be able to challenge the representative status of the union or the appropriateness of the unit so
long as an election has been conducted. Permitting employers
to assert only their own rights is consistent with the Due Pro49°
cess Clause.
Opponents of the proposed reform also might raise an equitable objection to the exclusion of employers from representation proceedings. According to this line of argument,
employers should be entitled to participate as proxies for individual employees who oppose union representation but cannot
effectively protect their interest. This argument founders for
two reasons. First, even accepting the proposition that the direct cost of litigation justifies an exception to ordinary standing
requirements, 49 ' employers are not appropriate parties to rep489. lda; cf. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193 n.11 (1984) (accepting the
concession that the failure to follow existing state procedures was not a federal due process violation). ARA Services involved a challenge to the Board's
practice of declining to hold hearings on challenges or objections that it finds
do not raise "substantial and material factual issues." 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d)
(1992). The courts have almost uniformly upheld this practice, although some
courts have suggested in dicta, contrary to ARA Services, that a hearing is constitutionally mandated if substantial and material issues are raised. See, e.g.,

NLRB v. Claxton Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1980).

490. Moreover, even if employers have some constitutional right to be
heard in representation proceedings, they do not have a constitutional right to
be parties to such proceedings with all the accompanying prerogatives. Given

the limited legal effect of certification on employers, a much more limited
form of hearing would be consistent with the Due Process Clause and the proposed reforms.
491. Federal courts' prudential limits on third-party standing, for example,
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resent anti-union employees because of likely conflicts of interest.492 Suppose, for example, that certain employees oppose
representation and therefore wish to be excluded from a bargaining unit, perhaps because they are supervisors. Their employer, whose principal objective is to defeat the union, may
argue in a representation proceeding that these employees
should be included in the unit in order to increase the "no"
vote. Employers' interests thus may conflict with even those of
493
avowedly anti-union employees.
The employer-as-proxy argument contains an even more
fundamental problem. It is premised on the proposition that
individual employees lack the resources either to express or to
protect their own interests. Yet, the conclusion that follows is
that employers should have standing in the representation proceeding in order to prevent employees from gaining union representation. Paradoxically, then, the proxy argument turns
employees' lack of effective legal capacity into a rationale for
perpetuating their disenfranchisement in the workplace. The
problem runs deeper than paradox, however. At bottom, the
proxy argument suggests that employers-whose authority is
inscribed in the employment relation and whose interests the
law presumes to be in conflict with their employees'-should
stand as their employees' representatives. The law, however,
has long maintained a wall between employers and the repre494
sentation of their employees by prohibiting company unions.
That wall must extend to representation proceedings. Neither
the constitutional nor the equitable argument suggests that employers should continue to enjoy party status in such
proceedings.
require some special obstacle to the third party's ability to assert his or her
own rights. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 455 (1958) (allowing
third-party association to assert standing on behalf of its members on the
grounds that to require the individual members to assert their own right to
anonymity would nullify the right).
492. This proposition might lead to the conclusion that the Board should
take a more active role in investigating challenges and objections, particularly
when they are filed by individual employees. The Board already conducts an
ex parte investigation to determine whether objections raise questions of fact.
See NLRB, supra note 91, § 11394. The Board also characterizes representation cases as investigations rather than adversary proceedings. Id For the
Board to play an independent investigatory role in order to compensate for the
lack of resources of individual employees would not be inconsistent with the
proposed reforms.
493. Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-16 (1976) (conflict of interest
is grounds for denying third-party standing).

494. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
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A constitutional objection might also be made to the proposal that employers be denied the rights of candidates. They
may argue that such a measure would infringe on employers'
right to free speech. Yet the new rules would actually restrict
employer speech less than the current rules. No absolute
prohibitions, such as the locus, home visit, and twenty-four
hour rules, would exist. Employers would be free to speak anywhere, at any time, so long as listening was not explicitly or implicitly a condition of employment. Captive audience speeches
would be grounds for setting aside an election, but such a prohibition clearly squares with the First Amendment. 495 As the
Board recognized in Clark Bros., there would be no restriction
on speech, merely a ban on the threat of discipline for declining
to listen to the speech. 496
495. "The First Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive
speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable
speech." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988); see also Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (advertisements in municipal bus system on
"captive audience" grounds); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) (upholding ban on sound trucks, noting that the "unwilling listener is not like the
passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to
take it"). As Marcy Strauss points out in Redefining the Captive Audience
Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85 (1991), captivity is a question of degree.

"[W]e are virtually never captive, because there is almost always something we
can do to avoid exposure.... The question is, how great a burden would be
imposed on the unwilling listener to avoid the message in order to protect
someone's right to speak?" Id. at 89. Leaving a job to avoid being captive to
anti-union speech is a substantial burden-heavier, for example, than forgoing
public transportation to avoid being subjected to political advertising.
496. 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 804-05 (1946), enforced as modified, 163 F.2d 373 (2d
Cir. 1947). Employers will argue that a rule that prevents them from paying
employees to listen to their speech and from firing employees if they refuse to
listen is the same kind of restriction on speech as the restrictions on expenditure that the Supreme Court struck down in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976). But as the Court noted in Buckley, "Some forms of communication
made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some
involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two." Id at
16. Terminating an employee for refusing to listen to a campaign speech is
"conduct primarily."
Two arguments in addition to those relying on the captive audience doctrine and the speech-conduct distinction can be made in support of the proposed restrictions on employer speech. First, the question whether employer
speech urging employees to continue to bargain as individuals is commercial
speech, subject to greater regulation, might be revisited. Cf. Board of Trustees
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (describing limited protection of commercial
speech). Although the Supreme Court rejected this argument in Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1945), since then labor speech has been routinely
treated as commercial speech subject to virtually plenary regulation. See
Cynthia Estlund, Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 942-47 (1982);
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It is but a short step to the realization that all employer
speech to employees during working hours, at the workplace, is
speech to a captive audience. Chief Justice Warren so recognized in his separate opinion in Steelworkers,497 as have other
courts and commentators. 498 The rule proposed here is on at
least as firm footing constitutionally as the prohibition in Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act of verbal racial and sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environment. 499 Indeed,
see also Mark D. Schneider, Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First
Amendmen4 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1484-88 (1982) (criticizing regulation of
picketing as commercial speech). But see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (finding that a prohibition of union handbills urging a consumer boycott of a mall
would pose a serious First Amendment question).
A second argument may adopt the rationale recently articulated in Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), in which the Court
upheld a ban on use of corporate funds to make independent expenditures in
support of candidates for state office. The Court reasoned that corporations
may "use 'resources amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace."' Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)). The Court explained in
Austin that use of corporate treasuries to fund political causes is "unfair" because the size of corporations' treasuries in no way reflects public support for
their political agendas and the availability of large sums of money may lend a
corporation political influence that is "'no reflection of the power of its
ideas.' "Id. (quoting MassachusettsCitizens, 479 U.S. at 258). Employers' ownership of the workplace similarly does not reflect support for their views about
unions, but it does yield employers influence beyond the persuasiveness of
their position.
497. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357, 368 (1957)
(Warren, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
498. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1535 (N.D. Fla. 1991) (observing that "female workers.., are a captive audience in relation to the speech that comprises the hostile work environment");
J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
FirstAmendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 ("Few audiences are more captive
than the average worker.")
499. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supreme Court held that such
non-quidpro quo sexual harassment violates the Act. Id. at 66-67. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines make it clear that such
harassment may be "verbal or physical." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992). For a
defense of the constitutionality of these restrictions on workplace speech, see
generally Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions
About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171, 197 (1990) and
Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1990). These scholars offer a number of doctrinal justifications for restrictions on harassing speech. Robert Post offers a justification that closely parallels the nonconstitutional argument of this Article. He argues that
even if the first amendment were to immunize from legal regulation
the circulation of certain racist ideas in newspapers, it would not follow that the expression of those same ideas could not be restrained by
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the proposed rule would not prohibit employers' campaign
speech in the workplace, despite the implicit threat of discipline for not listening. The rule would merely prevent employers from gaining unfair advantage through such speech by
requiring them to provide others with an equal opportunity to
campaign at work. Neither depriving employers of party status
nor denying them the rights of candidates in union elections
would violate the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
A quarter of a century before the passage of the Wagner
Act, the legal scholar Roscoe Pound published a devastating critique of contemporary labor law in the Yale Law Journal.500 In
this now classic essay, Pound attacked the "fallacy" of the doctrine of "Liberty of Contract" as propounded in the leading
cases of his day.50 ' "[Tihe decisions... are so academic and so
artificial," he wrote, so at odds "with actual industrial conditions.' ' 5° 2 Pound bluntly asked, "[W]hy [is] the legal conception
of the relation of employer and employee[s] so at variance with
the common knowledge of mankind?" 50 3 Why do the courts, he
asked, hold to "an academic theory of equality in the face of
practical conditions of inequality?" 5°4 These same judicial decithe government within the workplace, where an image of dialogue
among autonomous self-governing citizens would be patently out of
place.
Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the FirstAmendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 267, 289 (1991). Post elaborates,
[S]peech that is appropriately protected when it occurs within public
discourse is also appropriately regulated as racial or sexual harassment when it occurs within the context of the employment relationship. This is true because there are good reasons for the law to regard
persons as autonomous within the context of political deliberation,
but there are equally good reasons for the law to regard persons as
dependent within the work-place.
Robert Post, The Perilsof Conceptualism A Response to ProfessorFallon, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1744, 1746 (1990). No court has seriously questioned the constitutionality of Title Vii's restrictions on harassing speech, although a few commentators have. See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: HostileEnvironment Harrassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481,
544-45 (1991) (arguing that verbal elements of harassment are protected); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,39 UCLA L.
REV. 1791, 1846 (1992) (arguing that "undirected" harassing speech is
protected).
500. Pound, supra note 123.
501. Id- at 454.
502. Id. at 454, 487.
503. Id. at 454.
504. Id.
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sions provided the target for Wagner's opening statement in
Congress on behalf of the right to labor representation. 5 5 Today, however, a half-century after that right was enacted into
law, the legal conception of labor relations is no less at variance
with the conditions of the workplace than when Pound wrote.
In the spirit of Pound, who inquired into the "potent
causes" of the courts' doctrinal fallacies, 50 6 this Article has explored the theoretical and political sources of the incoherence
of contemporary labor law. It has traced such incoherence to
the original metaphor of industrial democracy that legitimated
the Wagner Act and that later framed the designation of the
union election as the exclusive instrument for exercising the
right to labor representation. In itself, as a method of deciding
the question of labor representation, the election is hardly the
nub of the problem. Rather, this Article has argued that the
right to representation has been subverted by lawmakers' interpretation of industrial democracy in terms of an analogy between political and union elections-an analogy that suggests a
theory of the union election as a contest between union and
employer.
Earlier in the century, it was possible for scholars such as
Pound to foresee surmounting the incoherence of judicial regulation of labor relations-to prophesy that "the hope for future
labor legislation .... is bright."50 7 Yet it is difficult to be sanguine today about the prospects of the reforms proposed here.
They are likely to be challenged from divergent perspectives.
On the one hand, they might be said to turn an adversary proceeding into an ex lparte one and to encroach on employers' liberty of speech and rights to property. On the other hand, they,
like the Wagner Act itself, might be said to provide only a feeble hedge against employers' economic authority. The right to
self-organization, labor representation, and collective bargaining inevitably entails limits on employers' legal and economic
prerogatives, however, and the proposed reforms would simply
give effect to existing guarantees. In so doing, the reforms
would buttress the legal apparatus that is indispensable to labor's ability to organize collectively and gain some voice in
workplace governance.
The Wagner Act seemed to fulfill the hope that relations in
505. See 79 CONG. REC. 7566-67 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprintedin 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2325.
506. Pound, supra note 123, at 455.

507. Id.

1993]

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE

603

the workplace would be reconciled with ideals of freedom. Yet
the regime of industrial democracy the Act substituted for liberty of contract has not reordered the employment relationship. Instead, it has reinscribed the inequality between
employer and employed. The law of the workplace has been
translated from the language of the market into the language
of politics, but still it elides the undemocratic authority the
Wagner Act was designed to eliminate. One thing therefore is
certain. So long as the law construes employers and unions as
equals in union elections, industrial democracy will remain as
much a legal fiction as liberty of contract.

